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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
It із generally recognized that the specifically 
social expressions of Intelligence, or the exer-
size of what is often called "social intelligence", 
depend upon the given individual's ability to take 
the rSles of, or "put himself in the place of", 
the other individuals implicated with him in given 
social situationsι and upon his consequent sensiv-
ity to their attitudes toward himself and toward 
one another. ... this putting of one's self in the 
place of others, this talcing by one's self of their 
rBles or attitudes, is not merely one of the vari­
ous aspects or expressions of intelligence or of 
Intelligent behavior, but is the very essence of 
its character (Mead, 1934, p. 141). 
1.1 Social cognition 
Only the last two decades the developoent of social cognition has 
become a topic for empirical investigation. This does not mean that 
social cognition and social behavior have not been explored prior to 
this period. To the contrary. Theoretical developments in psycho­
analytic, personality, and social psychology show the construct of 
social cognition often to be vehemently discussed (cf. MOnJcs, 1978; 
Shantz, 1975). Social cognition, however, is then defined in terms 
of social perception and deals with "the organization of information 
about persons and the attribution of properties to them ... (and) 
refers to a set of processes that intervene between the presentation 
of information about a person and awareness of him" (Jaspers, 1966, 
pp. 7-8; the insertion is mine). 
One of the most important develofments during the early sixties was 
the placing of the construct of social cognition in a developmental 
perspective, often in direct relation to Piaget's structural develop­
mental theory (Monks, 1978). "Thus, the recent work in social cogni­
tive development has been in large measure an extension of the study 
of cognitive developaent in logical problem solving" (Shantz, 1975, 
p. 259). In addition, during this period, the content of social 
cognition changed to the knowledge we have about ourselves and other 
human beings as acting and Interacting individuals. Social cognitive 
development then pertains to the development of knowledge concerning 
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"humans and human affairs" (Flavell, 1977, p. 118), and to the develop­
ment of the abilities or operations required to process and apply this 
knowledge during interactions with other people. It refers to cogni­
tions regarding the self, others, interpersonal relationships, and 
social organizations in general. 
Tagiuri (1969) offers a detailed list of events toward which social 
cognition and its processing abilities direct themselves: 
The observations or inferences we make are princi­
pally about intentions, attitudes, motions, ideas, 
abilities, purposes, traits, thoughts, perceptions, 
memories. -events that axe inside the person and 
strictly psychological. Similarly, we attend to 
certain psychological qualities of reletionships 
between persons, such as friendship, love, power, 
and influence. We attribute to a person properties 
of аопаеіоивпввв and self-datemirurtion, and the 
capacity for représentation of hie emiirorvrtent, 
which in turn mediates his actions (p. 396). 
Social cognition can be assumed to direct oux perceptions and under-
standing of ourselves and others, and to guide our judgments about 
others and relations between than. The social cognitive processing 
abilities or operations then enable us to integrate information we 
have obtained about others and to elaborate the quantity and quality 
of the information when thus required by the situation. 
The above emphasizes the knowledge we possess with regard to the 
inner, psychological processes of ourselves and other persons. 
Knowledge about, what we will call, the subjective, or social perspec-
tive of another person which can be specified to separate contents 
like emotions, perceptions, intentions, and concepts (e.g. the emotio-
nal, perceptual or visual, intentional, and conceptual perspectives). 
It also emphasizes the abilities to infer the particular subjective 
perspectives, that is the ability to determine what the perspective 
looks like. The latter inferential ability is often referred to as 
role-, or perspective-taking, that is, to the ability to place oneself 
in the position of the other person, or to take his perspective to-
wards an event. 
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1.2 Knowledge about social perspectives 
The major body of literature concerning social cognitive development 
deals with the development of knowledge about social perspectives. 
Flavell (1977) very adequately distinguishes a number of general pre-
conditions necessary in order to carry out successfully any act. of 
social thinking. Of greatest relevance for the present discussion are 
the preconditions "Existence" and "Inference". Existence refers to the 
fundamental insight that inner, psychological processes, like thoughts 
and emotions, are basic characteristics of human beings. This know-
ledge extents itself to the relation between particular inner proces-
ses and particular situations as well as to the mutual Interdependence 
of two or more subjective perspectives of two, or more interacting 
Individuals. About the development of Existence type knowledge quite 
some data are available which will be discussed in the next section. 
However, with regard to the developaent of the Inferential abilities, 
that is the process of perspective-taking by which we infer the nature 
of the perspective of another person, very little is known. As 
Flavell (1977) puts it: "It is the development of a wide variety of 
cognitive skills (Inference) - still largely unknown - with which to 
take these readings" (i.e. the observable features of a behavior or 
expression) (p. 122). 
1.3 The development of perspective-taking 
The subdivision of the social perspective in content specific perspec-
tives is solely based on pragmatic reasons. In everyday situations 
our subjective perspectives will consist of a combination of at least 
the four content specific perspectives mentioned in section 1.1. 
Experimentally, however. Instruments were developed which emphasized 
either one of the above types of perspectives resulting in large 
quantities of literature concerning the development of either visual, 
or perceptual perspective-taking, emotional, or affective perspective-
taking, conceptual perspective-taking, or intentional perspective-
taking. It is beyond the scope of the present introduction to discuss 
the above studies in detail. Excellent reviews are available by 
Chandler (1977), Flavell (1977), and Shantz (1975). The majority of 
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studies indicate that there are distinct developmental levels on which 
children function in their handling of social perspectives. These 
levels are most clearly described by Salman and Byrne (1974) who 
distinguish at least six major stages, or develqpaentally more pro-
gressive levels of conceptualization concerning thoughts. The six 
stages were found to emerge in a fixed order between the ages of about 
4 years and social cognitive maturity. For the present purpose only 
the three first stages will be discussed In detail. The first level, 
-egocentric role-taking (level 0), is characterized by the child's 
unawareness of the existence of subjective perspectives. Bis beliefs 
about the external world are "general beliefs" without the recognition 
that these beliefs are his subjective beliefs. Although, he acknow-
ledges the existence of other human beings as separate entities fron 
himself he does not yet assign to then or to himself the ability of 
thinking, judging and evaluating, and is subsequently not aware that 
people act on basis of these evaluations. "In his mind there is only 
the reality, there are no personal constructions or Interpretations 
of reality" (Flavall, 1977, p. 132). In other words, the child is not 
yet able to differentiate between perspectives. 
At the next level (level 1) of subjective role-taking, the child is 
able to differentiate between perspectives. He now understands that 
people possess individual social perspectives. "He recognizes that 
different people may have different thoughts and attitudes about 
things - even about the very sane things - based upon the information 
available to them, their individual motives and goals, and so on" 
(Flavell, 1977, p. 132). 
At the next higher stage of self-reflective role-taking (level 2) the 
child becomes aware that besides possessing individual perspectives 
people are able to infer the perspectives of others. At first this 
will occur non-outually, that is the child represents one person in-
fering the perspective of another person, or realizes that he himself 
is able to infer the perspective, e.g. thoughts, intents, percepts, 
and motives of another person. Later during this stage the child 
becomes aware that his own perspective can be object of another per-
son's inferential activities which in turn influences his ovni inferen-
tial processes with regard to the perspective of the other. The child 
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then is aware of the mutuality between perspectives and thus becomes 
able to mutually take the perspective of the other person. The latter 
type of perspective-taking is best characterized by the linguistic 
structure: "I think that (he thinks that (I think that ...))" (DaVries, 
1970) Miller, Kessel, and Flavell, 1970). 
The successive levels 3, 4, and S of the development of cognitions 
about social perspectives deal with progressively more abstract and 
general conceptions of social perspectives (i.e. "the generalized 
other". Head, 1934). These levels were found to appear only from the 
age of approximately 10-12 years and lay as such beyond the age range 
under consideration. 
1.4 A theoretical and empirical elaboration 
The above description of developmental stages in the conceptualization 
of social perspectives characterizes levels of knowledge with regard 
to the existence of, and relations between social perspectives. The 
successive developaents from one stage (n) to the next higher stage 
(n + 1) occur by means of the classical Piagetian cognitive activities 
of assimilation and acccmodation which are instigated by conflicts 
between the expectancies of the child and the real events in his envi-
ronment. Aesimilation then refers to the inclusion of new events in 
the existing cognitive structure without changing the latter, while 
accomodation stands for the reconstruction, to a higher level of cog-
nitive conplexity, of the existing structure in order to include events 
which could not be handled by the assimilation operation. 
Such a descriptive analysis of the development of social cognition, 
however, gives us no insight into the actual processes of perspective-
differentiation and perspective-taking, and to the cognitive variables 
and operations related to these abilities. The theoretical and empi-
rical studies presented in the next chapters try to deal with this 
issue. 
Prior to a short introduction of each chapter it is necessary to note 
that the presented studies were carried out over a time period of 
three years. In other words, the studies represent also a development 
in thinking and theorizing about social cognition which led, over time, 
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to changes 1л emphasis on concepts and relations between them. The 
ordering of the studies in the present monograph, however, is not 
chronological. For the ease of the reader the theoretical studies 
are presented first, although, approximately two years lay in between 
their successive appearances. 
The first of these studies, in chapter 2, represents a first attonpt 
to regard the processing abilities of social perspectives as being 
more than mare descriptive stages of development of knowledge about 
social perspectives. Quite a number of research proposals are offered 
in this chapter which will not be further discussed in the next chap­
ters. The reasons for this inconsistency lay to a large measure in 
changing interests and theoretical developments. The model presented 
in this chapter, however, is further elaborated in the theoretical 
study reported in chapter 3. This study encompasses, in a summarized 
form, most empirical studies that are reported in chapters 4 to 7, 
which testifies of the time interval between the first, and the second 
theoretical studies. The previously called "information-processing 
modal" (see chapter 2) became a "cognitive model" (see chapter 3) and 
detailed hypotheses with regard to the relations between a limited 
number of cognitive variables and the processing abilities of social 
perspectives are offered. The change In title from an "information-
processing model" to a "cognitive model" is based on the absence of 
stringent conditional and sequential relationships between the succes­
sive steps in the processing of social perspectives as proposed in this 
model. The model then has to be regarded as a working hypothesis, a 
frame of reference for research by which an attempt is made to restrict 
its scope to a manageable size. So are the subsequent models or 
schönes, presented in chapter 3, which specify relations between seve-
ral cognitive variables and the processing abilities of social pers-
pectives. Every relation indicated in these schemes is hypothetical 
and of no other nature than being mutually affective ones. Only 
empirical research will enable the determination of the exact nature 
of the relationships. 
In chapter 4 an empirical study is reported dealing with the develop-
ment of visual position-taking In comparison to visual perspective-
talcing, and the relation between the former and the development of 
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mental imagery, in fact, this study occupies the first place in 
chronological order of all the presented studies. Nevertheless, as 
result of changes in priorities of research topics, the analyses of 
the data of this experiment were only very recently carried out. 
Earlier, and unfortunately less carefully conducted analyses resulted 
in conclusions which are not backed by the data. Consequently, the 
results of this study reported, in summary, in chapter 3 do not 
correspond with the real results, obtained after additional analyses, 
which are reported in chapter 4. 
One of the abilities hypothesized to affect the processing of social 
perspectives was thought to be the ability to conceptualize and 
verbalize the thoughts of other people, that is, the ability of recur­
sive thinking. A number of studies exploring the developnent of this 
ability are reported in chapter 5. In chapter 7 the relation between 
the ability of recursive thinking and perspective-taking, in particu­
lar, is investigated and reported. As this relation was studied among 
others by the training of recursive thinking and the assesanent of its 
effects on an emotional, and conceptual perspective-taking task, the 
usefulness and validity of the Instrument for emotional perspective-
taking had to be determined. In chapter 6 a validation study of the 
emotional perspective-taking task is reported. The validity of the 
conceptual perspective-taking task was carried out separately by 
Vfiggers (Note 1 ) . 
In chapter θ the presented research and theory is discussed and pro­
posals for additional studies are offered. Because the field of 
research in social cognitive development is expanding itself both in 
depth and width it will be obvious that the presented studies can only 
be viewed as an initial attempt to attain a greater understanding of 
social cognitive development. 
In chapter 9 an example of the present developments in theorizing 
about social cognitive developnent and its relation to social behavior 
is represented by an additional theoretical study which has the status 
of being very hypothetical and incomplete. 
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2. SPECIFICATION OP THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSPECTIVE-COOR-
DINATION AND THE STIMULATION OF SOCIAL COGNITION l) 
2.1 Introduction 
Theories regarding the ability of role-taking or perspective-coordina-
tion as the central mechanism for the development of social cognition 
and social behaviour (Mead, 1956) assume the stimulation of social de-
velopment to be best achieved by stimulating perspective-coordination 
development. Perspective-coordination in the above general sense is 
used to refer to the whole process consisting of the seperate abilities 
to differentiate between perspectives> to determine, i.e. to take the 
perspective of another person, and to coordinate the perspectives of 
the others and/or self. The latter ability, -the ability to coordina-
te perspectives, is referred to as perspective-coordination in a more 
specific sense. 
To promote the developnent of perspective-coordination, two major sti-
mulatory techniques are available. The first, aiming at the induction 
of cognitive, or social cognitive developmental progress, makes use of 
the conflict model. This model assumes that if a child is brought ulto 
a situation which will cause a state of disequilibrium between his 
internal developmental structure (i.e. his expectancies, mode of acting, 
solutions, etc.) and perceived structure of the environment, disequi-
librium may lead to a reorganization of the developmental structure 
with the aim of restoring equilibrium. The reorganization is assumed 
to be progressive from the existing developmental level (n) to the 
following level (n + 1). 
The second technique does not in the first place aim at the progress 
in terms of acceleration but at the stimulation of those operations 
or cognitive abilities underlying perspective-coordination. Stimula-
tion of these operations is thought to lead to a generalization or 
broadening of perspective-coordination abilities over a diversity of 
1) In C.F.M. van Lieshout and D.J. Ingram (Eds.), Stimulation of so-
cial development in school. Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets and 
Zeitlinger, 1977. 
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contents, e.g. aootlone, intentions, percepts and concepts. As a by­
product this type of stimulation may also lead to a developmental pro­
gression. 
The stimulation techniques mentioned require a developmental model for 
information processing and a detailed specification of the developmen­
tal stages of perspective-coordination. 
2.2 Conflict Induction 
The rationale behind this type of training is to provide the child 
with a situation which causes either an expectancy-outcome conflict, 
or a structural mixture conflict. By the latter is meant an internal 
organizational disequilibrium while the foimaer refers to an external, 
adaptional disequilibrium (Strauss, 1972, p. 333). 
Regardless of the type of conflict induced, both require that they can 
be solved at one level above the present structural-developmental 
level, i.e. they are most affective if the conflicting information can 
be integrated using reasoning typical for level η + 1. This is an 
important condition as it carries implications for first, the specifi­
city of the theory, that is to what detail the η + 1 levels are speci­
fied and defined; second, the sensivity of the measuring-instruments 
that will assess the developmental levels; and third, the practical 
applicability and realizability of a stimulation programe in the 
school based on this theoretical starting-point. 
Directly related to these implications are findings imiicatlng that 
the effect of any conflict induction training is limited and depends 
to a great extent on the precise assessment of the developmental stage 
a child is at within the developmental level (Kuhn, 1972; Kuhn and 
Angelev, 1976; Strauss, 1972; Turisi, 1973). Each stage can be divi­
ded into subatages of consolidation and transition. It seems that 
training at the η + 1 level leads to a structural developmental reor­
ganization, with some stability over time, only if a child is transi­
tional, i.e. already reorganizing the existing developmental structure 
into a new developmental structure. A child at the consolidation 
stage of a newly acquired developmental structure will not benefit at 
all from such a training (Turiel, 1973, p. 747). 
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The above implies that for each child in a school class it will be 
necessary to determina at which developmental (sub)stage he is and 
whether he is just consolidating this stage or already transitional to 
the next higher stage. Evan if the latter assesanent could be carried 
out, it will have to lead to the condition, difficult to implement, 
where classes are split into smaller groups of children with identical 
levels. These smaller groups will then have to be presented with 
conflict-inducing situations at the respective η levels in order to 
assist consolidation, or η + 1 levels in order to accelerate transi­
tion. 
To sumarize, a number of studies have provided evidence (cf. Strauss, 
1972) that the induction of (social) cognitive development can be 
achieved, on a very limited scale by conflict procedures at the η + 1 
structural developmental level. Consequently, the use of this trai­
ning technique without splitting classes into smaller groups with 
identical developmental levels will have an effect only for a small 
number of children in the class. 
2.3 Operation training 
This approach does not so much aim at structural reorganization as at 
the increase of effectiveness, accuracy and generalizability of the 
abilities and operations underlying perspective-coordination develop­
ment. In part, this type of training will have to consist of concept-
development In terms of psychological (social) causality (cf. Oppen­
heimer, 1976), which is about how and why people act and react in cer­
tain ways (Flavell, 1974). Second there will have to be training in, 
for instance, the development of recursive thinking, - the ability to 
think about the thoughts of another person, which seems a basic abili­
ty underlying the accuracy of the product of perspective-taking; trai­
ning in the development of reciprocity, that is the ability to process 
feedback from the (re)actions of another person during an interaction, 
which seems a basic ability underlying perspective-coordination in its 
specific sense; and other variables which may constitute the process 
of perspective coordination. In addition, there will have to be trai­
ning of the more general operations: perspective-determination, and 
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perspective-coordination in order to enlarge their application areas. 
Finally, this training will have to include presentation of as many 
situations as possible in which children can exercise the acquired abi­
lities. The point of departure for this type of training is the as­
sumption that "the process of developmental advance is self-constructed 
and self-regulated" (Turiel, 1973, p. 732). Children thus need to be 
provided with problem environments which enable them "to exercise their 
existing cognitive strategies and in so doing reorganize them into more 
advanced structures" (Kuhn and Angelev, 1976, p. 70S). 
Both types of training, - conflict induction and operation training, 
require a detailed description of perspective-coordination development. 
The latter operation training requires an information-processing model 
that will give insight into which basic operations or abilities are 
related to perspective-coordination development and which constitute 
the all-round abilities within this development. The former conflict 
Induction training requires a detailed description of developmental 
stages to enable specification of the η + 1 levels and the specifica­
tion of educational objectives for the development of a curriculum for 
the stimulation of social development (cf. Gerris, 1977, p. 165). 
In the next section first an information-processing model for perspec­
tive-coordination development as described above will be presented; 
next an attempt to describe the development of perspective-coordination 
will be discussed; and finally, an analysis of several perspective-
taking tasks along variables derived from the presented model and Im­
plications for the development of a curriculum will be presented. 
2.4 A model for perspective-coordination development 
Selman (1975; Selman and Byrne, 1974) postulated four levels of pers­
pective-coordination development between the ages of 4 and 12 years. 
At the first level (level 0), called "egocentric role-taking", the 
child does not differentiate points of view. He is not yet aware that 
another person possesses a perspective different from his own. Level 
1, which is called "subjective role-taking", represents the ability to 
differentiate, that is the child realizes that another person has a 
perspective different from that of himself. However, the child is not 
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yet able to determine what that perspective looks like. At. the next 
level (level 2), - "self-reflective role-taking", the child Is able to 
Infer the perspective of another person, though not mutually. He un­
derstands that he himself can be object of the other person's thoughts 
and viae versa, but he Is not able to Incorporate this relationship in 
the inference. At the level of "mutual role-taking" (level 3) he is 
able to do so. He can now put himself In the position of a third per­
son and "consider the relationships involved". For a more detailed 
description of this model I would like to refer to Van Lieshout's ar­
ticle, elsewhere In the present volume (i.e. Van Lieshout, 1977). 
A first attempt to introduce other than structural developmental abi­
lities was carried out by Flavell (1974; 1977) . He proposes a general 
Information processing model in which four abilities necessary for 
making inferences about the perspective of the other person are repre­
sented in the following sequence. The first component of his model, 
- "the existence component", represents the awareness that there is 
such a thing as a perspective and that the other person may possess a 
perspective different from one's own. The realization that seme goal-
directed behaviour requires inferential processes regarding the pers­
pective of the other person is represented by the second component, 
the "need component". The "inference component" refers to the actual 
mental activity that leads to the construction of a representation of 
the other person's perspective (i.e. the process of perspective-taking), 
while the coordination of the found perspective with one's own perspec­
tive and the subsequent behaviour is referred to as the "application 
component". In short, this model represents, in addition to the abili­
ties to differentiate between perspectives (i.e. the existence compo­
nent) and to determine or take the perspective of another person (i.e. 
the inference cemponent) that is the structural-developmental model, 
also the important "need" and "application" components involved in any 
process of perspective-coordination. Furthermore, as each component 
develops and is sequentially ordered, the information sequence may 
also be regarded as "a description of the sequence of the development 
of role-taking" (Shantz, 1975, p. 267). 
Enright (1976) projected Flavell'з information-processing flows over 
each structural developmental level proposed by Selman. It was a first 
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attempt to integrate both Salman's and Flavell's model. With the 
aim to obtain a model for intervention by which the processing phases 
offered by Flavell "have the specified content of Salman'з system (i.e. 
interpersonal conceptions)" (Enrlght, 1976, p. 6Θ). The present model 
(Oppenheimer, 1977) is a second attempt to integrate both models with 
the addition of several of Enright's ideas (see Figure 1) into one in-
fozmation-processing and developmental model for perspective-coordina­
tion. In this model the interrelationships between information-proces­
sing and cognitive variables and perspective-coordination development 
are emphasized. 
The subroutines (see Figure 1) represent the abilities characterizing 
Selman's developmental levels, independent of age. As result level 0 
is characterized by the inability to differentiate between perspecti­
ves, while level 1 allows differentiation whereas perspective-taking 
(i.e. level 2: the ability to determine what the other person's pers­
pective is like) does not yet occur; subroutines 2 and 3 represent 
Selman's levels 2 and 3. Subroutine 4 does not stand for a developmen­
tal level, in Selman's sense, but it does represent the "application 
component" referred to by Flavell. It is the ability to coordinate 
the acquired representation of the other person's perspective (obtai­
ned frem either subroutine 2 or 3) with one's own perspective and to 
behave accordingly. 
The Œnphaais on information processing development is necessary to ex-
plain why, over age and independent of the content (e.g. emotions, in-
tentions, percepts, concepts, etc.), the result of perspective-taking 
(i.e. the representation obtained) becomes mors accurate (Flavell, 
1974: "accuracy"). In addition, there is evidence that the different 
information-processing modes required by the several contents, are at 
the basis of the absence of any relationship between the developmental 
sequences for each content (Kurdek and Rodgon, 1975). The detailed 
specification of information-processing variables related to the res-
pective contents and investigation of their developments may thus pro-
vide Invaluable information with regard to perspective-coordination 
development. 
To the right of each subroutine three axes are drawn in the flow dia-
gram. They represent the axes for content and for complexity within 
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each content which often will vary for each interaction situation. 
The latter term complexity refers, for instance, to the type of inter-
ΕΞΞΖ1 
Hate. S. - Subject 11 s. - Subject 2| рагвр - Persnectlve. 
Fig. 1 A model for the Integration of information processes du­
ring perspective-coordination activities and the development of 
perspective-coordination. 
action (i.e. subject(s) χ subject(s), subject(a) χ object(s), and ob-
ject(s) χ object(s) interactions), and to any other measurable charac­
teristic of an interaction (cf. Oppenheimer, 1976). The third and 
vertical axis could be regarded as the age dimension. However, this 
assumption is only valid if development of a subroutine for each con­
tent seperately, over the complexity dimension, is investigated. 
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Besides, the above developmental aspects, the model represents the act 
of perspective—coordination at any given mcoent. In order to coordina­
te, one has first to be able to differentiate between perspectives, 
that Is, to be aware that one's own perspective Is not Identical to 
that of another person (cf. Flavell, 1974: "existence")ι then one has 
to determine what the other person's perspective looks like (cf. Fla­
vell: "Inference"), and only then one will be able to take the other 
person's perspective correctly Into account In one's own perspective 
(I.e. perspective-coordination). 
In other words, the structural-davelopmental levels are also the neces­
sary, logical conditions In each Interaction situation in order that 
one may interact adequately. 
Thus the coordination of perspectives Is the essentxal process for suc­
cessful Interacting. It Is a continuous process, since there are mutu­
al influences and resulting changes In perspectives during an inter­
action, this being known as the reciprocity principle. (See the control 
feedback mechanism In Figure 1 ) . This process of continuous adaptation 
to new Information corresponds to Flavell's "maintenance", whereas 
perspective-coordination refers to his "application component". 
The "need component" postulated by Flavell is different and additional 
to motivation. That Is, even If a child realizes that another person 
possesses a different perspective from his own, he is not yet aware 
that to attain his goal he will have to Infer the other person's pers­
pective and to coordinate It with his own perspective (Flavell, 1974, 
pp. 75-7Θ). Motivation is present during the whole process of perspec­
tive-coordination and may determine at any moment during this process 
a halt or continuation of the information flow: need, however, Is the 
activator of the Inference, and subsequent application stages, that Is 
no Inference will take place, even If a child Is motivated to. If no 
need to do so Is perceived. 
From the present model a number of variables were derived which func­
tioned as criteria to analyse several perspective-taking tasks. Befo­
rehand, an analysis of several studies resulting In a more detailed 
sequence of development from the Inability to the ability to differen­
tiate between perspectives will be presented. 
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2.5 Perspective-coordination development: A first analy-
sis 
For social p«rspective-taklng< Selman (1975; Selman and Byrne, 1974) 
postulates approximately two years of development between the first 
two developmental levels (i.e. level 0: no differentiation between 
perspectives and level 1: differentiation between perspectives). How-
ever/ the structural developmental theory assumes development to be a 
continuous process, a "process of organization and adaptation" (Piaget, 
1950). Consequently, smaller and more subtle qualitative changes will 
occur during these approximately two years of development. 
On the basis of four studies by OeVries (1970), Plavell (1974), Salatas 
and Flavell (1976), and Selman (1971), and also son» additional hypo-
theses a fairly detailed sequential ordering of developmental steps. In 
terms of behavioural, observable characteristics, is possible. In 
order to enable the sequential ordering of developmental steps it was 
necessary to limit the number of studies to be analyzed to four. The 
resulting order of developmental steps Is represented in Table 1. A 
clear distinction has been made between behavioural perspectives in 
which no cognitions are involved and covert, psychological perspectives 
in which besides behavioural characteristics the inner, covert proces-
ses play a dominant role. As result, stage 0-4: "differentiation be-
tween behavioural perspectives; no awareness of covert psychological 
perspectives" corresponds to level 0: "ego-centric role-taking" pro-
posed by Selman and Byrne (1974). The inability to differentiate be-
tween behavioural perspectives (stage 0-0) and the ability to do so 
without being aware of any covert psychological perspective (stage 0-4) 
were derived from DeVries's (1970) study on role-taking skills In a 
social guessing game. This study is of great importance as it contains 
behavioural as well as covert psychological perspective-taking. 
Additional stages assumed by DeVries are not represented because they 
coincide partly with those of Selman (1971; i.e. stages 0-4, 0-7, and 
1-0). Salatas and Flavell (1976) found that children made use of two 
rules. The first rule: "one position, then one unique perspective" 
(stage 0-8) negates the attribution of the own perspective to the 
other person (stage 0-7; Selman, 1971). A second rule: "different 
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positions, then different perspectives" (Salatas and Flavell, 1976, 
pp. 107-10Θ) constitutes the ability to differentiate between perspec­
tives (stage 1-0). The realization that another person possesses a 
Table 1. Proposed developmental steps between the inabili­
ty to differentiate between behavioural perspectives and the 
ability to differentiate between covert, psychological pers­
pectives. 
Stages 
0-0 no differentiat ion between behavioural perspectives 
0-1 awareness of own behavioural perspective 
0-2 awareness of the behavioural perspective of the other person, i.e. 
sense of the other 
0-3 attribution of own behavioural perspective to the other person 
0-4 differentiation between behavioural perspectives, no awareness of 
covert, psychological perspectives 
0-5 awareness of own psychological perspective 
0-6 awareness of psychological perspective of the other person 
0-7 attribution of the owi perspective to the other person 
0-Θ awareness of one position - one unique perspective 
1-0 differentiation between psychological perspectives, no a b i l i t y to 
take perspective. 
Note: Stage ( M corresponds to level 0 proposed by Selaan and Byrne 
(1974), while stage MJ corresponds to level 1. 
perspective (stage 0-6) was taken from F l a v e l l (1974). 
Of course the sequence was constructed on the b a s i s of overlap in the 
several sequences avai lab le . The "awareness of own psychological per­
spect ives" (stage 0-5) was hypothesized by the present author. I t may 
be argued that prior to becoming aware of the perspective ( i . e . 
thoughts, emotions, or whatever) of the other person, the chi ld w i l l 
f i r s t have to be aware of these covert, inner f e e l i n g s within himself. 
(For an a l ternat ive descript ion of t h i s development see Van Lieshout, 
in the present volume, ρ. 24; i . e . Van Lieshout, 1977). 
Between the Inab i l i ty t o d i f ferent ia te between behavioural perspect i-
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vea (stage 0-0) and the ability to do so (stage 0-4), three further 
stages were postulated of which stage 0-2: "awareness of the behavi-
oural perspective of the other person, i.e. sense of the other" corres-
ponds to SeIman'9 (1971) level A: "the child may have a sense of the 
other ..." (p. 1733). The awareness of one's own behaviour (I.e. be-
havioural perspective) and the attribution of the own behavioural pers-
pective to the other person (stages 0-1 and 0-3, respectively) are the 
result of a projection of the stages of the psychological level, to the 
behavioural level of perspective-taking. 
As result a sequence of nine developmental steps could be formed. To 
prevent misunderstanding it has to be noted here that these steps do 
not have the pretention of being a conditional and logical prerequisi-
te. The proposed sequence is hypothetical and still in need of empi-
rical confirmation. The only purpose of this analysis is to show that 
on the basis of the literature available, we can Infer developaental 
phenomena and behaviours, which may serve as a guideline for the spe-
cification of educational objectives (cf. Gerris, 1977; 1976). 
2.6 Perspective-coordination development: a second ana-
lysis 
One of the alms of the Information processing model in figure 1 is to 
represent the interrelations between a number of variables which con-
stitute and/or affect the process of perspective-coordination. Four 
broad categories of variables were taken from the model: information-
processing, cognitive, developmental, and situational variables (see 
Table 2, in the left-hand column) , which were subdivided into more 
specific variables on the basis of the literature. For instance, the 
content of a perspective-taking task (e.g. perceptual or conceptual) 
is assumed to put demands on different information-processing modes 
(e.g. visual or verbal, respectively). An often used argument against 
the validity of several perspective-taking tasks is that they measure 
memory-capacity, temporal integration or other information-processing 
abilities instead of the perspective-taking ability. For this reason 
the variables memory and temporal integration were included. Similar-
ly, arguments and reasons can be given for the use of each variable 
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shown In the left-hand column of Table 2. The resulting 13 variables 
were used to analyse eight tasks measuring perspective-taking develop­
ment. 
Table 2. The analysis of two tasks along the criteria derived 
from the information-processing model. 
1. 
г. 
Information-processing 
variables: 
*. aode 
с concrete-abstract 
features 
4. t » p o r a l Integration 
Related cognitive 
a b i l i t i e s . 
a. reciprocity concept 
b. level of recursive 
thinking 
Tasks 
Urberg and Oocherty, 
1976: 
task IV 
verbal 
yes 
concrete features 
no 
no 
contiguity 
Analyzed 
Layton. 1975 
verbal 
yes 
concrete features 
no 
no 
contiguity 
3. Developaental level of 
the sub-routines 
non-mutual perspective non-mutual perspective 
taking taking 
4. Situational variables: 
niaber of subjects 
type of Interaction 
type of response 
role of the subject 
Information about 
the situation 
2 
S it 0 
verbal 
active participant 
yes 
S χ 0 
verbal 
observer 
yes 
Analysis of perspective-taking tasks for different contents (e.g. emo­
tions, concepts, percepts, etc.) was thought to complicate the results 
unnecessarily. As a result only perspective-taking tasks for one con­
tent, -concepts, which did not require a higher, but also not a lower 
level than non-mutual perspective-taking development towards a solu­
tion, were considered. 
The analyses resulted in two groups of tasks with the most salient 
difference the role of the child. That is, the role as an observer of 
a social interaction or as an active participant) actively playing the 
role assigned to him. In the two remaining columns of Table 2 the 
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analyses of two tasks representative for the two groups are presented. 
Within each group differences are present between the tasks, but none 
was as discriminatory as the "role of the child" as can be seen in 
Figure 2. In this figure, the percentages of correct solutions over 
age for the eight conceptual perspective-taking tasks are represented. 
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Fig. 2 The percentage of correct solutions over age for eight 
conceptual perspective-taking tasks. 
The four tasks in which the phild is an active participant lay close 
to each other and show a ceiling effect around the age of 6 years, 
while the four tasks in which the child is a mere observer also lay 
close to each other but on a lower level. Redivisions of the tasks 
on the basis of differences on other criteria, such as the type of 
interaction, number of subjects participating, or mode, did not result 
in any similar distinction between the tasks, or groups of tasks. As 
noted above, within each group some interesting differences are pre-
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sent. So was the DeVrlea (1970) task (analyzed up to item 8: non-mi-
tual perspective-taxing) the only task making use of nonverbal respon­
ses. This task seems to be easier to solve than the other three tasks 
for the 3-year-olds; at the age of 4 years this difference disappeared 
probably as result of an increasing verbalization capacity. 
Within the same group, the Urberg aai Docharty (1976) task IV is the 
only task m»H"g use of less concrete features that the other three 
tasks. This task seems also to be more difficult than the other tasks. 
The four tasks in which the child functions as an observer are clearly 
more difficult; not so much as the result of task complexity, but as 
result of infoimation-processing demands put on the child. By being 
an observer the child very probably will have to make more use of 
mental representative processes and reasoning and will therefore per­
form at a completely different level of development. At the age of 
about 11 years, these tasks only reach the level of 70 to 30 percent 
correct. 
The number of subjects participating in an interaction, whether this 
be two or three subjects, seems not to be of any importance (cf. Mar­
vin, Greenberg and Mossier, 1976). The Chandler and Greenspan (1972) 
task makes use of situations in which three persons Interact, but it 
does not seem to be more difficult than the other tasks in which the 
child is an observer. 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
From the above analyses a number of conclusions can be drawn in regard 
to the stimulation of social development by means of a structured cur­
riculum. First, active involvement seems the most likely to have a 
positive effect on development in situations that allow a child to 
exercise and automate skills, regardless of the exact level of his 
development in terms of η + 1 levels or of the intensity of induced 
conflict that he undergoes. If, however, conflict-induction training 
is to be used, it was shown that on the basis of available data more 
subtle qualitative changes in development can be found, which may con­
stitute the η + 1 levels. In addition, these η + 1 levels can also 
function as educational objectives for the development of a curriculum. 
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Second, evidence was found that the type of response (i.e. either ver-
bal or nonverbal) may be an important variable at least for very young 
children. And finally, concrete situations must be preferred by the 
teacher above any type of situation requiring too much abstract and 
logical reasoning. 
The aim of this paper has been to show how from the theories concer-
ning social-cognitive development or perspective-coordination develop-
ment, by way of an information-processing and developmental model, di-
rections can be derived for practical application in curriculum deve-
lopnent. 
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3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESSING OF SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES: A COGNITIVE MODEL 1 > 
Abstract 
A cognitive model for the development of the processing of 
social perspectives was designed to represent the relation­
ships between various cognitive variables and the processing 
of social perspectives. Several of the relationships be­
tween the variables and perspective-taking, in particular 
are discussed in detail. Empirical data obtained from stu­
dies investigating sane of the hypotheses based upon the 
model are presented. 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent research with regard to the development of social cognition has 
centered on the development of role-taking abilities. For instance, 
according to Shantz (1975), the area of social cognition refers to 
"the child's intuitive or logical representation of others" (p. 258). 
Such a representation is derived from inferences about the psychologi­
cal processes or experiences of another person. The inferential pro­
cesses are referred to as role-taking (hence, perspective-taking). 
Perspective-taking is here regarded as one of the abilities which forms 
part of the processing of social perspectives. As such the processing 
of social perspectives can be described by the separate abilities of 
perspective-differentiation, —the awareness that another person may, 
and often will have other thoughts, feelings, intents, percepts, and 
motives than oneself; the ability to take the perspective of another 
person, that is to be able to determine what the perspective of the 
other person looks like (cf. Salman and Byrne, 1974); and finally, 
perspective-coordination, —the ability to take the Inferential pro­
duct (i.e. from the perspective-taking operation) into account in one's 
own perspective and to put the obtained coordination (see Figure 1) 
into practice (i.e. behavlorally) (see also Flavell's (1974) applica­
tion component). 
1) In the International Journal of Behairioral Development, 197Θ, 1, 
149-171. 
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Because the processing of social perspectives and perspective-taking, 
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Fig. 1 The schematic representation of the development of the 
processing of social perspectives. 
In particular, is regarded as basic for social cognitive development 
(cf. Mead, 1934), it is thought that the promotion of social cognitive 
development can be achieved by the stimulation of the development of 
the processing abilities of social perspectives (Gerris, 1977; Oppen-
heimer, 1977b). 
The aim of the present paper is to propose a cognitive model for the 
developsent of the processing of social perspectives. First, the 
existing theories about, and models for the development of the proces­
sing of social perspectives will be discussed after which an integra­
tion of the existing models into one model will follow; second, seve­
ral hypothetical submodels will be presented which are based on the 
cognitive model and which focus on the interrelationships between 
separate cognitive variables and the development of processing abili­
ties of social perspectives; finally, some of the hypotheses implied 
by the foregoing sections will be discussed on the basis of available 
empirical data. 
3.2 Social cognitive development: theory and models 
Selman and Byrne (1974; Selman, 1977) postulate four levels of role-
taking development between the ages of 4 and 12 years. At the first 
level (level 0), called "egocentric role-taking", the child does not 
differentiate between points of view. He is not yet aware that ano­
ther person possesses a perspective different from his own. Level 1, 
which is called "subjective role-taking", represents the ability to 
differentiate, that is, the child realizes that another person has a 
perspective different from that of himself. However, the child is not 
yet able to determine what the perspective looks like. At the next 
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level (level 2), —"self-reflective role-taking", the child is able to 
Infer the perspective of another person, though not mutually. Mutual 
perspectlve-taJdng refers to the comprehension that the child himself 
and his thoughts can be object of the other person's thoughts and viae 
versa, but he is not yet able to include this relationship in the in-
ferential processes of perspectlve-taJdng. At the level of "mutual 
role-taking" (level 3) he is able to do so. He can now put himself in 
the position of a third person and. "consider the relationship involv-
ed". 
The above described levels or "role-taking structures" are, according 
to Selman and Byrne (1974, p. 304), logically related and were found 
to appear in an invariant sequence. These assumptions are characteris-
tic for a structural developmental model. 
A first attempt to introduce other than strictly structural develop-
mental abilities was carried out by Flavell (1974, 1977). He proposes 
a "general information processing model" in which four components 
necessary for making inferences about the perspective of the other 
person are represented in the following sequence. The first component 
of his model, —"the existence component", represents the awareness 
that there is such a thing as a perspective and that the other person 
may possess a perspective different from one's own. The realization 
that some goal-directed behavior requires an inference with regard to 
the perspective of the other person is represented by the "need compo-
nent" . The "inference component" refers to the actual mental activity 
that leads to the construction of a representation of the other per-
son' s perspective (i.e. the process of perspective-taking), while the 
coordination of the found perspective with one's own perspective and 
the subsequent behavior is referred to as the "application component". 
In short, this model assumes, in addition to the abilities to diffe-
rentiate between perspectives (i.e. the existence conponent) and to 
determine or take the perspective of another person (i.e. the inferen-
ce component), also the important "need" and "application" components 
involved in the processing of social perspectives. Furthermore , as 
each component develops and is sequentially ordered the separate 
steps for the processing of information with regard to the perspec-
tive of the other person may also be regarded as "a description of the 
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aequsnce of tita development of role-taking" (Shantz, 1975, p. 267). 
Bovever, It has to be noted that the sequence of development not ne-
ceasexlly reflects the sequence of processes during an event of pers­
pective-coordination. The "application-component" in Flavell's model 
implies that perspective-coordination is not necessarily a prerequisi­
te for behavior, although it would enhance its adequacy. For this 
reason the use of the term "information-processing model" is mislea­
ding. 
Enxight (1977) projects the sequential flow of information proposed 
by Flavell over each structural developmental level proposed by Sei-
man . It was a first attempt to Integrate both Salman's and Flavell's 
models with the aim to obtain a model for intervention by which the 
processing phases offered by Flavell "have the specified content of 
Salman's system (i.e. interpersonal conceptions)" (Enright, 1977, p. 
6Θ). 
The development of the processing abilities for social perspectives 
has bean investigated over a number of contents (e.g. visual, emotio­
nal, conceptual, and Intentional perspective-differentiation and pers­
pective-taking, in particular). This research has not led to a clear 
picture with regard to the relationships between the processing abili­
ties over the several contents. The question that has been posed in 
a number of studies was whether the perspective-taking ability for 
visual, emotional, conceptual, and intentional perspectives develops 
simultaneously and in an identical form. Mhlle a number of studies 
report significant relationships (Feffer and Gourevitch, 1960; Kurdek 
and Rodgon, 1975; Rubin, 1973; Swinson, 1966) other studies did not 
find such relationships (Johnson, 1975a, 1975b; Rubin, Note 1; Sulli­
van and Hunt, 1967). The absence of a clear relationship between the 
content-specific perspective-^iifferentiation, and perspective-taking 
abilities was explained by Sullivan and Bunt (1967, p. 209) as being 
"the result of a lack of comparability of the measures and differen­
tial level of difficulty" between the respective tasks. 
Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) investigated the interrelationships between 
the ability to infer visual, cognitive, and affective perspectives. 
Besides a positive correlation between perceptual, and cognitive 
perspective-taking, the data were confusing in that no consistent re-
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lationahips among the other perspective-taking abilities were found. 
The authors concluded that "... while successful performance in each 
task did require perspective-taking skill, it also Involved additional 
cognitive-perceptual abilities that were specific to perceptual, cog-
nitive, and affective perspective-taking" (p. 649). 
In short, while there sens to exist general processing abilities of 
social perspectives, the use of these abilities depend on additional 
skills specific to the content onto which the perspective-processing 
abilities are applied. The processing abilities for social perspecti-
ves can thus be regarded as complex abilities entailing several sub-
skills which develop differentially (cf. Piché, Mlchlin, Rubin, and 
Johnson, 1975, p. 968). 
The above results and subsequent assumptions brought Urbexg and 
Docherty (1976) to conclude that "rather than considering role-taking 
as a global, unidimensional ability, the variables that are known or 
hypothesized to affect the role-taking process should be examined to 
determine the developmental course of each, as well as the interact-
ions between them" (p. 203). 
3.3 A cognitive model 
The present model is another attempt to integrate Salman's structural 
developmental model and Flavell's information-processing model with 
the addition of several of Enright's ideas into one cognitive model 
for the development of the processing of social perspectives. 
The schematic representation of the model is shown in Figure 2. The 
subroutines represent the abilities characterizing Selman's develop-
mental levels, independent of age. As a result level 0 is characte-
rized by the inability to differentiate between perspectives; level 1 
allows differentiation whereas perspective-taking (i.e. level 2: the 
ability to determine what the other person's perspective is like) does 
not yet occur; subroutines 2 and 3 represent Selman's levels 2 and 3. 
Subroutine 4 does not stand for a developmental level, in Selman's 
sense, but it does represent the "application component" referred to 
by Flavell. It is the ability to coordinate the acquired representa-
tion of the other person's perspective (obtained from either subrou-
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tine 2 or 3) with one's own perspective and to behave accordingly. 
The emphasis on the growth of the processing abilities is necessary to 
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Fig. 2 The integrative model representing the levels of develop­
ment of the processing of social perspectives. 
explain why, over age, and Independent of the content (e.g. emotions, 
intentions, percepts, and concepts), the result of perspective-taking 
(i.e. the representation obtained) becomes more accurate (Flavell, 
1974: "accuracy"). As was noted above, there is evidence that the 
different subskills or abilities required by the several contents, may 
explain the absence of any relationship between the developmental 
- 31 -
sequence for each content (Kurdek and Rodgon, 1975). The detailed 
specification of the variables related to the respective contents and 
Investigation of their development may thus provide Invaluable Informa­
tion with regard to the development of the processing of social pers­
pectives . 
To the right of each subroutine three axes are drawn In the flow dia­
gram. They represent the axes for content and for complexity within 
each content which often will vary for each Interaction situation. The 
latter term, complexity, refers to, for instance, the level of concre-
teness of a topic of an interaction, the type of interaction (i.e. per­
son (s) χ person(3), person(s) χ objectts), and object(э) χ object(з) 
interactions), and any other measurable characteristic of an Interact­
ion (cf. Oppenheimer, Note 2). The third and vertical axis could be 
regarded as the age dimension. However, this assumption is only valid 
if development of a subroutine for each content separately, over the 
complexity dimension, is investigated. 
Besides the above developmental aspect, the model represents the act 
of perspective-coordination at any given moment. In order to coordi­
nate perspectives a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. First, 
one has to be able to differentiate between perspectives, that is, to 
be aware that one's own perspective is not identical to that of another 
person (cf. Flavell, 1974: "existence"), and second, one has to deter­
mine what the other person's perspective looks like (cf. Flavell: "In­
ference"). Only then one will be able to take the other person's pers­
pective correctly Into account in one's own perspective (i.e. perspec­
tive—coordination) . In other words, the processing abilities for so­
cial perspectives which characterize the structural developmental le­
vels of the development of the processing of social perspectives can 
be regarded as the necessary, logical conditions In each situation, in 
order that one may interact adequately. For the sake of clarity the 
processing abilities are represent sequentially in Figure 2. However, 
there is no evidence available that supports the claim of the sequent­
ial ordering of these abilities as is suggested by Flavell's (1974) 
model. It can be argued that In mature social Interactions part of, 
or all processing abilities for social perspectives will occur simulta­
neously. 
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The coordination of perspectives can then be regarded ля the essential 
process for mature interacting. It Is a continuous process, since 
there are mutual Influences and resulting changes In perspectives during 
an interaction, this being known as the reciprocity principle (see the 
control-feedbacX mechanism in Figure 2). The process of continuous 
adaptation to new Information corresponds to Plavell's "maintenance", 
whereas perspective-coordination is part of the "application component", 
by which the coordination of perspectives is transformed into behavioral 
action which is applied in the interaction situation. 
The "need cooiponent" postulated by Flavell refers to "the disposition 
or sensed need to attempt an act of social cognition" iFlavell, 1977, 
pp. 120-121). That is, even if a child realizes that another person 
possesses a different perspective from his own, he is not yet aware that 
to attain his goal he will have to infer the other person's perspective 
and to coordinate it with his own perspective. Motivation, on the 
other hand, is assumed to be present during all processing activities 
of social perspectives and may determine at any given moment during 
this process to stop or continue the processing of information with 
regard to the perspective of the other person. Consequently, a child 
can Interact with another person whan motivated to do so, he may even 
be able to Infer the perspective of the other person, although in fact 
no inference will take place as result of the Inability to see any 
point ("need") in making such an inference. 
3.4 An elaboration 
In the above model a number of variables can be Included which are 
assumed to play a role In the inferential process of perspective-taking. 
These variables are: recursive thinking, that is the ability to think 
about another person's thoughts; the concept of psychological causality 
with its subsequent related concepts of nutuallty, anticipation, and 
reciprocity; the concept of interpersonal relationships, or concepts 
about how people act and react in variour interaction situations; and 
mental imagery - the ability to represent various objects and configu­
rations mentally. 
More specifically, the above variables are hypothesized to affect the 
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products of the Inference processes. That Is, the accuracy of the 
perspective-taking processes will be a function of the development of 
these variables. 
Only a snail number of variables is considered in order to prevent the 
development of incomprehensible submodels In which no clear relation­
ships would be traceable. If empirical data should lead to the rejec­
tion of the hypothesis that these variables affect the development of 
processing abilities and perspective-talcing, In particular, in a signi­
ficant way, the models would have to be reconsidered, that is modified, 
with new variables added, or totally rejected. In other words, the 
submodels that will be presented are merely frames of reference or 
working hypotheses. While the models thonselves are hypothetical, 
every relation represented is a testable hypothesis itself. 
3.4.1 Recursive thinking 
Recursive thinking refers to the ability to think about the thinking of 
another parsonι it впсошраавез the comprehension that thoughts may be 
self-embedded, e.g. "he is thinking that (she is thinking that (he is 
thinking ))" (Niller, Kessel, and Flavell, 1970). Being able to 
think about another person's inner processes, irrespective of the con­
tents (e.g. feelings, thoughts, percepts, etc.), that is being first 
of all able to comprehend, and if this should be necessary to verbali­
ze the thoughts of another person, may lie at the root of the ability 
to infer the other person's perspective. Miller et al. (1970) presen­
ted children from varying ages with pictures representing line drawings 
of a boy thinking of one, two, and three noninteracting, simultaneously 
presented persons (i.e. contiguity thinking); of two persons inter­
acting in "social nonrecursive action", - e.g. talking (i.e. action 
thinking); of himself or somebody else thinking about some person (i.e. 
one-loop recursive thinking); and finally, of himself or somebody else 
thinking of himself or somebody else thinking about some person (i.e. 
two-loop recursive thinking). The children were then asked to tell 
what the boy was thinking about. The authors found that thinking about 
contiguous people is already fully present at the age of 6 years follo­
wed by action thinking at about the age of 10 years. One-loop, and 
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two-loop recursive thinking, on the other hand, only reached a level of 
approximately 50% correct and leas, respectively, at the age of 12/13 
years. 
In the course of constructing a more elaborated Instrument for the 
assessment of the development of recursive thinJclng (Oppenheimer and 
Helana, Note 3) a nuabar of studies were carried out in order to repli­
cate and enrich the above data. In one study the experimental proce­
dure was changed from the original presentation of one drawing with the 
accompanying question: "What is the boy thlnlcing about?" (Killer et 
al., 1970), to the simultaneous presentation of all sixteen pictures 
»пД the question: "Show me the picture in which the boy is thinking 
about ". The revised procedure reduced the verbal production re­
quirements of the original procedure, while the comprehension of the 
thought hierarchies was kept identical. Піе performance on the revised 
procedure was significantly higher than the performance on the original 
procedure. The mean performance of the kisdergartners in the revised 
procedure equalled that of the first-graders in the original procedure 
as used by Miller et al.; the first-graders in the revised procedure 
showed a performance equal to that of the third-graders in the original 
procedure. In short, the assessment of the ability to think about the 
thoughts of other people was significantly influenced by the task re­
quirements. The ability to verbalize the iterative structure of thought 
as portrayed in pictures lagged developoentally behind the comprehension 
of these structures. 
The above assumption that the develofment of recursive thinking plays 
an important role in the development of the processing of social pers­
pectives is worked out in more detail in Figure 3. Speculatively, 
contiguity thinking, that is the ability to think about one or more 
noninteracting, simultaneously presented persons is linked to the 
thinking about directly recognizable behavior of other people be it 
feelings, intentions, or perceptions. The direct recognition and ver­
balization of the other person's behavior is thus based on mere exter­
nal features. Differentiation between perceivable behaviors (i.e. 
behavioral perspectives) is then based on the distinction between fea­
tures characterizing different percepts, feelings and intentions, yet 
without verbalizing the specific perspectives. The moment the res-
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pective perspectives are specified (e.g. verbalized) we talk about 
perspective-taking. This type of perspective-taking, however, is then 
reducable to perception and verbalization of the perceived behavioral 
perspectives: "Ue wants this and I want that", or "She feels good and 
I feel bad". However, no uhy is involved in the inferences but only 
uhat. 
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Fig. 3 The submodel representing the relationships between levels 
of recursive thinking (in the left-hand column), perspective-
differentiation, and perspective-taking development. 
Knowledge about the "how and why people act and react in specific 
situations (e.g. interactions)" will to a great extent depend on the 
experiences a child has gone through. It can be hypothesized that the 
richer the environment, that is the greater the amount of interpersonal 
encounters the child has gone through with different people, the more 
elaborate, complex, and detailed his knowledge about people and inter­
personal relations will be. The ability to generalize this knowledge to 
new situations and people will then depend on the ability to think a-
bout interacting people and interpersonal relations (i.e. part of 
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action thlnJung). It la thought that the idiosyncratic knowledge about 
people will affect the products of the perspective-taking processes. 
At first these products will be of a stereotypic nature, that is the 
child will, in the first instance, make use of his everyday experiences 
in orde to interprete the behavior of another person, irrespective of 
theix adequacy (cf. Chandler and Greenspan, 1972). As result of a pro-
gressively higher ability to think about interacting people and an in-
crease in knowledge about people and interpersonal relationships the 
stereotypic nature of the inferential products is thought to decrease 
(cf. Urberg and Docherty, 1976). An intervening variable in this pro-
cess of deduction may be the child himself as the actor in an interact-
ion situation. He may act in a stereotypic or non-staraotypic way and 
cause a stereotypic or non-stereotypic reaction. The resulting feelings, 
intentions, thoughts, or percepts of the other person may then be not 
stereotypic but a direct result of his specific behavior. The under-
lying reason for a change in the perspective of the other person is 
then the directly known (i.e. to the child) act. 
One-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking are thought to enable the 
child to expose the underlying cognitions (i.e. the conceptual or cog-
nitive perspectives) of behaviors and expressions of the other and his 
reactions to own or others' actions. In a social guessing game, 
DeVrles (1970) noted that successful hiding of a penny was based on the 
child's ability not only to take account of the other person's role but 
also on the comprehension that the other person is taking account of 
his own perspective. "He modifies his behavior appropriately on the 
basis of a prediction about the other's behavioral modification based 
on a prediction of the child's prediction" (p. 770; that is, "I think 
that (he thinks that (I think that ...))"). The ability to expose the 
underlying cognitions is represented by one-loop, and two-loop recursi-
ve thinking (see Figure 3) which is related to thinking about the inner 
processes and to the determination of the content of the inner, covert 
perspectives. 
In a number of studies first, the development of action thinking and 
second, the relationship between the development of recursive thinking 
and emotional, and conceptual perspective-taking were investigated. 
In the Miller et al. (1970) task for the assessment of the development 
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of recursive thinklnij us· was made ou only people, that Is the boy who 
did the thinking on the line drawings thought only of contiguous people 
and interacting people (i.e. talking). An elaborated version of the ori­
ginal task was developed (Oppenheimer and Helsma, Note 3) in which the 
following changes in regard to conguity thinking, and action thinking 
were carried out: 
Contiguity thinking: This element included thinking about one, and 
two contiguous persons, and one and two contiguous objects. 
Action thinking: Within the category of action thinking the following 
types of interactions were included (cf. Oppenheimer, Note 2): 
(1) person(a) χ parson(s) interactions, e.g. two fighting boys. 
(2) person(я) χ object (s) interactions, e.g. a girl playing with a ball. 
(3) objectts) χ abject(s) interactions, e.g. the wind turning the sails 
of a windmill. 
The above elaborated task was presented to 30 children divided over 
three age groups (mean ages 5.5, 7.2, and 9.2 years). The scoring for 
this task was slightly changed in comparison to the scoring used by 
Millar et al. (1970). While the latter authors scored on a right or 
wrong basis, in the present study a score of 0, 1, or 2 was used. To 
illustrate, the answers to the card on which the boy is thinking of a 
girl playing with a ball could be: first, "he thinks of a girls play­
ing with a ball" which was given a score of 2; second, "he thinks of a 
girl and a ball" (i.e. contiguity thinking), which was given a score 
of 1) and third, "he thinks of a girl" or "he thinks of a ball", which 
answer was given a score of 0. 
The results showed that for all types of contiguity thinking a ceiling 
effect is present at the age of 5 years. For action thinking, however, 
it was found that thinking about interacting people develops prior to 
thinking about persons interacting with objects, which, in turn deve­
lops prior to thinking about interacting objects. This development was 
most clearly present with the 5 year-olds with mean scores for the res­
pective types of action thinking being 7.1, 5.9, and 3.Θ. The 7 and 9 
year-olds showed thinking about interacting persons and persons inter­
acting with objects to be equal but significantly better than thinking 
about interacting objects. The mean scores for the 7 year-olds were 
7.8, 7.0, and 4.4, respectively, and for the 9 year-olds 7.9, 7.7, and 
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6.0, respectively. The action thinking category was found to differen­
tiate best between the three age groups, that is, what seems to deve­
lop during the age period from 5 to 9 years Is the ability to think 
about Interactions between persons and objects. One-loop, and two-loop 
recursive thinking do not yet appear to play an important role. 
In a first study Investigating the relationship between the developments 
of recursive thinking and emotional perspective-taking. In particular, 
children were presented with first, the elaborated task for the assess­
ment of recursive thinking and second, a compound task of ooiotional 
perspective-taking tasks (cf. Urberg and Docherty, 1976). The compound 
task consisted of three tasks which required a progressively more ad­
vanced level of perspective-taking, e.g. task 1 required stereotypic 
perspective-takingj task 2 non-mutual perspective-taking; and task 3 
mutual perspective-taking. An overall correlation (Γ - 0.43, ρ -
0.001) showed recursive thinking and emotional perspective-taking to 
be related to each other. It was thought that by presenting children 
from three age greoupa (i.e. klndergratners, 1-graders, and 3-graders) 
with the recursive-thinking task and «notional perspective-taking 
task, in the respective order, in one session (i.e. the direct proce­
dure) would result In a training effect for recursive thinking compared 
to the presentation of both tasks separated In two sessions, with a 10 
day interval between them (i.e. tlje indirect procedure). The results 
showed a significant interaction between the procedures, age groups, 
ani tasks (Oppenhelmer, 1977a) . For the third-graders there was no 
detectable difference on the perspective-taking task between the two 
procedures. The first-graders showed a significant higher score on the 
perspective-taking task for the indirect procedure, that is, contrary 
to the hypothesis that the direct procedure would result In a higher 
training effect for recursive thinking. The kudargartners, on the 
other hand, showed a higher score on the perspective-taking task as 
result of the direct procedure. 
The second study was an extension of the above study, in that the abi­
lity to think about the thoughts of other people (i.e. the ability to 
verbalize these thoughts correctly) was trained to criterion (Oppenhei-
mer, Note 4). In order to check if such a training did not result in 
the mere learning of a verbal lable belonging to a specific picture a 
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post-training task was administered which made use of similar but not 
Identical material. The effects of the training were measured on two 
perspective-taking tasks, that Is the emotional perspective-taking task 
used In the previous study and a conceptual perspective-taking task 
analogous to the emotional perspective-taking task (Wlggers, Note 5). 
Two main hypotheses were formulated. The first stated that as recur­
sive thinking can be regarded as a special type of conceptual perspec­
tive-taking the training effects of recursive thinking would be greatest 
on the conceptual perspective-taking task. The second hypothesis was 
based on the two procedures used in the present study, - the training 
procedure and control procedure. It was expected that the training 
for recursive thinking would result In a higher performance on the 
perspective-taking tasks in comparison to the control group which did 
not receive such a training. In this study 10Θ children participated. 
again divided over three age groups (i.e. kindergarten, mean age 5.7 
yearsι first-grade, mean age 6.9 years; and third-grade, mean age Θ.3 
years). 
A very salient phenomenon during the training procedure was the inabi­
lity to train kindergarten and first-grade children to formulate the 
thoughts of other people beyond action thinking. While the klndergart-
ners were not able to reach criterion level for one-loop recursive 
thinking in the training, the first-graders showed that they merely 
learned to verbalize specific pictures as they were not able to main­
tain their criterion level on the post-training task. The third-graders 
on the other hand, managed to comprehend one-loop recursive thinking 
and maintained their criterion level on the post-training task. Two-
loop recursive thinking was not trained. 
While an overall analysis of variance resulted in a significant effect 
for the training procedure, this effect seaned to originate only from 
the third-graders' performance. Separate analyses of variance for each 
age group revealed that there was neither a significant effect for the 
training procedure, nor a significant procedure χ perspective-taking 
task interaction with the kindergartners and first-graders. The train­
ing procedure and the procedure χ perspective-taking task interaction 
were found to be significant only with the third-graders. 
In addition, the effect of the training for recursive thinking on the 
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conceptual· perspective-taking task was found to be significantly grea-
ter (p " 0.07) than on the emotional perspective-taking task. The mean 
scores were 2.9 and 3.4 on the anotional, and conceptual perspective-
taking tasks, respectively. 
The data from the above study confirmed the hypothesis that recursive 
thinking is related to the development of perspective-taking. This 
relationship was found to exist for both conceptual, and emotional 
perspective-taking, although, more salient for the former conceptual 
perspective-taking. Moreover, only one—loop, and probably also two-
loop recursive thinking, appear to affect this development. The attain-
ment of criterion level for contiguity and action thinking did not re-
sult in any Increase of performance on the used perspective-taking 
tasks. The latter result confirms the hypothesis that at least one-
loop recursive thinking is an essential ability to expose the underly-
ing cognitions of behaviors and experiences of another person and his 
reaction to own or others' actions. 
3.4.2 Psychological causality 
The concept of psychological causality, that is the comprehension of 
the causal relations in social situation (i.e. interactions) is the 
second variable thought to influence the perspective-taking processes. 
Very little is known about this concept. There is some evidence that 
the concept of psychological causality develops prior to the concept of 
physical causality (cf. Oppenhejjner, Note 2) . The first appearance of 
non-stereotypic products of the perspective-taking processes was assum-
ed to be a result of the comprehension that one's own actions may 
cause non-stereotypic reaction with another person (see page 36). The 
latter implies that the child has to comprehend the cause-consequence 
relationship between his act and the resulting consequence. For this 
reason the concept of causality and the cause-consequence relationship, 
in particular (which was found to develop prior to the consequence-
cause relationship: Brown and French, 1976), is linked to the appea-
rance of non-stereotypic, inferential products in Figure 4. 
A second application of the cause-consequence sequence in a modified 
form is the comprehension that perspectives rarely exist in solitary 
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form. It can be argued that a social perspective is a product of the 
interaction between two or more perspectives. However, the perspecti­
ve of another person can be determined without paying attention to the 
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causality, one-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking, and pers­
pective-taking . 
perspectives of other individuals or the self. This type of perspec­
tive-taking is referred to as non-mutual perspective-taking. Mutual 
perspective-taking, on the other hand, refers to the determination of 
the other person's perspective in relation to one's own or other indi­
vidual's perspectives - or what is hypothesized to occur prior to this 
process, the determination of one's own perspective in relation to 
the other person's perspective. The subsequent comprehension of the 
mutuality between perspectives, is assumed to be a second form of psy­
chological causality. 
A very important aspect of causality development is the ability to 
anticipate, to doresee what will be the (re)action of another person 
as result of one's own actions when carried out. In addition to the 
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concept of the cause-consequence relationship, the ability to order 
events over time (i.e. temporal ordering) is necessary in order to 
anticipate. The prediction that can be formulted states that the more 
efficient the anticipatory abilities the more accurate the perspective-
taking products will be. The ability to anticipate social events and 
(re)actions is thus hypothesized to affect both non-mutual and mutual 
perspective-talcing (see Figure 4). 
The final concept is that of reciprocity. This concept refers to the 
ability to process information with regard to the adequacy of the in-
teraction. The coordination of perspectives was assumed to be the 
essential process for mature interacting. It is a continuous process, 
since there are mutual influences and resulting changes in perspectives 
during an interaction. Leaving the instance of rigid points of view 
or perspectives out of consideration, there will be a continuous 
stream of feedback from the partner(s) in the interaction regarding 
the adequacy of the own (re)actions. The processing of this feedback-
information which may lead to renewed perspective-taking and/or pers-
pective-coordination activities is hypothesized to rely on the recipro-
city principle (see also Figure 2). Speculatively, the reciprocity 
principle is thought to consist of several (sublabilities. First, the 
concept of causality but in its total form, that is, in addition to 
the cause-consequence relationship, also the consequence-cause rela-
tionship. The latter relationship is assumed to be necessary in order 
to retrace events in time to their origins or causes. Second, the 
ability of one-loop and two-loop recursive thinking. This ability to 
think: "that he thought that I thought that " is considered essen-
tial to the ability to retrace or anticipate events as inner trains of 
thought with the other person and to process the new information ob-
tained. Training studies in which either the concept of causality, 
the ability of one-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking, or both are 
trained could possible lead to answers to the formulated hypotheses. 
3.4.3 The concept of interpersonal relationships 
This variable was already mentioned in relation to the development of 
recursive thinking and action thinking, in particular. What is really 
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meant hare by concepts of interpersonal relationships ara concepts 
about people, that Is the knowledge about how various sorts of people 
are likely to react. Internally and externally, In various situations 
(I.e. Interactions) (Flavell, 1974, p. 80). Subsequent topics for 
research would be to Investigate the development of organized, coherent, 
cognitive structures about other person (Schneider, Note 6) and the 
more specific development of concepts of interpersonal relationships 
(cf. Selaan, Note 7). 
3.4.4 Mental rotation and imagery development 
Visual perspective-taking, that is the inferences about the visual 
percepts of other people, is considered to be the least social type of 
perspective-taking. For this reason the variables of mental rotation 
and mental imagery ware not worked out in a sutauodel. Repeatedly the 
Importance of visual Imagery development for oental rotations of a 
display in visual perspective-taking tasks was stressed in the litera­
ture. However, no conclusive data are available with regard to the 
relationship between the development of mental loagery, the mental 
rotation of a display, and visual perspective-taking (Huttenlocher 
and Presson, 1973; Strauss and Cohen, Note 8). Nevertheless, the 
focus remained on visual imagery. 
Three studies were conducted (Oppenheuner, Note 9) to investigate first, 
whether there is a difference between the traditional task procedures 
for visual perspective-taking (i.e. perspectxve-inference: if a posi­
tion in relation to a display is given then select from a series of 
pictures how the display looks from that position), and the reversed 
procedure (i.e. position-inference: if the display is seen as on a 
given picture then show in which position around the display у ш will 
have to be); second, the development of the latter position-inference 
ability; and third, the relationships between mental Imagery develop­
ment and position-inference. 
The first study did not result in any significant differences between 
the two procedures both on grounds of the number of correct solutions 
as well as the time required to solve the tasks. However, the laten­
cies compared over the four different positions used in relation to 
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the display (e.g. the 0-, 90-, 180-, and 270-degreee orientations) 
showed an increase corresponding to the clockwise rotation for the 
perspective-inference taak, bit not for the position-inference task. 
The second study showed that children did not rotate themselves or the 
display to determine the position from which the photograph was taken 
but systematically reversed the near-far, and left-right relationships 
between the objects within the display. It was hypothesized that if 
rotation would occur then the latencies for the orientations of 90-, 
180-, and 270-degrees would have to be a function of this rotation. 
However, the results showed the latencies (and also the scores) for 
the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations to be identical (i.e. 5.9 and 
5.8 seconds, respectively) but significantly higher than the latency 
for the 180-degrees orientation (i.e. 4.9 sec, ρ • 0.05). 
In the third study the relationship between the development of product 
imagery and position-inference was investigated. Product imagery 
refers to visual imagery bearing upon only the product (e.g. a confi­
guration or a display) of a process, implying that the interrelation­
ships between the elanents of such a configuration did not change as 
result of the process. The development of product imagery was assess­
ed by means of a task developed by Oppenheimer and Strauss (1975). 
The results of this study showed that the development of product ima­
gery was not related to the level of solution for a visual position-
inference task. 
These data have no direct implications for the present models of the 
development of the processing of social perspectives although the 
principles underlying this research were similar. An attemgrfc «аэ mod· 
to assess the role of two variables, e.g. mental rotation and mental 
imagery for the visual perspective-taking ability. The results showed 
that while the development of mental imagery - perhaps also mental 
rotation - may affect perspective-inference, position-inference relies 
on the ability to reverse (i.e. coordinate) relationships within a 
display. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The above sections indicate that the products to be obtained from the 
inferential processes (e.g. the respective perspectives) will be dif­
ferent, either quantitatively, qualitatively, or both, depending on 
the developmental levels of the variables affecting these inferential 
processes (see Figure 5). 
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Fig. 5 The submodel representing the interrelationships between 
the developments of recursive thinking, psychological causality, 
and concepts of interpersonal relations, on the one hand, and 
perspective-differentiation, -taking, and -coordination, on the 
other hand. 
h major purpose of the present paper was to present a model represen­
ting the development of the processing of social perspectives in rela­
tion to л limited number of cognitive variables. An important advance 
of the present model and the accompanying theory is that it enables a 
more precise and fundamental study of social cognitive development. 
While the structural developmental stage theory still remains in the 
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background, the proposed models went beyond a mere description of 
global, successive, behavlorally determined stages. Several cognitive 
variables were suggested which may function, either separately or in 
interaction with each other, as the transitory mechanisms for the pro­
gress from one stage (n) to the next higher stage in + I). The thought 
that development will be a continuous process formed the basis for the 
latter assumption. Knowledge with regard to the above mentioned vari­
ables, e.g. recursive thinking, concept of causality, and concepts of 
interpersonal relationships, may be essential for a deeper understan­
ding of social cognition and its development. The more so for an 
effective stimulation of social developaent (cf. Gerris, 1977; Oppen-
helmer, 1977b). 
However, a major disadvantage remains. The present model is a cogni­
tive model. In spite of the introduction of motivational, need, and 
situational components (see Figure 2) no further attention was paid to 
these variables. Nevertheless, these variables can be regarded as 
additional determinants of social cognitive development (Kell 1977; 
Silbereisen, 1977). Further theoretical developments and empirical 
research will have to be carried out within a wider context encompass­
ing the interaction between the child's environment, his needs, and 
his (social) cognitive development. 
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4 . THE VISUAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING ABILITY: 
SOME ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES " 
Abstract 
In three successive studies the follawljig questions were 
Investigated: first whether the ability to infer the 
position of a person in relation to a display (position-
inference) , given his visual experience, and the ability 
to infer the visual experience of a person (perspective-
inference), given his position in relation to a display, 
develop simultaneously and in an identical way; second, 
whether there exists a relation between the development 
of mental imagery and position-inference. The results 
showed both Inference processes to be Identical and to 
develop simultaneously. No apparent relation between 
the development of mental imagery and position-inference 
was found. 
4.1 Introduction 
The ability to infer the perceptual experience and percepts of another 
person is considered to be a social and cognitive one. Flavell (1977) 
notes that the child "gradually must cane to understand ... that other 
people also see things, and that the nature of another person's visual 
experience at a given moment can often be inferred from various clues" 
(pp. 125-126). Піе latter inferential process is conmonly referred to 
as visual role-, or perspective-taking. 
In studying the development of visual perspective-taking extensive use 
has been made of Plaget and Inhelder's (1971) "three mountain" task 
and modifications thereoff. This task requires children to select from 
a series of pictures, or to reconstruct, the visual appearance of the 
three mountains from locations other than their own. 
Only one study is available (Piaget and Inhelder, 1971) In which the 
child was required to infer the position of a person, -in contrast to 
his perspective, given the visual experience he has of a display. 
According to the latter authors "the results ... are in complete 
conformity with those already found" (i.e. by the perspective-taking 
study) (p. 221). Nevertheless, it can be argued that in order to 
1) Submitted for publication 
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infer the visual experience of another person, it will be necessary 
first, to determine what his position will be in relation to a display 
(i.e. abject) and second, to infer the visual experience or percept 
of the other person. This assumption implies that position-inference 
will occur, and subsequently develop prior to perspective-Inference. 
In the first study, 24 children were presented with either one of the 
inference problems in order to investigate the above hypothesis. 
4.2 Experiment 1 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Subjects 
The subjects were 25 first-grade children (age range from 6.9 to 7.4 
years, mean age 7.2 years) from an elementary school serving a middle 
class neighborhood in Nijmegen. Each child was at random assigned to 
either the perspective-, or the position-inference procedure. 
Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were present in each 
group. 
4.2.1.2 Materiala 
For both the perspective-, and position-inference tasks a simplicated 
version of the three mountain task was used. The materials consisted 
of a circular presentation board (45 an in diameter) and three colored 
wooden blocks: a yellow triangle (base: 13 cm; sides: 9 cm; 
breadth: 3 cm), a blue cube ЦЗк хЗ cm), and a red cube (16x3x3 cm). 
A toy car was used for the pretest trials. 
For both inference procedures three display conditions for the blocks 
were used: 
The single-object diaplay (D-l). In this display condition only the 
yellow triangle was used. It was placed on its side in the center of 
the board with the other side directed to the child (i.e. the zero-
degrees orientation, that is the position of the child in relation to 
the display; see Figure la), 
The two-ob.jecta display (D-2) . In this display condition the yellow 
triangle and the red cube were used. The blocks were placed diagonally 
such that from each orientation (i.e. the zero-, 90-, 1Θ0-, and 270-
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degrees orientation, in a clockwise order) each block could be viewed 
separately. That is, no block stood in front or behind another block 
(see Figure lb)„ 
0-1 o~2 o-j 
I« lb te 
Fig. 1 The representation of the three display 
conditions. Figure la: the single-object dis-
play; Figure lb: the two-objects display; Fi-
gure 1c: the three-objects display. The zero-
degrees orientation, that is the position of 
the child in relation to the display is repre-
sented by the 0. 
The three-objects display (D-3). In this condition the blue cube was 
added. Again the blocks were placed on the diagonal, in accordance 
with the principles stated in the D-2 condition, although the positions 
and the visual appearances of the blocks (i.e. of the yellow triangle 
and the red cube) were changed (see Figure 1c). 
The display conditions were identical for all childern. 
To illustrate the effect of the diagonal arrangement of the blocks, 
the D-3 condition is most appropriate. In the zero-degrees orientation 
the yellow triangle is nearest to, and to the left of the child; the 
blue cube is farthest from, and to the right of the child; and the red 
cube stands exactly in the middle of the board. In the 90-degrees 
clockwise orientation only the near-far relationships between the 
blocks is changed. In the 270-degrees orientation (i.e. 90-degrees 
anti-clockwise) only the left-right relationships are changed, while in 
the 180-degrees orientation both the left-right, and the near-far 
relationships between the blocks are changed. The only difference 
between the D-2 and 0-3 conditions is the presence of the central 
block (i.e. the red cube) in the 0-3 condition, which remains a stable 
explicit point of reference from each orientation. 
Besides the above materials for the display conditions, from each 
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orientation colored pictures of the display (18x26 cm) vere available. 
For the pretest trials also pictures of the toy car frcm the four ori-
entations were present. 
4.2.1.3 Procedure 
Each orientation within a display condition was presented three times 
during each test-course. This resulted in twelve picture presentations 
or position presentations within each display in the position-, and 
perspective-inference procedures, respectively. Two orders of the 
twelve presentations were constructed such that no two successive 
orientations in one order followed each other directly in the second 
order (i.e. order I and II). Also the display conditions were presen-
ted in two orders, that is D-l, D-2, D-3 (order A), and D-3, D-l, D-2 
(order B). As result the children were at random assigned to either 
orientation-display condition (i.e. IA, IIA, IB, and IIB) within each 
Inference procedure. 
All children were tested individually in a small roan at the elementa-
ry school. 
Position-inference. This task required from the child to infer from the 
picture presented to him, the position from which he could see the 
display as shown in the picture. In order to ascertain that the child 
understood the task remiirements he was first presented with a number 
of pretest trials. In the pretest trials the toy car was placed in 
the center of the presentation board and pictures of the car from 
either four orientations were successively presented to the child. 
The child was requested to show (i.e. by pointing) where he would have 
to stand or sit to see the car as shown in the picture. He was allowed 
to walk around the presentation board, so that he would have a clear 
notion what was meant by the position or place he had to infer and in-
dicate. After he showed understanding of the task requirements, the 
position-inference procedure with the blocks as display was started. 
Again the child was presented with one picture at a time and had to 
infer from what position he could see the display as shown in the 
picture. Now, the child was not allowed anymore to leave his place 
(i.e. in the zero-degrees orientation) and had to point to the position 
he thought to be the proper one; no feedback to his choice was given. 
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Besides the recording of his choice, the latencies were measured from 
the mcnent of the presentation of the picture to the answer (i.e. the 
indication) of the child. 
Perepective-inferenee. This task required freni the child to infer, 
from a given position, what visual experience he would have of the 
display. In the present procedure the four pictures freo the different 
orientations were placed in a random order in front of the child. The 
child was really required to select from the four pictures that picture 
matching his Inference product. 
The position was made clear to the child by pointing of the experimen­
tator who was sitting beside the child. The ассашрапуіпд question ran 
as follows: "If you are sitting over there (pointing by the E) then 
show me how you would see the blocks". Again, use was made of a number 
of pretest trials with the toy car to ascertain the child understood 
the task requirements. In the present perspective-inference procedure 
the choice of the child was recorded as well as the latencies from the 
moment of the position presentation (i.e. the indication by E) and the 
choice made by the child from the four pictures in front of him. 
4.2.2 Results 
Prior to the conparieon between both inference tasks, first simple 
t-tests were carried out between the four orientation-display conditi­
ons within each Inference procedure on both the scores and the laten­
cies. No significant differences were found. This result enabled the 
combination of all order conditions for each inference task (.V»12). 
In the first instance a 2x3x4 (Inference task χ display condition χ 
orientation) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last 
two factors for the correct scores ma carried out. This analysis 
showed the orientatimi factor to be significant (F(3,66)-28.9, ρ <.001) 
with mean scores being 2.5, 1.2, 1.5, and 1.0 for the 0-, 90-, 180-, 
and 270-degrees orientations (i.e. in a clockwise order), respectively. 
As the zero-degrees orientation required a mere direct matching between 
the position given and the corresponding picture, in the perspective-
inference task, and between the picture given and the corresponding 
position in the position-Inference task (i.e. recognition instead of 
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Inference) the significant effect could originate freo this orientation. 
On basis of this assumption the zero-degrees orientation was omitted 
fron all further analysés. 
A 2x3x3 analysis of variance did not result in any significant diffe-
rence between the two inference tasks. Also no significant Interactions 
were found between the inference tasks and the display conditions, the 
inference- tasks and the orientations, and the third order Interaction 
between inference tasks, display conditions, and orientations. Again, 
the main effect for orientations was found to be significant (F(2,44)» 
4.7, ρ < .05) with mean scores being 1.2, 1.5, and 1.0 for the 90-, 
ISO-, and 270-degrees orientations, respectively. Also the display 
conditions χ orientations interaction was found to be significant 
(F(2,88)-2.7, ρ < .05). The mean scores for the three respective ori­
entations were 1.3, 1.2, and 1.3 in the 0-1 condition, 1.2, 1.4, and 
0.9 in the D-2 condition, and 1.0, 2.0, and 0.8 in the D-3 condition. 
Apparently the 180-degrees orientation becomes better solved as a 
function of the number of objects in the display, while the levels of 
solution for the 90-, and 270-degree8 orientations decrease as a 
function of more objects in the display. 
Again, a 2x3x3 (Inference task χ display condition χ orientation) ana­
lysis of variance on the latencies did not reveal a significant effect 
for the inference tasks. The third order interaction between the 
inference tasks, the display conditions, and the orientations was 
found to be significant (F(4,88)>4.5, ρ < .01). This interaction is 
shown in Figure 2. Each display condition then shows a different 
pattern of latencies required for each orientation. While in the D-l 
condition perspective-inference apparently seems to reqruire more time 
then position-inference, this result is reversed in the D-2, and D-3 
conditions which show that, except for the 270-degrees orientation 
in the D-2 condition, perspective-inferences are carried out in less 
time then position-inferences. While there are no clear differences 
between the display conditions for perspective-inference (i.e. mean 
latencies being 4.6, 6.5, and 5.6 seconds for the D-l, D-2, and D-3 
conditions, respectively) there are significant differences on the 
ρ » .05 level (Newman-Keuls analyses) between the D-l, and the D-2, 
and D-3 conditions for position-inference (i.e. mean latencies 3.6, 
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8.3, and 7.1 seconds), although no significant Interaction between the 
inference tasks and the display conditions was present. The display 
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' Fig. 2 The mean latencies in seconds as a function of the clock-
wise orientations for the perspective-, and position-inference 
tasks for each display condition seperately. 
condition χ orientation interaction was found to be significant 
(F(4,88)=3.2/ ρ < .05) showing no significant differences between the 
latencies for the 90-, 160-, and 270-degrees orientations for position-
inference (i.e. mean latencies 6.2, 6.2, and 6.6 seconds, respectively) 
but a significant difference between the 90-, and 180-degrees orienta­
tions and the 270-degrees orientation on the ρ - .05 level (i.e. mean 
latencies 4.6, 5.2, and 6.9 seconds, respectively) for perspective-
inference. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The present study apparently replicates Piaget and Inhelder's (1971) 
results that position-inference develops simultaneously with perspec­
tive-inference. Certainly on basis of the analyses of the scores this 
conclusion is warranted. In accordance with a number of studies 
(Brodzinsky, Jackson, and Overton, 19721 Huttenlocher and Pressen, 
1973; Minnigerode and Carey, 1974; Nigl and Fishbein, 1974) the number 
of objects within the display did not seem to affect the level of 
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solution. This result was further corroborated by the analysis of the 
latencies required to carry out the perspective-taking inferences. 
Also here no differences between the latencies as a function of the 
number of objects in the display (i.e. the display conditions) was 
found. Por the position-inference processes, however, such a differen­
ce was found. The D-l condition required considerably less time to 
solve than either the D-2, and D-3 conditions, with the D-2 condition 
requiring more time than the D-3 condition. Also on basis of the la­
tencies differences were found between the orientations within each 
display in the perspective-taking process, but not in the position-
taking process. 
In the next study the position-inference ability is studied in more 
detail and within a developmental context. That is, three age groups 
are presented with the position-inference task in order to explore 
developmental differences in this ability. 
4.3 Experiment 2 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3. J. 1 Subjeote 
In total 4Θ children participated in this study divided over three 
age groups consisting of 16 children each. The age ranges are from 
4.4 to 6.4 years (mean age 5.5 years: kindergarten); from 6.6 to 
7.10 years (mean age 7.1 years: first-grade); and from 8.4 to 10.2 
years (mean age 9.1 years: third-grade). Both the kindergarten and 
the elementary school served middle class neighborhoods in Nijmegen. 
Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were present within each 
age group. 
4.3.1.2 Materiale and Procedure 
The materials and the procedure for the position-inference task were 
identical to those used in the first experiment (see sections 4.2.1.2 
and 4.2.1.3). 
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4.3.2 Results 
In accordance with the analyses for the first experiment the zero-de­
grees orientation was omitted from the analyses of the data fron the 
present study. 
For the ease of survey first, the analyses of the scores and then the 
analyses of the latencies will be reported. 
Snores. A 3x3x3 (Age χ display condition χ orientation) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the last two factors on the correct 
scores was carried out. The analysis showed age to have a significant 
effect (F(2,45)-12.6, ρ < .001). There is an increase in correct 
scores as a function of age, with the mean scores being 1.1, 1.3, and 
2.0 for the Undergartners, first-graders, and third-graders, respecti­
vely. Contrary to the results in the first study the effect of the 
display conditions was also found to be significant (F(2,90)-5.4, 
ρ < .01) showing the 0-1 condition (mean score 1.2) to be significantly 
more difficult than either the 0-2, or 0-3 conditions (mean scores 1.6 
and 1.6, respectively! ρ - .05, Newman-Keuls analyses). 
A more detailed analysis of the errors in the D-l condition revealed 
that the lower mean score for this condition is a result of the incapa­
bility of the children to distinguish between the zero-, and the 180-
degrees orientations. The latter orientations were very similar in 
their appearances and differed only in a slight Inequality of length 
of the base (i.e. in the ΙΘΟ-degrees orientation) and the upright side 
(i.e. in the zero-degrees orientation) of the triangle and a scarcely 
detectable difference in hue of both sides. In other words, not the 
number of objects in the display but the object in question (i.e. the 
yellow triangle in the D-l condition) could have led to the significant 
effect for the display condition. Removal of the D-l condition from 
the analysis resulted in a disappearance of the effect for the display 
conditions. 
Піе effect for the orientations was also found to be significant 
(F(2,90)»e.3, ρ < .001) which showed the IBO-degrees orientation to be 
significantly better solved than either 90-, or 270-degrees orienta­
tions (p • .05). The mean scores were 1.Θ, 1.3, and 1.4, respectively. 
After removal of the 0-1 condition this difference became even more 
emphasized with mean scores being 2.0, 1.4, and 1.4 for the ISO-, 90-, 
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and 270-degrees orientations, respectively. Only the display condition 
χ orientation interaction which is shown in Figure 3 was found to be 
significant (F(4f180)-=2.3, ρ = .OS). However, also here the omission 
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Flg. Э The combined mean scores of the three 
display conditions for each age group, as a 
function of orientation. 
of the D-t condition from the analysis resulted in the disappearance of 
the significant effect. 
Latenaiea. The analysis of variance on the latencies revealed a signi­
ficant age ж display condition χ orientation interaction on the ρ < .05 
level (Γ(β,1ΘΟ)-2.6). This interaction is shown in Figure 4. Again, 
the pattern of latencies for the D-l condition clearly deviates from 
those of the D-2, and D-3 conditions. Only the kindergartners in the 
D-l condition show a lantency pattern identical to those in the other 
conditions. Reaoval of the D-l condition, however, led again to the 
disappearance of the significant interaction. Also the significant 
effect for the display conditions present in the first analysis dis­
appeared by the omission of the D-l condition. As result only the 
effect for age (F(2,45)»6.3, ρ < .01) and the effect for the orienta­
tion (P(2,90)-4.8, ρ < .05) remain significant in the analysis without 
the D-l condition. The first significant effect, that for age, showed 
that the kindergartners and first-graders required not significantly 
different latencies to solve the position-inference tasks (mean laten­
cies 6.9 and 7.8 seconds, respectively), but significantly more time 
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than the third-graders (mean latency 4.9 seconds, ρ ° .05). The effect 
for the orientations showed that identical latencies were required to 
solve the inference tasks for the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations 
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Fig. 4 The mean latencies in seconds as a function of the ori­
entations for each age group and display condition. 
(mean latencies 7.0, and 6.9 seconds, respectively) while the latter 
two orientations required significantly more time than the IBO-degrees 
orientation (i.e. 5.7 seconds, ρ - .05). The latter effect is most 
clearly demonstrated by the three age groups in the D-Э condition (see 
Figure 4). With the addition of the D-l condition also the main effect 
for the display conditions is significant (F(2,90)=24.4, ρ < .001) with 
mean latencies being 3.5, 6.Θ, and 6.4 seconds for the D-l, D-2, and 
D-3 conditions, respectively. The time required to solve the D-l con­
dition is significantly lower (p - .05) than the time required by the 
D-2, and D-Э conditions. 
4.3.3 Discussion 
The single-object display (D-l) in the present study apparently was of 
a different nature than the D-2, and D-3 conditions as result of the 
type of object (i.e. the yellow triangle). The apparent effect on 
both the correct scores and the latencies by the display conditions 
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was found to originate solely from the D-l condition. The amission of 
this condition fron the analysée resulted in the disappearance of this 
effect. 
λ number of perspective-taking studie« (Cox, 1977; Nigl and Flshbein, 
1973; Pufall, 1975) report the 180-degreea orientation to be more dif­
ficult than the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations. Flavell (196Θ) foam] 
that more errors were made by the ΙΘΟ-degrees orientation in a single-
object display than by the other orientations. In miltiple-objects 
displays this result was revere·. That is, more errors were made by 
the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations than by the 160-degrees orienta­
tion (see also Lauxendeau and Pinard, 1970; Eiser, 1974). The results 
of the present study also show thé latter pattern. Although, the D-l 
condition did not result in more errors for the opposite orientation 
than the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations, which were of equal diffi-
culty, It was also not easier. The D-2, and D-3 conditions, on the 
other hand, showed the ΙΘΟ-degrees orientation to produce less errors 
than the 90-, and 270-degx«ee orientations. Kceoxding to Lauxendeau 
and Pinard (1970) the ISO-degrees orientation requires sisple, symme­
tric reversals of the left-right, and far-near relationships between 
the objects, whereas the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations require 
asynsMtric transformations of left-right into near-far, and near-far 
into left-right relationships, respectively. 
While no significant differences were present between the D-2, and D-3 
conditions on basis of the correct scores, the latencies show that the 
ISO-degrees orientation in the D-3 condition requires less tine (i.e. 
5.4 seconds) than the 180-degreea orientation in the D-2 condition (i.e. 
6.1 seconds). There were no such differences between the two conditions 
for the 90-, and 270-degrees orientations. This result could be an 
additional corroboration of Laurendeau and Pinard'β (1970) assumption 
of symmetric reversals for this orientation which could then be facili­
tated by the stable reference point in the D-3 condition represented 
by the upright red cube in the center of the display. 
In general then, the pattern of latencies corresponds to that of the 
errors showing the ISO-degrees orientation to require less time than 
the 90-, and 270-degrees orientation. The latter orientations resulted 
in a lower correct score than the ISO-degrees orientation. 
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The developmental differences can be summarized Co an Increase In cor­
rect scores and a decrease In latencies required as a function of the 
three age levels used In the present experiment. 
In эшшпагу, the position-Inference ability appears to be Identical to 
the perspective-Inference ability. While the first experiment did not 
result In cleat significant differences between the two abilities, the 
present study showed that the development and the pattern of correct 
scores of the position-Inference ability correspond to a great extent 
to the data found by previous studies with regard to the perspective-
inference ability. 
According to Huttenlocher and Pressen (1973) adults, as well as child­
ren make use of a two-stage process in solving standard persoective-
taking tasks (see the Introduction, section 4.1). The first stage 
entails the consideration of "the relation between the imagined viewer 
and the array" (p, 296). The second stage consists of a rotation of 
"the entire observer-array pair until the Imagined observer becomes 
recoupled with ego". The thus obtained Imagined view of the display 
enables the reconstruction of the appearance of the array or the 
matching of the appearance with one of the available pictures of the 
array taken from the given orientations. In other words, the child 
"may take the observer-array relation and rotate that relation to his 
own-array relation and read off the resulting Image" (Shantz, 1975, 
p. 276). The ability to mentally rotate the array is then prerequisite 
to the perspective-inference ability (Buttenlocher and Pressori, 1973; 
Strauss and Cohen, Note 1). On basis of the found identity between the 
perspective-, and position-inference abilities, it can be assumed that 
also the resolution of the position-inference task will require the 
prior presence of the ability of mental rotation. The processes invol­
ved in the position-inference task could be assumed to consist of a 
rotation of the given observer-array relation from the own-array rela­
tion to the matching appearance of the array. 
According to Piaget and Inhelder (1971) the ability to mentally rotate 
an object or an array presupposes the presence of anticipatory imagery. 
The perspective-inference task and subsequently also the position-Infe­
rence task will require anticipatory Imagery "for successful task solu­
tion" (Brodzinsky et al., 1972). Plaget and Inhelder (1971) distinguish 
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between two types of anticipatory Imagery: (a) images concerned only 
with the product or result of an imagined process, that is product-
imagery, and (b) images concerned with the process of modification it-
self, that is modification-imagery. As the observer-array relation is 
rotated in ita entirety while no apparent changes in the interrelation-
ships between the objects in the array do occur (Buttenlocher and 
Pressen, 1973), it is hypothesized that developmental changes in the 
ability of product-imagery will affect the ability of perspective-, and 
position-inference. 
In order to explore whether there exists a relation between the deve-
lopment of product-Imagery and the ability of position-Inference, the 
subjects of the second experiment were also presented with a product-
imagery task. The latter task, developed by Oppenheimer and Strauss 
(1975) enables the assesaient of developmental levels of product image-
ry. The assessment of Imagery is based on children's gestures, verba-
lizations (i.e. explanations of the gestures), and drawings. The 
authors report that drawing was the most difficult symbolic medium, 
followed by verbalization and finally, gestures which was the easiest 
symbolic medium. In a follow-up study Oppenheimer (1976) found that 
the gestural, and verbalization media as separata criteria for the 
development of product-imagery did not sufficiently differentiate. Be 
suggests to combine both criteria into one criterion. As result child-
ren can be divided into the following three developmental levels of 
product-imagery: (a) none of the imagery criteria is reached (level 1), 
that is there is no evidence that product-imagery is present on the 
lowest symbolic level; (b) only the gestural-verbalization criterion 
is reached (i.e. level 2); and (c) the gestural-verbalization, and the 
drawing criteria are reached (i.e. level 3). A progress in the 
development of product-imagery then will have to correspond with an 
increase in performance on the position-inference task. 
4.3.3.1 Mate-riale and Procedure 
For the product-imagery task two closed wooden boxes (25x7.5x4 on) 
with two small holes in one side through which two wooden sticks of 
equal length (29 cm) could be entered were used. For the drawing 
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criterion, prepared drawings of the boxes without the sticke were 
presented on separate sheets. 
The product-imagery task was presented prior to the position-Inference 
task to all children that participated in the position-Inference study 
(Experiment 2). The procedure for this task was identical to the one 
used by Oppenheimer and Strauss (1975, p. 183). After the child had 
checked that both sticks ware of the same length, they were placed into 
the first box. Approximately 5 on of both sticks remained visible on 
the left side of the box. To ascertain that the child understood that 
both sticks were of equal length he had to Indicate, by pointing, where 
the invisible ends of the sticks had to be inside the box. Then the 
second box was placed over the protuding sticks, such that approximate­
ly 4 as of the sticks remained visible between the two boxes. Again, 
the child was requested to Indicate where both ends of the sticks had 
to be inside both boxes. Than the stick nearest to the child was 
pushed further into the left box. How the child was requested (a) to 
indicate, by pointing, the positions of the sticks inside both boxes 
and to explain his Indication, and (b) to draw the sticks on the pre­
pared drawing of the boxes. Both the Indication and the explanation 
were recorded. 
4.3.3.2 Resulta 
In accordance with the structural developmental theory the development 
of cognitive abilities is not bound to age. As result 16 kindergart-
ners and 5 first-graders could be divided into the three grouos corres­
ponding to the proposed levels of product-imagery development (i.e. 
levels 1, 2, and 3). The remaining children showed either a level 2, 
or a level 3 performance on the Imagery assessment task. This procedure 
also reduced the effect of age to a minimum as the mean ages for the 
three developmental groups were 6.3, 6.2, and 6.9 years, respectively. 
Two 3x3x3 (Developmental level χ display condition χ orientation) ana­
lysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors were 
carried out on the scores and the latencies for the position-inference 
task. 
Scores. None of the effects of this analysis were found to be signifi-
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сале. The effect for the display conditions is only significant at 
the ρ - .07 level (F(2,36)-2.9). The difference of this effect with 
that found in experiment 2 (see section 4.3.2) can be explained by the 
age group under consideration. In experiment 2 the display effect is 
formed by a combined effect for three age groups, while in the present 
study the majority of children are kindergartners only. The same 
explanation applies on the absence of an effect for the orientations. 
The mean scores for the kindergartners in experiment 2 were 1.0, 1.3, 
and 1.0 for the 90-, ISO-, and 2?0-degrees orientations, respectively, 
while the present study resulted in mean scores of 1.2, 1.4, 1.1, res­
pectively. No effect is present by the division of the children in 
levels of product-imagery on the performance of the position-inference 
task. 
Latenciea. Although the main effect for the display condition is 
significant (F(2,36)-6.7, ρ < .01) with mean latencies being 4.9, 7.9, 
and 6.3 seconds for the D-l, D-2, and D-3 conditions, respectively, 
again none of the other effects were found to be significant. 
4.3.3.3 Diaouesion 
The data show that there is no apparent relation between the develop­
ment of product-Imagery as assessed by the used imagery task and posi­
tion-inference. Subsequently, it could be argued that at least the 
position-inference process is not based on mental Imagery and conse­
quently mental rotation of the observer-array relation. Marmor and 
Zaback (1976), however, showed that although, visual imagery may be 
auxiliary to mental rotation, it appears to be no necessary prerequi­
site for mental rotation. That is the absence of a relation between 
product-imagery and poàition-inferenca warrants no conclusions with 
regard to the relationship between jthe latter and mental rotation. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The alas of the present study were threefold. First, to investigate 
whether position-inference and perspective-inference are identical 
processes; second, to explore the developmental course of position-
inference ; and third, to study the relation between mental imagery and 
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position-Inference. 
The results showed that both inference processes are identical and 
develop in on analoquous manner. While no conclusions could be drawn 
in respect to the relationship between mental rotation and position-
inference, no evidence was found that the latter ability should be 
related to the development of product-imagery. 
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5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RECURSIVE THINKING: SOME 
PROCEDURAL VARIATIONS l) 
Abstract 
Two hundred and forty children participated In a series of 
experiments that were designed to Investigate the develop-
ment of recursive thinking In greater detail. They were 
divided over three age groups with mean ages of 5.8, 7.2, 
and 9.3 years. In the first study the results found by 
(tiller et al. (1970) were replicated. The reduction of 
the verbal production requirements of the task, in the 
second study, led to the appearance of the conceptual ope-
rations for thought structures at approximately two years 
earlier that in the original task. In the third study the 
level of self-Involvement of the child, with the task, was 
increased. The results indicate that the increase of self-
involveaent led to a lower performance which was explained 
by the interfering role of the growing self-concept. In 
the fourth and fifth studies additional developmental steps 
were found within the ability to conceptualize thoughts 
about interactions. Children were first able to conceptu-
alize thoughts about interacting people, followed by Inter-
actions between people and objects, and finally. Interac-
tions between objects. The results and implications of 
these studies are discussed. 
S.1 Introduction 
In everyday life w· often have to pay attention to what other people 
are thinking, feeling, intending, and seeing. The ability to infer 
the thoughts, feelings, intentions, and perceptions of another person 
is referred to as perspective-taking. It consists of deductive proces-
ses by which we are able to form a picture (i.e. representation) of the 
"social perspective" of others. It is assumed that on basis of such a 
representation we are able to Interact properly (Flavell, 1974: Oppen-
helmer, 1978). 
Quite a number of studies have explored first, the development of 
conceptual perspective-taking, that is the development of the inferen-
tial processes with regard to the thoughts of other people (DeVries, 
1) Submitted for publication 
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1970; Kuzdak, 1977; Kurd·* and Rodgon, 1975i Marvin, Greenberg, and 
Moaslar, 1976i Moaalar, Marvin, and Greanberg, 1976» Rotanberg, 1974; 
Salman, 1971), and second, the davalopmnta of thoughts, or cognitions 
about intarparaonal relationships (Salman, Nota 1; Selman and Byrne, 
1974; Salaan, Jaquette, and Lavin, Nota 2; Saloan, Naiibargar, and 
Jaquette, Note 3). 
However, only little is known about the development of the ability to 
conceptualize specific typea of thinking, in particular with respect to 
the neated structure of thoughts. Miller, Kassel, and Flavell (1970) 
state that "Hianan objects can contact or apprehend other hunan and 
"""Ь"»" objecta in three ways: motor actions, perceptual actions, 
and representational ... actions" (pp. 613-614). Subsequently, a per­
son can think about motor actions, perceptual actions, and the thought 
actions of others or himself. In the lattar case of thought actions, 
thoughts became embedded or nested in thoughts: "he thinks that (I 
think that (ha thinks that ...)). This type of thinking is referred 
to as recursive or iterative thinking. The ability to conceptualize 
the iterative structures of thought is assumed to form part of, or to 
play an important role in the perspective-taking processes (DeVries, 
1970; Flavell, 1977; Miller et al., 1970). 
In order to assess the developmental sequence of the ability of recur­
sive thinking Miller et al. (1970) constructed a task, in which (our 
types of thinking were present. The first type of thinking, —conti­
guity thinking, refers to thinking about one, or more nonintaractlng, 
simultaneously, present persons. Action thinking is the second type 
of thinking and represents thinking about two interacting persons in 
"social nonrecursive action", e.g. talking. The third, and fourth 
types of thinking are characterized by the iterative structure of 
thoughts. They differ in the number of loops present in these struc­
tures. One-loop recursive thinking is represented by the structure: 
"he thinks that (I think that . . . ) " , while two-loop recursive thinking 
can be schematized by "I think that (aha thinks that (I think that .. 
..))". The different types of thinking were illustrated by line dra-
wlnga of a boy thinking about contiguous people, interacting people, 
and thinking people, aa described above. The authors presented these 
materials to children of varying agas, with the acccmpanying question 
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to tell what the boy was thinking about. The results showed that the 
conceptualization of thinking about contiguous people Is already fully 
developed at the age of 6 years, followed by action thinking at about 
the age of 10 years. One-loop recursive, and two-loop recursive thin­
king, however, only reached a level of approximately 50% correct and 
less, respectively, at the age of 12/13 years. 
Miller et al. (1970) mention two problems with regard to the task 
developed by them. First, they mention the unrealistic nature of the 
Items for the different types of thinking, and second, the high level 
of verbal production requlrstents Inherent In the used procedure. They 
assume that the development of the conceptualization of recursive 
thoughts may occur earlier by the presentation of more realistically 
drawn materials and by a nonverbal, presentation procedure for this 
task. 
An additional question that could be posed with regard to Miller et 
al.'s study concerns the level of self-Involvement of the child with 
the task. In fact, the children had to verbalize the thoughts of ano­
ther person (i.e. the boy in the line drawing). An Increase of the 
level of self-lnvolvonent could also reveal an earlier appearance of 
the understanding of recursive thoughts (Oppenheloer, 1977). 
Finally, objections can be raised to the type of nonrecursive social 
action used by Miller et al., that is talking; and to the fact that 
only use was made of persons but not of objects as contents of thoughts. 
The purposes of the present study are (a) to validate, by means of a 
replication study, newly drawn materials, (Ы to investigate the effects 
on the appearance of the ability to conceptualize thought structures 
by the reduction of the verbal production requirements of the task, 
(c) to investigate the effects of a heightened level of self-involve­
ment on the performance on the recursive thinking task, and (d) to 
explore the development of thinking about broader categories of objects 
and subjects and interactions between them. 
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5 . 2 E x p e r i m e n t 1 
5.2.1 Method 
S.2.1.1 Subjects 
The subjects for this study were thirty children from a kindergarten 
and an elementary school serving middle class neighborhoods in Nijmegen. 
Table I. The items used in experiments I, 2, and 3. (Copied froa Hiller et al., 
1970, p. 617). 
Item group 
and No. Debcription 
Contiguity: 
I The boy is thinking of the girl 
2 The boy is thinking of himself 
3 The boy is thinking of the girl and father 
4 The boy is thinking of himself and the girl 
3 The boy is thinking of the girl, father, and mother 
6 The boy is thinking of himself, the girl, and father 
Action: 
7 The boy is thinking that the цігі is talking Co father 
8 The boy is thinking that he is talking to the girl 
9 The buy is thinking that the girl is talking to him 
One-loop 
recursion: 
10 The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of father 
II The boy is thinking that he is chinking of the girl 
12 The boy is thinking that Che girl is chinking of him 
ІЭ The boy is thinking chat the girl is thinking of herself 
14 The boy is thinking that he is thinking of himself 
Two-loop 
recursion: 
15 The boy i s thinking chat the g i r l i s Chinking of the father 
thinking of mother 
16 The boy i s thinking that he i s chinking of Che g i r l chinking 
of herse l f 
17 The boy i s thinking that the g i r l i s chinking of him thinking 
of her 
18 The boy i s chinking chac he i s chinking of himself chinking 
of himself 
Note. For experimenc 3 an additional series of piccures on which a girl 
іь doing the chinking was constructed idendcal to the above series. 
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They were divided over three age groups with ages ranging from 6.1 to 
6.7 years (mean age 6.4 years: kindergarten), from 7.0 to Θ.6 years 
(mean age 7.5 years: first-grade), and from Θ.11 to 9.10 years (mean 
age 9.4 years: third-grade). Approximately equal numbers of boys and 
girls were present within each age group. 
S.Z.I. В Materiale 
The materials were newly drawn exactly in accordance with the descrip-
UNt-LUOr KLLUIblOH (I lea »β I«) TVU-UHV HLLIMSIU« ( I tr« 
Fig. 1 Examples of the items frog the four item groups. 
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tlon of the materials usad by Miller et al. (1970). Use was mads of 
18 white cards (13x18 en) on which a line drawing in black ink was pre­
sented. Table 1 represents a schoatic survey of the contents of each 
drawing. Figure 1 shows four of -the items, each representing an examp­
le of one of the four types of thinking, e.g. contiguity thinking, ac­
tion thinking, and one-loop recursive, and two-loop recursive thinking. 
5.2.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure for this task was identical to the one used by Miller et 
al. (1970). All subjects were tested individually in a separate room 
at the kindergarten and the elementary school. After the child was 
made acquainted with the form of representation of thinking clouds, 
and talking clouds, the IB cards «rare successively presented to him in 
one random order. Each card was accompanied by the question: "What 
is the boy thinking about". The responses were recorded on paper. 
In order to prevent an effect of one and the same card being the first 
to be presented to each child, for each child the first card was raso-
ved to be the last one. 
The scoring procedure was again identical to the one used by Miller et 
al. (1970). 
S.2.2 Results 
λ caparison was made between the results found by Miller et al. (see 
Miller et al., 1970: Figure 2, p. 619) and the results of the present 
study. As can be seen in Figure 2 there is no difference between the 
two tasks except for action thinking which scored slightly higher 
in the present experiment. The latter result can be explained by the 
somewhat more realistically drawn materials in the new task, that is 
the talking person had his face turned to the person he is talking to 
(see Figure 1, itan no. 9). In the original task as used by Miller et 
al. this was not the case. 
The results found by Miller at al. were replicated by the present stu­
dy on a Dutch population. Two conclusions can be drawn fron this 
result. First, that the sequence of conceptual operations of thinking 
is also valid for a Dutch population, and second, that the newly drawn 
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t'iq. 2 The scores for the four types of thinking of the 
Miller at al. (1970), and the present study, as a funct­
ion of grade level. 
materials used in the present study are comparable to the ones used by 
Miller et al. 
5.Э Experiment 2 
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Subjects 
The subjects for this study were again 30 children from a kindergarten 
and an elementary school. They were divided over three age groups 
with age ranges from 5.4 to 6.6 years (mean age 5.4 years: kindergar­
ten), from 6.9 to 7.6 years (mean age 7.1 years: first-grade), and 
from 9.0 to 9.8 years (mean age 9.6 years: third-grade). Approximate­
ly equal numbers of boys and girls were present within each age group. 
5.3.1.2 Materials 
The materials consisted of the same IB cards used in the first experi­
ment. However, as use was made of a simultaneous presentation of all 
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carda, the number of cards was reduced to 16. This was achieved by the 
omission of two cards from the two-loop recursive thinking items (itans 
no. IS and no. 18) for the Icindergartners, and two cards from the con­
tiguity thinking items (items no. 1 and no. 2) for the first-, and 
third-graders. 
5.3.1.3 Procedure 
Again all children were tested individually. After the child was made 
acquainted with the form of representation of the thinking, and talking 
clouds all 16 cards were placed in front of the child. Be was then 
asked to point to the card representing the verbally given thought 
structure. To illustrate, for item no. 12 the question was: "Show me 
the card on which the boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of 
him". The order of the verbally presented thought structures was iden­
tical to the presentation order of the cards in the first experiment. 
5.3.2 Results 
In order to compare the original procedure' with the revised procedure 
an 2x3x4 (Procedure χ age χ type of thinking) analysis of variance 
with repeated measures on the last factor was carried out. The out­
comes showed that the performance on the ability to conceptualize 
thought structures in the revised task was significantly higher than 
in the original task (F(l,541-12.26, ρ < .001). This result confirms 
the expectation that the reduction of the verbal production requirements 
to the passive use of language (i.e. comprehension) would lead to an 
earlier appearance of the conceptual operations of thinking. The ab­
sence of a significant procedure χ age interaction indicates that with 
a progressing age the higher performance on the revised task was main­
tained. In Figure 3 the graphs for the original and revised procedures 
for each type of thinking and each age group are represented. 
Separate Newman-Keuls analyses on the means revealed that, for the 
Icindergartners, the revised task resulted in significantly higher 
scores for contiguity thinking (p » .05), and action, one-loop recur­
sive, and two-loop recursive thinking (p - .01). For the first-, and 
third-graders significantly higher scores were found for action, one-
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Fig· 3 The mean scores of the three age groups in the re­
vised, and original procedures as a function of the four 
types of thinking. 
loop recursive, and two-loop recursive thinking at the .01 level. 
5.4 Experiment 3 
5.4.1 Method 
S.4.1.1 Subjects 
Again 30 children participated in this study. The age ranges of the 
three age groups were from 4.7 to 6.5 years (mean age 5.β years: 
kindergarten), from 6.6 to 7.5 years (mean age 7.1 years: first-grade), 
and from Θ.3 to 10.3 years (mean age 9.4 years: third-grade). In 
the present study there were exactly equal numbers of boys and girls 
within each age group. 
5.4.1.2 Materials 
In accordance with the purpose of the present study a second series 
of pictures was constructed in which a girl was doing the thinking. 
Subsequently, there was one series of pictures, identical to the one 
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used in the first experiment, for the boys, and one series of pictures 
for the girls. 
5.4.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure for this study was identical to the one used in the first 
experiment with the exception that the child was told that the boy/ 
girl on the picture represented the child him/herself. The accompany­
ing question to each card was formulated as follows: "Now imagine you 
are this boy/girl, then tell me what you are thinking about". If the 
child did not answer in the "I" form, he/she was again told that the 
boy/girl on the picture represented the child him/herself and the 
question was repeated. No problems were encountered by this procedure. 
Recording and scoring of the answers were identical to those used in 
the first study. 
5.4.2 Results 
An 2x3x4 (Procedure χ age χ types of thinking) analysis of variance 
with repeated measures on the last factor was carried out on the data 
of the present study and the data of the first study (i.e. the original 
S 
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Fig. 4 The combined mean scores for the self-
involved, and original procedures as a function of 
grade level. 
• original procedure 
О belt-involved procedure 
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procedure). The performance on the more self-involved task was found 
to be significantly lower that on the original task (F(l,54)- .1 , 
ρ < .01). In Figure 4 this difference is schonatically represented. 
This result is contrary to the hypothesis that an increase in the level 
of self-involvement with the task would lead to a higher performance 
on the ability to conceptualize thought structures. Of major Interest 
is the age χ procedure interaction which was found to be significant 
at the .05 level (F(2,54)-3.8). The interaction shows that with pro­
gressing age there is an increasing difference in performance between 
the two procedures in favor of the procedure used in the original task. 
S.S Discussion 
The three reported studies show that the appearance of the developmen­
tal sequences for recursive thinking is dependent on the specific pro­
cedure used. All three studies, however, corroborate the originally 
found sequence of development with regard to the conceptualization of 
thought structures (Miller et al., 1970). That is, children are first 
able to conceptualize thinking about contiguous people, followed by 
action thinking, and one-loop recursive, and two-loop recursive think­
ing, in this respective order. Independent of the procedure the same 
sequence was found. 
For the age range under study (e.g. from 4 till approximately 9 years), 
two-loop recursive thinking did not play any role. Only the third-
graders, in the nonverbal task did reach a level of performance above 
change level for this type of thinking. Younger children were not 
even able to grasp the structures of the verbally presented two-loop 
recursive thought hierarchies. The nonverbal task revealed that the 
development of the compréhension of thought structures, in contrast to 
the conceptualization (i.e. verbalization) of thought structures, 
occurs approximately two years earlier. The verbal production require-
ment seemed to be a major obstacle in the ability to conceptualize 
the thought structures, while the comprehension of these structures 
is already present. 
The results of the third study were surprising. On basis of an analy-
sis of a number of perspective-taking studies. Oppenheimer (1977) con-
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eluded that a high level of self-involvement with a task considerably 
enhanced the performance on the task. The main difference between the 
non self-involved tasks and the self-involved tasks was found to be 
present in the procedures used. In the non self-involved tasks the 
child was required to tell what another boy/girl would do, or think, 
while in the self-involved tasks the child was first told to identify 
himself with a particular story character and then asked to tell what 
he would do, or think. 
A first explanation for the contrary results in the third study could 
be that children have difficulties in identifying themselves with the 
cartoon figure as presented on the cards. However, if this would be 
the case then by a progressing age this difficulty should disappear. 
The results indicate that there is an increasing discrepancy between 
kimJargAFCen l-grade Э-grade 
CRAUE l£VfcL 
Fig. 5 The mean scores for the four types of thinking 
for the self-involved and the original procedures as a 
function of grade level. 
the original and the self-involved task as a function of age. With 
the exception of contiguity thinking, which was found to reach a 
ceiling effect already at the kindergarten-age, all other types of 
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thinking showed thla Increase in discrepancy as a function of aqe (see 
Figure 5). 
A second explanation of the resulta could be the role of the development 
of self-consciousness, or the self-concept In the ability to Identify 
with the cartoon figure. Although, there are numerous studies Investi­
gating the development of the self-concept (cf. Flavell, 1977) little 
is known about the effects of this development on the identification 
abilities. The present data suggest that a growing self-consciousness 
may affect the ability to identify oneself with other persons. This 
assumption is based on the result that kindergartners appear to have 
no problans in identifying themselves with the cartoon figure, though 
it did not lead to a higher score, while third-graders had quite seme 
problans in doing so. 
The purpose of the above mentioned studies was to investigate the ef­
fects of procedural variations of the original procedure used by 
Miller et al. (1970) on the assessment of the sequential steps for the 
conceptualization of thought structures. 
In the next two studies the contiguity, action, and one-loop recursive 
thinking components of the Miller et al. task were elaborated. Again 
the developmental sequence for recursive thinking, by means of the 
modified task, is investigated. 
5.6 Experiment 4 
5.6.1 Method 
5.6.1.1 Subjects 
Again 30 children participated in the present study divided over three 
age groups. The age ranges were from 4.8 to 6.3 years (mean age 5.6 
years: kindergarten), from 6.θ to 8.1 years (mean age 7.2 years: 
first-grade), and from 8.6 to 9.10 years (mean age 9.2 years: third-
grade) . Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were present 
within each age group. 
5.5.1.2 Materiale 
In the modified recursive thinking task the contiguity, action, and 
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Table 2. The items used in experinencs 4 end 5. 
Item group 
and No. Description 
Contiguity: (one object) 
1 The boy is thinking ot a piece of wood 
2 The boy is thinking of a train 
Э The boy is thinking of a tree 
Contiguity: (two objects) 
4 The boy is thinking of a car and a train 
S The boy is thinking of a tree and a piece of wood 
Contiguity:(one person) 
6 The boy is thinking of the aan 
7.. The boy is thinking of the girl 
в The boy is thinking of the woaan 
Contiguity:(two persona) 
9 The boy is thinking of the woman and the boy 
10 The boy is thinking of the girl and the boy 
Action:(person ж person) 
M The boy is thinking of two fighting boys 
12 The boy is thinking of two playing girls 
13 The boy is thinking of the man and the girl cycling 
Action:(person ж object) 
14 The boy ia thinking of the woman hanging out the washing 
15 The boy is thinking of the cycling girl 
16 The boy is thinking of the boy playing with a ball 
Action*(object ж object) 
17 The boy is thinking of the wind turning the sails of a windmill 
18 The boy is thinking of the woman and the boy painting 
19 The boy is thinking of the wind blcwing through the trees 
20.. The boy is thinking of fire burning wood 
One-loop recursion: 
21 The boy is thinking of himself thinking of the girl 
22 The boy ia thinking that the girl is thinking of the man 
and the woman 
23 The boy is thinking of himself thinking of a car 
24 The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of the doll 
and the babyoarriage 
25 The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of the man 
and woman playing tennis 
26 The boy is thinking of himself thinking of the boy playing 
with a ball 
27 The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of the wind 
turning the sails of a windmill 
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one-loop recursive thinking components of the original task were com­
plemented. In addition to only persons and interaction between only 
persona, as contents of thinking, also objects, interactions between 
person(s) and object(s), and (inter)actions between objects were in­
cluded. This resulted in a total of 27 white cards (13x16 cm) on which 
again line drawings in black ink, representing a boy doing the thinking, 
СІЖТІЫЛП |іы> .jbj.tt») IH*» n» <l LI'HIII-UITT |α« ргг.мі l i tt» no ·) ALIION (pano· • р«гіи«) ( I I · · то I I ) 
ACTION liwrtoa ι u b j d l I I I » »и '<' *· > " ^ ' , Ь І * 1 · «bj.
 к
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Fig. 6 Examples of items freni the different item groups of the ela­
borated recursive thinking task. 
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were present. In Table 2 the description of the 27 items is schemati­
cally represented. In Figure 6 examples of the items from the diffe­
rent types of thinking are shown. As can be seen in Table 2 there 
were no items for two-loop recursive thinking. This component was 
cnitted from the task on basis of the earlier found results that none 
of the children within the age range under study were able to solve 
correctly any of the two-loop recursive thinking items. 
5.6.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure for this task was again kept identical to the procedure 
used in the original task by Miller et al. (1970). Together with the 
presentation of each card the child was asked to tell what the boy on 
the picture was thinking about. In order to reduce the size of the 
task,selections were made from the pools of items for the different 
types of thinking to reach a total number of 18 cards for each age 
group. As result, the one-loop recursive thinking cards were omitted 
for the klndergartners. This emission was based on the floor effect 
for this type of thinking found by Miller et al. (1970) and which was 
replicated in the first experiment. In addition items no. 1 and no. 6 
from the contiguity thinking coaponent were left out of the total num­
ber of cards, resulting in 8 contiguity thinking, and 10 action think­
ing cards. For the first-graders, the number of contiguity thinking, 
and one-loop recursive thinking cards were reduced, leaving 4 cards 
for contiguity thinking, 10 cards for action thinking, and 4 cards for 
one-loop recursive thinking. For the third-graders only one card for 
contiguity thinking remained, while all action thinking carde (10), 
and all one-loop recursive thinking cards (7) were present. 
5.6.2 Results 
Only a comparison was made between the total scores for each type of 
thinking, irrespective of its specific contents, between the data fron 
the first experiment and the data from the present study. This com­
parison was carried out in order to check whether the addition of 
thought contents changed the performance on the modified task. 
An 2x3x4 (Task χ age χ types of thinking) analysis of variance with 
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repeated measures on the last factor did not result In any difference 
between the two tasks. The total mean scores being 4.4 and 4.3 for 
the original and modified tasks, respectively. In other words, both 
tasks appear to measure the same ability; the Inclusion of additional 
thought contents did not Interfere with the purpose of the recursive 
thinking task. No further analyses with respect to the present data 
were carried out. 
5.7 Experiment 5 
5.7.1 Method 
5.7.1.1 SubjectB 
Mithin the context of another study (Oppenheimer, In press) 120 chil-
dren were presented with the modified task for the assessment of the 
development of recursive thinking. The children were again divided 
over three¡age groups with age ranges frem 4.5 to 6.7 years (mean age 
5.7 years: kindergarten), from 6.10 to 8.1 years (mean age 7,4 years: 
first-grade), and from 8.7 to 10.6 years (mean age 9.4 years: third-
grade) . Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were present 
within each age group. 
5.7.1.2 Materiale and Procedure 
Both the materials and the procedure were identical to the one used 
in the fourth experiment with the exception that now an additional 3 
contiguity thinking cards were added to the task for the third-graders 
only. 
5.7.2 Results 
The following types of thinking, specified to its contents were in-
cluded in the analyses of the data: (a) contiguity thinking: (1) 
one person and (2) two persons, (3) one object and (4) two objects; 
(b) action thinking: (5) person χ person, (6) person χ object, (7) 
object χ abject; (c) one-loop recursive thinking: (8) all contents 
combined· 
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An 3x6 (Age χ types of thinking) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last factor resulted in significant effects for age 
(F(2,U7)=17.7, ρ < .01) and for the types of thinking (Ρ(5,5Θ5)»677.1, 
ρ < .001). In Figure 7 the curves for each age as a function of the 
types of thinking are represented. Also the age χ types of thinking 
interaction was found to be significant at the .001 level (F(10,585)= 
4.4). Seperate Newman-Keuls analyses revealed that the differences 
between the consequent mean pairs for contiguity thinking, action 
thinking (persons), action thinking (person χ object), action thinking 
(objects), and one-loop recursive thinking were significant at the 
one one two two 
регэоп objeLE persoiu objacts 
person ж peraoQ ж object ж onu-Loop 
perlón object obiect recunion 
una or IMIWINC 
Fig. 7 The mean scores for the three age groups as a function of the 
different types of thinking. 
ρ = .01 level for both the kindergartners and the first-graders. For 
the third-graders there was no significant difference between the 
means of action thinking (persons) and action thinking (object χ per­
son) but still between the latter two types of thinking and action 
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thinking (objects) (ρ - .01). 
5.7.3 DIscusslon 
What appears to develop between the ages of 4 till 9 years, with regard 
to the conceptualization of thought structures. Is the ability to con­
ceptualize different types of Interactions (I.e. different kinds of 
action thinking). Younger children have difficulties In the conceptu­
alization of Interactions between person(s) and object(s) and Inter­
actions between objects, in contrast to Interactions between persons. 
Older children, on the other hand, are able to conceptualize inter­
actions between persons, and Interactions between person(s) and ob­
ject (s) equally well, but still have difficulties In conceptualizing 
Interactions between objects. 
The late appearance of the ability to conceptualize Interactions be­
tween objects may have two distinct causes. First, it can easily be 
argued that wind and fire are not representative entities for objects. 
Additional research with other types of object χ object uiteractions 
is necessary to clarify this issue. 
The second reason for the late appearance may lay in the causal rela­
tions between the elements of the interaction. According to Fein 
(1973) the comprehension of psychological relationships (i.e. causali­
ty) appears prior to the comprehension of physical causality. She 
explains this development by the argument that "... children learn the 
rules of social justice early (because) they are exposed to violations 
of these rules. This is not the case with physical situations, in 
which the child does not view violations of causal laws" (Fein, 1973, 
p. 147; the brackets are mine). On basis of this argument Oppenhelmer 
(Note 4) distinguishes between interactions between (a) persons, (b) 
object(з) and person(s), and (c) objects as a function of the types of 
causal relations Involved in these interactions. Subsequently, per-
son(s) χ person(s) Interactions are characterized by only psychological, 
causal relationships; person(s) χ object(з) interactions by partial, 
psychological, and partial physical, causal relationships; and object(s) 
χ object(s) interactions by only physical, causal relationships. The 
increasing degree of complexity of the different Interactions as a 
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function of the causal relations la then in the above respective order. 
The results of the present study then could reflect the above levels of 
complexity.Inherent In the to conceptualize interactions. However, 
again additional research is necessary to substantiate the above assump­
tions. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In accordance with Miller et al. (1970), it was shown that the child 
passes four ordered conceptual operations in his developnent to concep­
tualize thought structures. In sequential order these operations are 
contiguity, action, one-loop recursive, and two-loop recursive think­
ing. 
The reduction of the verbal production requirements of the task led to 
the earlier appearance of the conceptual operations which indicated 
that verbalization of thought structures lags considerably behind the 
conprehension of the same thought structures. 
The negative effect of a higher level of self-involvement in the task 
was explained by the progressing development of the self-concept which 
may interfere with the ability to identify with the cartoon figure. 
Additional research in respect to this assumption is necessary. 
It appears that within the action thinking component additional, se­
quential, developnental steps can be distinguished. Children sean 
first to be able to conceptualize thought structures with regard to 
thinking about interacting people, followed by interactions between 
person(s) and object(э), and finally, interactions between objects. 
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6 . A VALIDATION STODX OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF EMOTIONAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 1 ) 
Abstract 
The aim of the present study was to validate an assessment 
instrument for the development of aootional perspective-
taking. 120 children participated in this study divided 
over three age groups: kindergarten (mean age 5.6 years)« 
first-grade (mean age 7.3 years), and third-grade (mean 
age 9.4 years). Scalogram analyses and a non-linear Item-
tree analysis revealed that one of the tasks was not posi-
tioned along the dimension of décentrâtion only. The re-
maining four tasks were found to differentiate adequately 
between the different age groups with regard to the deve-
lopment of emotional perspective—taking. 
6.1 Introduction 
The number of studies investigating the development of role-taking 
(henceforth, perspective-taking) has steadily grown over the last few 
years. Simultaneously, the number of develofmental sequences of pers-
pective-taking grew. A situation which led Urberg and Docherty (1976) 
to state that "rather than considering role-taking as a global, uni-
dimensional ability, the variables that are known or hypothesized to 
affect the role-taking process should be examined to detemine the 
developmental course of each as well as the interactions between than" 
(p. 203). 
In order to investigate the relationships between any of the hypothe-
sized variables (cf. Oppenheimer, 197Θ) and the perspective-taking 
processes, a valid assessment instrument for the developmental levels 
of perspective-taking is necessary. One of these instruments is the 
compound emotional perspective-taking task developed by Urberg and 
Docherty (1976) consisting of three already existing tasks (e.g. task 
I: Borke, 1971; task III: Burns and Cavey, 1957; task V: Chandler 
and Greenspan, 1972) and two tasks developed by the authors themselves 
1) Revised part of the article "Recursive thinking and the develop­
ment of social perspective-taking". In R.K. Silbereisen (Hg.), 
¡ieuetezter Soziale Kognition 1, 1977. Berlin: TUB-Dokumentation 
aktuell, 1977. 
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(е.?. taak II and task Г ). The numbering of the taaka from I to V 
corresponda to a progressively higher level of difficulty. The authors 
hypothesized that the tasks would be positioned along one dimension of 
decentratlon. That ls
r
 In order to solve the successive tasks an In­
creasingly higher level of decentratlon Is required. Subsequently, 
task I required one stereotypical answer (i.e. knowledge that another 
Individual possesses a perspective), task II required two stereotypical 
answers (I.e. perspective-differentiation), task III required one 
stereotypical, and one unique answer (i.e. perspective-differentiation, 
though more difficult than in task II), task IV required the inference 
of one stereotypical, and one unique perspective (i.e. non-mutual pers­
pective-taking) , and taak V required the simultaneous consideration of 
two conflicting perspectives (i.e. mutual perspective-taking). 
After presentation of these tasks to children within the age span from 
3 to 5 years, a Guttman scalograa analysis resulted in the following 
order for the tasks: task I, task III, task II, and task IV (Urberg 
and Docharty, 1976, p. 201). Because of a floor effect and the resul­
ting zero variance for task V, the task was omitted from the analysis. 
No explanation was offered by the authors for the position of task III 
in the above order, which deviates from the theoretically hypothesized 
one. The high coefficient of reproducibility (i.e. 0.99) for the 
above scale points to a possible overeatlmation of the level of decen­
tratlon required by task III. 
In the present study the above five tasks were presented to children 
within the age range fron 5 to 9 years with the aim first, to validate 
this Instrument on a Dutch population and second, to explore its 
applicability with older children. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Subjects 
The subjects were 120 middle-class children. They were divided over 
three age groups with age ranges from 4.S to 6.6 years (mean age 5.6 
years: kindergarten), from 6.8 to 8.1 years (mean age 7.3 years: 
first-grade), and from 8.6 to 10.6 years (mean age 9.4 years: third-
grade) . In each group approximately equal numbers of boys and girls 
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ware present. 
6.2.2 Materials 
The pictures and stories belonging to the five tasks were obtained from 
Kathryn Urberg and copied and translated into the Dutch language. The 
tasks consisted of short stories illustrated by pictures. In all tasks 
situations were described which affected the story characters diffe-
rently. For a more detailed description of the materials see Urberg 
and Docherty (1976). 
6.2.3 Procedure 
All children were tested individually in separate rooms at the kinder-
garten and elementary school. Again the procedures for the presenta-
tion and the scoring were exact replicates of those used by Urberg and 
Docherty. 
6.3 Results and Discussion 
In Table 1 the results of three Scalogram analyses are shown. The 
first scale is the one found by Urberg and Docherty (1976, p. 201). 
The second and third scales are based on the present data. The second 
scale resulted fron separata analyses for each age group (N - 40). It 
was found that the five tasks were ordered differently for the five 
year-olds than for the 7, and 9 year-olds. The order of tasks for the 
latter two age groups is shown in the third scale. Task III is seen 
to shift position along the scale as a function of a progress in age. 
A closer analysis of task II revealed that the unique answer required 
is also discongruent with the situation depicted in the pictures. 
That is, while on a birthday party one -stereotypically- is happy, the 
boy in the picture looks sad; or when sitting at a doctor's office 
to get a shot, one -stereotypically- is afraid, whereas the boy shown 
in the picture is smiling. In addition to the discongruent nature of 
this task it was also the only task in which emotional expressions 
were visible. In tasks I, II, and IV always blank faces were presen-
ted. The child had to infer from previous information, provided by 
the story, and the situation, shown in the pictures, how the story 
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Table 1. The Guttman scales for the perspective-taking tasks 
of the compound emotional perspective-taking instruments. 
Data Task Scale Coefficient of 
Reproducibility 
0.99 ( , ) 
0.9. ( , ) 
0.97 ( 1 ) 
(1) ρ < .01 
Note. The brackets for task V and task I indicate the omission 
of these tasks from the sealogram analyses as result of a floor-
effect for task 7 (i.e. a zero variance) and a ceiling-effect and 
lack of differentiation between tasks I and II. 
character is feeling, while in task III the child had to name the 
visible motional expression which was dicongruent with the situation. 
In other words, task III appears to require besides a specific level 
of decentration also understanding or negation of discongruity. An 
alternative explanation for the changing position of task III may be 
that younger children pay more attention to the facial expressions of 
persons than to the situations they are in, while older children seem 
to prefer to pay more attention to the situation than to the actual 
facial expressions shown (cf. Kiirdek and Rodgon, 1975) . 
On basis of the assumption that the correct resolution of task III 
depends not only on the level of decentration required but is also 
Influenced by additional variables, like the comprehension of discon­
gruity and developmental changes in the attention given to facial, 
and situational features, it is hypothesized that task III does not 
fit the unidimensional Guttman scale. This assumption is further 
corroborated by the relatively high coefficients of reproducibility 
for the found scales for each age group. 
The data for all groups together (i.e. of the present experiment) were 
analysed by Item Tree Analysis (Van Leeuwe, 1974), which produces a 
nonlinear hierarchy of the tasks. The resulting hierarchy (Rep-po 
0.96, CA. 0.88) is shown in Figure 1. The hierarchy does confirm the 
hypothesis: the lack of an arrow between two tasks within the hier-
Urberg and Docherty 
3-5 year-olds 
Present experiment 
5 year-olds 
Present experiment 
7-9 year-olds 
I, III, II. IV, (V) 
(I), II, III, IV, V 
(I), II, IV, III, V 
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archy points to the absence of a conditional relation. Task III is seen 
not to be related to task IV, while tasks I, II, IV, and V remain condi­
tionally related to each other in the respective order. As result task 
III was not further included in the analysis for perspective-taking 
development. Also task I was removed (see also Table 1) as at the age 
USI III 
USI 
U S I I . 
» 1 
USI IV 
USI II 
Fig. 1 The hierarchy of perspective-taking tasks 
of the emotional perspective-taking instrument as 
produced by the Item Tree Analysis (Rep-po 0.96, 
CA. 0. ). 
of 5 years all children had reached a near 100% correct score for 
both tasks I and II. 
An 3x3x2 (Age χ task χ item) analysis of variance with repeated measu­
res on the last two factors showed age to be significant (F(2,114)-
36.1, ρ < .001) with mean numbers of total correct responses being 9.9 
for the klndergartners, 10.8 for the first-graders, and 13.5 for the 
third-graders (i.e. the maximum score possible was 18). 
Newman-Keuls analyses on these means did not reveal any significant 
differences between the age groups. The age χ task interaction was 
found to be significant at the .001 level (Ρ(4,2βθ)=6.β). A ccmparison 
of the means showed that there were no significant differences on 
task II between the three age groups. For task IV, however, both the 
first-, and third-grade children's performance was significantly better 
than that of the kindergarten children (p = .01). Task V, on the other 
hand, showed the third-graders to be significantly better than both the 
kindergarten children and the first-graders (p = .05). 
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The above study left us with a considerably in size reduced emotional 
perspective-taking instrument. Only three tasks remained which diffe-
rentiate rather wall between levels of perspective-taking development 
between the ages of S to 9 years. For younger children task I can be 
added and task V omitted) resulting in an emotional perspective-taking 
instrument of always three tasks. 
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7 . THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECURSIVE THINKING AND SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING: A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY 1 ) 
Abstract 
Two studies were conducted in order to investigate the rela­
tionship between the developnent of recursive thinking and 
the developnent of social perspective-taking. In the first 
study two presentation procedures were used: a direct pro­
cedure, that is both a task for the assesaient of recursive 
thinking development and a task assessing the developnent of 
emotional perspective-taking were presented in one session 
following each other directly in the respective order; an 
indirect procedure, that is both tasks followed each other 
in two separate sessions with a time interval of 10 days. 
Hundred and twenty children participated in this study divi­
ded over three age groups with mean ages 5.7, 7.5, and 9.5 
years. A significant correlation was found to exist between 
the developments of recursive thinking and emotional pers­
pective-taking. The assumption that the indirect procedure 
would result in a higher training effect for recursive 
thinking than the indirect procedure was not confirmed. 
There was no unambiguous effect of the procedures on the 
performance of the perspective-taking task. There were dif­
ferential effects over the ages on the subtasks of the emo­
tional perspective-taking task as result of the procedures 
used. 
In the second study, recursive thinking was trained to cri­
terion and its effects assessed on an emotional, and concep­
tual perspective-taking task. Seventy-two children partici­
pated in this study again divided over three age groups with 
mean ages 5.7, 6.9, and β.7 years. A post-training task for 
recursive thinking showed that the training criterion level 
for action thinking, that is the ability to think and verba­
lize thoughts about interactions between persons, persons 
and objects, and objects was maintained for all three age 
groups. However, only the oldest group maintained its trai­
ning criterion level for one-loop recursive thinking (i.e. 
the comprehension of the iterative structure of thoughts) on 
the post-training task. The data showed that there was only 
a training effect for the oldest age group on the perspecti­
ve-taking tasks. In addition, the data indicate that one-
loop recursive thinking plays an important role in the abi­
lity to expose the underlying cognitions of behavior shown 
by other persons. The implications of the results are dis­
cussed. 
1) To appear in L.H. Eckensberger and R.K. Silbereisen (Eds.), 
Entuicklung Sozialer Kognition: Paradigmen, Theorien, Ergebnisse. 
Klett Verlag, in press. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The ability to think about the thoughts of other people is referred to 
as recursive thinldng; it includes the comprehension that thoughts may 
be self-embedded, that is "representational actions, but not perceptu­
al or motor ones, can enter recursive structures such as: I think 
that (you think that (he thinks that (she thinks that ...)))" (Hiller, 
Kessel, and Flavell, 1970, p. £14). In a task constructed to assess 
the develogment of recursive thinking Miller et al. (1970) made use 
of four types of thinking. The first type is called "contiguity 
thinking" and refers to thinking about Individually, simultaneously, 
present people. Thinking about interacting people in a "social non-
recursive action" (e.g. talking) Is referred to as action thinking. 
The iterative structure of thoughts is represented by one-loop recur­
sive thinking (e.g. he thinks that (you think that )) and two-loop 
recursive thinking (e.g. he thinks that (you think that (she thinks 
that ...))). Miller et al. (1970) presented children from varying 
ages with pictures representing the above types of thinking, thought 
by a boy. The children were asked to tell what the boy was thinking 
about. The authors found that thinking about contiguous people is 
already fully present at the age of 6 years, followed by action think­
ing at about the age of 10 years. One-loop, and two-loop recursive 
thinking, however, reached only a level of 50» correct or less, res­
pectively, at the age of 12/13 years. 
Several investigators (DeVries, 1970; Flavell, 1977; Miller et al., 
1970; Urberg and Docherty, 1976) have noted that the ability to think 
about the thoughts of 'other people may be one of the variables affect­
ing the development of perspective-taking. More specifically, Oppen-
heimer (197Θ) assumes that the ability to think about the inner pro­
cesses of another person, irrespective of the content (e.g. feelings, 
percepts, intentions, and thoughts) may lie at the base of the abili­
ty to infer the other person's perspective. It is thought that the 
ability to think about contiguous people and objects, and the 
ability to think about interactions between people are related to 
perspective-differentiation, and perspective-taking. 
Perspective-differentiation, —the ability to differentiate between 
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tuo or mora perspectives, and perspectlve-taXlng, —the ability to 
infer the perspective of another person are then based on observable 
features of behavior and actions and as such reducible to perception 
and verbalization of the perceived "behavioral perspectives": "He 
wants this and I want that", or "She feels good and I feel bad". 
Ho further inferences with regard to the reasons or underlying causes 
for certain feelings, percepts. Intentions, and behaviors are required. 
That is, no uhy is involved but only uhat. 
One-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking enable the child to expose 
the underlying cognitions (i.e. the cognitive, or conceptual perspec­
tive) of behaviors and experiences of the other person and his reac­
tions to the own or others' actions. As such one-loop, and two-loop 
recursive thinking, in particular, are thought to affect the develop­
ment of the ability to think about the inner processes and to the 
determination or inference of covert perspectives (Oppenheimer, I97θ). 
In order to investigate the relationship between the develojment of 
recursive thinking and the development of perspective-taking two 
studies were conducted. In the first study a recursive thinking task 
and an emotional perspective-taking task were presented, in the res­
pective order, in one session and in two separate sessions with a time 
interval of 10 days. In the second study recursive thinking was trai­
ned to criterion and its effects were assessed on an «notional and 
conceptual perspective-taking task. 
7.2 Experiment 1 
The purpose of this study was to trace the effects of the presentation 
of a task assessing the developnental level of recursive thinking di­
rectly prior to a task assessing the developmental level of emotional 
perspective-taking compared to an Indirect presentation of both tasks 
with an interval of 10 days in between them. It was expected that 
1) The present experiment was part of two separate studies validating 
Instruments for the assessment of the developmental levels of 
recursive thinking (cf. Oppenheimer and Belsma, Dote 1), and of 
emotional perspective-taking (cf. Oppenheimer, 1977). 
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the direct presentation would lead to a limited training effect for 
recursive thinking and subsequently would lead to a higher performance 
on the eeotional perspective-taking task in cooparison to the effects 
on the perspective-taking taak by the indirect procedure. 
For the assessment of the developnent of recursive thinking use was 
made of a newly developed task which was an elaboration of the origi-
nal task used by Miller et al. (1970). The additions in the new task 
consisted of the Inclusion of objects besides only persons in the 
contiguity thinking component; the inclusion of interactions between 
person(s) and abject(s) and interactions between objects besides the 
interactions between only persons in the action thinking component; 
and the inclusion of objects, interactions between person(s) and ob-
ject(s) and Interactions between objects besides only persons in the 
one-loop recursive thinking conponent. Two-loop recursive thinking 
was omitted as this type of thinking did not develop before the age 
of 12/13 years. 
A number of studies with these new materials (Oppenheuner and Helsma, 
Note 1) showed them to be valid and comparable to the materials used 
by Miller et al. (1970). For the emotional perspective-taking task 
use was made of part of the emotional perspective-taking battery de-
veloped by Urberg and Docherty (1976). The original battery consisted 
of five tasks which were positioned along the dimension of decentra-
tion. Validation of this battery on a Dutch population resulted in 
the omission of two tasks (Oppenheimer, 1977). One task was left out 
of the battery as already at the age of 4 years a ceiling-effect for 
this task was reached (i.e. task I of Urberg and Docherty). A second 
task was found not to be situated only on a decentration dimension as 
it required additional abilities like the cceiprehension of discongru-
ency (i.e. task III of Urberg and Docherty). This task was also re-
moved from the battery. Consequently, the remaining battery for the 
assessment of emotional perspective-taking development consisted of 
three tasks. Task 1, developed by Urberg and Docherty (1976) them-
selves was an extension of Borke's (1971) instrument. Instead of one 
stereotypical inference now two stereotypical inferences were required 
(i.e. perspective-differentiation). Task 2 was developed analoguous 
to a task used by Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, and Jarvis (1968) and 
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required one stereotypical and one unique inference (I.e. non-mutual 
perspective-taking). Task 3 made use of items developed by Chandler 
and Greenspan (1972) and required the simultaneous consideration of 
two conflicting perspectives (i.e. mutual perspective-taking). 
7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 Subi acte 
The subjects were 120 children from kindergarten and elementary 
schools serving middle-class neighborhoods in Nijmegen. The children 
were divided over three age groups with the age ranges from 4.5 to 
6.8 years (mean age 5.7 years: kindergarten), from 6.8 to 8.5 years 
(mean age 7.5 years: first-grade), and from 8.6 to 10.5 years (mean 
age 9.5 years: third-grade). Each age group was again divided into 
two groups of 20 children each who were assigned to either presenta­
tion procedure. There were approximately equal numbers of boys and 
girls in each group. 
7.Z.1.2 Materiale 
The гвоигаі в thinking task. The materials cor this task consisted 
of 27 white cards (13x18 cm). On each card was a line drawing in 
black Ink representing a boy thinking about one object (3 cards), two 
objects (two cards), one person (3 cards), two persons (2 cards), 
interacting persons (3 cards), person(s) interacting with object(s) 
(4 cards), objects interacting with objects (3 cards), and finally, 
7 cards on which the boy is thinking about a person, or himself, 
thinking about object(s), person(9), and Interactions between them 
The emotional perspective-taking task. The task consisted of pictu­
res with a short accompanying story describing a situation that 
affects the story characters differently. The pictures were presen­
ted in black line drawings on white cards (13x18 cm). The items of 
task 1 made use of two cards each; the itans of task 2 made use of 3 
cards eachi and the items for task 3 made use of 5 cards each. Each 
1) For a detailed description of the separate items see Oppenheimer 
and Неіэва (Note 1; chapter 5, in the present volume). 
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task consisted of thre« itame. (For α detailed description of each 
itaa I would like to refer to Urberg and Docherty, 1976, p. 200). 
7.2.1.3 Procedure 
Two procedures were used in the present study (e.g. the direct, and 
the indirect procedure). The presentation procedures for the recursi­
ve thinking task and the emotional perspective-taking task were iden­
tical in both presentation procedures. All children were individually 
tested in a separate room at the kindergarten and the elementary 
school. 
The recursive thinking taak. The procedure for this task was identi­
cal to the one used by Miller et al. (1970). Bach child was first 
presented with cards on which only thinking clouds, that is clouds 
with scalloped outlines, and two cards on which the boy is thinking 
about a bycicle and a person were drawn. These cards were used to 
explain the purpose of the task to the child and were followed by two 
practice cards to ascertain that the child understood what was requi­
red from him (use was made of two contiguity cards). 
For the kindergarten children the one-loop recursive thinking cards 
were omitted. For the first-grade children the number of contiguity 
thinking, and one-loop recursive thinking cards was reduced, while 
for the third-grade children the number of contiguity thinking cards 
was reduced. All in such a way that each group received 18 cards. 
After the pretest training each child was presented with the 1Θ cards 
which ware successively placed on the table in front of the child 
accompanied by the question: "What is the boy thinking about"? The 
answers were recorded and scored identical to the scoring procedure 
used by Miller et al. (1970). Only one random order of presentation 
for the cards was used as Miller et al. found no order effect. 
The emotional perepective-taking task. The procedure and scoring for 
this task was identical to the one used by Urberg ani Docherty (1976). 
The nine items were presented in a randan order and successively to 
the child. Depending on the iten the child was given a short descrip­
tion of the situation as shown on the pictures and was then asked 
questions with regard to the emotional state of the characters in the 
stories and with regard to the reasons for the emotional states. 
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7.2.2 Results 
In order to obtain a first impression in respect to the relationship 
between the development oi recursive thinking and the developnent of 
emotional perspective-taking the correlation between both developments 
was computed. For this reason the age groups from both presentation 
procedures were combined. An overall Pearson correlation coefficient 
of .43 (p < .001) was found. The development of recursive thinking 
seems to correspond to a simultaneous development of emotional perspec­
tive taking. For each age group separate correlation coefficients 
S 
О 2 
и 
ел 
0 . 
Kinder­
garten 
Task 3 
Direct 
Indirect 
first 
grade 
third 
grade 
GRADE LEVEL 
Fig. 1 The direct versus the indirect presentation 
procedure for tasks 1, 2, and 3 as a function of 
grade-level. 
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were computed. This resulted in a significant correlation between 
both developments (r = .34, ρ = .01) for the kindergartners, but not 
for the first-, and third-graders. It appeared that chronological age 
contributed to a great extent to the overall correlation. 
An 2x3x3x3 (Procedure χ age χ task χ item) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the last two factors on the scores of the emotio­
nal perspective-taking task did not reveal a significant effect for 
the procedure, but a significant procedure χ age χ task interaction 
(F(4,28B)=3.1, ρ < .05). In Figure 1 the graphs for the three age 
groups for each condition are shown. Newman-Keuls analyses on the 
means did not show any significant differences between the two proce­
dures for task 1, that is, all age groups reached a score of nearly 
100% correct. For task 2 it was found that the direct procedure had 
a significant posxtive effect for the kindergartners (p = .01). No 
further differences were found for this task. Task 3, to the contrary, 
showed that the indirect procedure had a positive effect for the kin­
dergartners and the first-graders (p = .01), while no differences 
between the two procedures were present for the third-graders. 
Additional 2x3x3 (Procedure χ task χ item) analyses of variance with 
repeated measures on the last two factors for each age group separa-
Λ 
• 
TASKS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Kindergarten f i r s t fjrade third grate 
» m Direct 
ù о Indirect 
Fig. 2 The direct versus the indirect presentation procedure 
for each task for each grade-level separately. 
Й 2 
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tely again showed the procedure χ task interaction to be significant 
for the kindergarten children (F(2,76)-14.2, ρ < .001) (see Figure 2). 
For the first-graders the indirect procedure resulted in a higher 
score on the eootional perspective-talcing task than the direct proce­
dure (F(1.38)-3.7, ρ a .05). Ho significant effects for the procedure 
and any of the interactions were found for the third-graders. 
7.2.3 Discussion 
The hypothesis that the direct procedure should lead to a training 
effect for recursive thinking and that its effect on the emotional 
perspective-taking task would be greater than for the indirect proce­
dure was not confirmed. There is no indication that the kind of 
procedure (e.g. direct vs indirect) had any effect on the performance 
on the emotional perspective-taking task. Consequently, a number of 
questions can be raised. First, with regard to the relationship be­
tween recursive thinking and emotional perspective-taking. That is, 
is the hypothesis that recursive thinking affects the development of 
perspective-taking valid? From the above data this question can not 
be answered as there is no way to ascertain whether the direct proce­
dure, as contrasted to the indirect procedure, equals the effects of 
a training procedure. 
There is reason to suggest that no training did occur, or that the 
training effects of both procedures were Identical and not influenced 
by a time interval of 10 days. 
A second question that can be posed is whether the training of recur­
sive thinking, which really refers to the comprehension and verbali­
zation of thoughts and thought-structures (i.e. more specifically a 
part of conceptual perspective-taking), will have an effect on emo­
tional perspective-taking, in particular. It can be argued that 
emotional perspective-taking in comparison to conceptual perspective-
taking relies to a greater extent on external features of expressions 
and own knowledge about causes for these expressions than on the inner 
psychological processes of the other person. The latter assumption 
implies that training of recursive thinking will have only little 
effect on emotional perspective-taking but a greater effect on con-
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captual per epectlve-taJoLng. 
Th· purpos· of the second study is to obtain answers to the above 
questions. In order to attain this goal recursive thinking will ex-
plicitely be trained to criterion and the effects of the training 
will be assessed by means of an emotional, and conceptual perspective-
taking task. 
7.3 Experiment 2 
Two hypotheses were formulated. The first stated that if recursive 
thinking can be regarded as part of the conceptual perspective-taking 
process, then the effects of a training of recursive thinking will be 
greatest on the conceptual perspective-taking task. The second hypo­
thesis was based on the two procedures used in the present experiment. 
The procedures were (a) the training procedure, consisting of the 
training for recursive thinking to criterion and the presentation of 
the perspective-taking tasksι and (b) the control procedure In which 
only the perspective-taking tasks were presented. It was expected 
that the performance on both perspective-taking tasks (i.e. the emo­
tional, and conceptual perspective-taking tasks) will be higher in 
the training procedure than in the control procedure. 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Subjecte 
The subjects In this study were 72 children from kindergartens and 
elementary schools serving middle-class neighborhoods in Nijmegen. 
Again the children were divided over three age groups with the age 
ranges from 4.9 to 6.7 years (mean age 5.7 years: kindergarten), 
from 6.4 to 7.11 years (mean age 6.9 years: first-grade), and from 
8.1 to 9.6 years (mean age 8.7 years: third-grade). The 24 children 
in each age group were randomly assigned to either the training, or the 
control procedure. Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls 
were present in each experimental group. 
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7.3.1.г Materiale 
The training and poet-training taske for recureive thinking. The 
training for recursive thinking made use of 20 variations of the items 
fren the elaborated task for the assessment of developmental levels 
of recursive thinking (see experiment 1). In total, seven contiguity 
thinking cards; one person χ person interaction card; four person χ 
object Interaction cards; two object χ object interaction cardai and 
six one-loop recursive thinking cards were used. For the post-train­
ing task the elaborated task far recursive thinking consisting of 18 
cards (see experiment 1) was used. 
The emotional perspective-taking task. The same task for the assess­
ment of the developmental levels for emotional perspective-taking, as 
used in the first experiment, was presented in the present study. 
However, instead of 3 items per subtask, now only 2 Items per sub-
task were used. 
The conceptual perspective-taking taak. Analoguous to the tasks for 
emotional perspective-taking used by Urberg and Docherty (1976) a 
conceptual perspective-taking task was developed and validated by 
Wiggers (Note 2). Again the tasks consisted of pictures with a short 
accompanying story. The pictures were presented in black line dra­
wings on white cards (13x18 cm). The Items of task 1 made use of 
two cards each; the Items of task 2 made use of three cards each; and 
the items of task 3 made use of four cards each. Each task consist­
ing of two Items required identical answers as the emotional perspec­
tive-taking tasks. That is, task 1 referred to perspective-differen­
tiation, task 2 to non-mutual perspective-taking, and task 3 to mu­
tual perspective-taking. In Figure 3 one of the items of task 3 Is 
shown to illustrate the materials. The accompanying story and ques­
tions ran as follows: "This boy has been playing in a playing-garden 
and is now going heme for dinner. However, on the way home he gets 
a flat tyre and he has to walk. As result he arrives too late at 
hone for dinner. Why did he arrive too late? What does the mother 
think that happened? Why does she thinly that?" The scoring for this 
task is 2 if the child is able to distinguish correctly between the 
perspectives of the boy and the mother and is able to give correct 
explanations for these perspectives. A score of 1 is given when the 
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child distinguishes correctly between the perspectives but is not able 
to offer correct explanations, and a score of 0 is given when the child 
Fig. 3 An example of an item of task 3 of the conceptual perspec-
tive-taking task. (From Niggers, Note 2, p. 10). 
is not able to distinguish between the perspectives. The total score 
for this task was 4 (i.e. both itees correct). 
7.3.1.3 Procedure 
Again the children were tested individually in separate rooms at the 
kindergarten and elementary school. In the training procedure, the 
children received the training for recursive thinking to criterion 
and the post-training task, followed by a random order of the perspec-
tive-taking tasks. In the control procedure the children were presen-
ted with the perspective-taking tasks only. 
The training procedure. The aim of the training procedure was to ex-
plain to the child the structures Inherent in thinking about thoughts 
and to teach him how to verbalize these structures correctly. In 
order to attain this goal first three contiguity, and one action think-
ing cards (i.e. the instruction cards) were presented successively. 
Each card was discussed so that the child became acquainted with the 
form of representation of thinking. The first four cards were then 
followed by one additional action thinking card. Then several cards 
were presented simultaneously to explain how, for instance, contiguity 
thinking and action thinking differed, or how contiguity thinking, 
that is thinking about a person or object may be imbedded in one-loop 
recursive thinking. 
To illustrate, in one simultaneous presentation two contiguity thinking 
cards and one one-loop thinking card were presented (see Figure 4). 
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First it is Biade clear that the "girl is thinking about herself (card 
A) and that the "boy is thinking about the girl" (card B). Thus if 
the boy knows that the girl is thinking about herself then the "boy 
thinks that the girl is thinking about herself" (card C), which is 
represented by the one-loop recursive thinking card. This training 
φ φ Φ 
Ιλ) (·) IO 
Fig. 4 An example of the simultaneous presentation of two cards 
for contiguity thinking (cards A and B) and one card for one-
loop recursive thinking (card C) in the training for recursive 
thinking. 
was continued till the child was able to verbalize 10 out of 16 cards 
correctly (i.e. the four instruction cards excluded) without further 
assistance. 
After this was achieved, the elaborate recursive thinking task was 
presented in order to check if the criterion level reached by the 
training would be more than the learning of only rules or the verbal 
label belonging to a specific picture. 
The perepeotive-taking tasks. The perspective-taking tasks were pre­
sented in a randoa order. That is, each subtask of both the emotional, 
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and conceptual perspective-taking tasks consisted of two items each 
resulting in a total of 12 items. Irrespective of the content (i.e. 
emotions or concepts) one random order of the itene was constructed. 
The procedure for these tasks was identical to the one used in the 
first experiment. Both the training, and control groups received the 
same randan order of the perspective-taking tasks. 
7.3.2 Results 
The training for recursive thinking did not succeed in teaching kinder­
garten children to comprehend the structure of one-loop recursive 
thinking, or even to learn a rule to verbalize this type of thinking. 
Although, the first-graders reached criterion level for one-loop 
recursive thinking, during the training procedure, this level was not 
maintained on the post-training'task, which made use of similar but 
not identical materials. This result showed that the first-graders 
were able to grasp the verbal rule necessary for the verbalization of 
the pictures used in the training procedure. No comprehension of the 
iterative nature of the thought structures was learned. Only the 
third-graders maintained their training level also on the post-train­
ing task. More specifically, the training for recursive thinking had 
no effect on contiguity thinking as this ability reached already a 
ceiling effect at the age of 5 years (cf. Miller et al., 1970; Oppen­
heimer and Helsma, Note 1). There was a clear effect on the ability 
for action thinking. All three age groups maintained their criterion 
level on the post-training task. The mean scores were 9.2, 8.8, and 
8.6 for the third-grade, first-grade, and kindergarten children, res­
pectively. The effect on the ability of one-loop recursive thinking 
only held for the third-graders. For the first-graders there was no 
maintenance of criterion level, and for the klndergartners even cri­
terion level could not be reached for one-loop recursive thinking. 
An 3x2x2x3 (Age χ procedure χ perspective-taking task χ subtask) ana­
lysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors was 
carried out on the scores of the perspective-taking tasks. The analy­
sis showed the training procedure to have a significant effect 
(F(l,661-13.6, ρ < .001) on the perspective-taking tasks. There was 
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no significant effect for the perspective-taking tasks, that is there 
seems to be no differential effect of the training on the emotional, 
and conceptual perspective-taking tasks. However, the procedure χ 
subtask interaction was found to be significant on a ρ < .01 level 
(F(2,132)-5.5). 
As the main effect for the training procedure was found to be signifi­
cant, while apparently this training had only a vary limited effect on 
the performance for recursive thinking, separate 2x2x3 (Procedure χ 
perspective-taking task χ subtask) analyses of variance were carried 
out for each age group. 
Kindergarten. The analysis of variance did not result in a significant 
effect for the procedure. That is, the performance on the perspective-
taking tasks was not influenced by the training for recursive think­
ing. The only significant result for this age group was the main 
effect for the subtasks (F(2,44)-21.1, ρ < .001), which was expected 
as the subtasks were situated along a dimension of progressively 
higher levels of perspective-taking development. Neither the main 
effect for the perspective-taking tasks, nor any of the interactions 
were found to be significant (see Figure 5). 
First grade. Near similar results as for the kindergartners were found 
for the first-graders. Again no effects for the procedure and pers­
pective-taking tasks were present. The subtasks had a significant 
effect on a ρ < .001 level (F(2/44)-292.1). However, for this age 
group the perspective-taking tasks χ subtasks interaction was signifi­
cant (F(2,44)-21.1, ρ < .001) (see Figure 5). 
Third-grade. The analysis of variance for this age group resulted in 
a significant effect for the procedure (F(1,22)-16.7, ρ < .001). That 
is, the training procedure resulted in a significantly higher score 
on the perspective-taking tasks than the control procedure. The main 
effect for the task reached significancy on a ρ - .07 level (F(l,22)-
3.S). Conform the hypothesis the training effect on the conceptual 
perspective-taking task is higher than on the emotional perspective-
taking task, at least for this age group. 
Newman-Keuls analyses on the means showed that for the conceptual 
perspective-taking task the training effects were significant on the 
ρ - .OS level for task 2, and on the ρ - .01 level for task 3. For 
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Fig. S The effects of the training for recursive think­
ing for each grade level on the subtasks of the enotion-
al, and conceptual perspective-taking task 
the emotional perspective-taking task the training effects were signi­
ficant only for task 3 on the ρ » .01 level. 
7.3.3 Discussion 
Although the hypothesis stating that the training for recursive think­
ing would lead to a higher performance of the perspective-taking tasks 
was confirmed by the above experiment, additional analyses showed that 
only the third-graders contributed to this effect. Neither the kin-
dergartners, nor the first-graders showed a significant Increase in 
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performance on the perspective-taking tasks as result of the training. 
In the light of the results on the post-training task for recursive 
thinking it appears that training of only contiguity, and action think-
ing does not result In a higher level of perspective-taking. However, 
training of one-loop recursive thinking, which was only possible with 
the third-graders, resulted in a significant higher score on the pers-
pective-taking tasks. This implies that the ability to think about 
the thoughts of other persons, that is the comprehension of the itera-
tive nature or structure of thoughts, plays an Important role in the 
ability to expose the underlying cognitions of behavior, or the pers-
pective of another person. The assumption that contiguity, and action 
thinking are related to perspective-differentiation could not be test-
ed as the emotional, and conceptual perspective-differentiation sub-
tasks (i.e. tasks 1, respectively) already reached a ceiling effect 
at the age of S years. For the second subtask of the emotional pers-
pective-taking task (i.e. task 2) a ceiling effect was reached at the 
age of approximately 7 years. These ceiling effects could be the 
cause for the nearly significant differential effects of the training 
on the anotional, and conceptual perspective-taking tasks for the 
third-graders. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The ability to take the perspective of another person and to determine 
what this perspective looks like was found to be influenced by the 
development of recursive thinking. The comprehension of the iterative 
structure of thoughts, that is that thoughts can be subject of thought, 
seems to be an important achievement in order to infer the underlying 
cognitions of emotional expressions and thoughts of people. The se-
cond study showed that there is an apparent causal relationship between 
the ability of recursive thinking and the ability of perspective-
taking. 
Whether this relationship is a necessary but not sufficient one is not 
yet clear. The construction of new perspective-taking tasks which 
will not reach a ceiling effect at the ages used in the present experi-
ments, or the use of these tasks on younger age groups may provide 
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information with regard to the relatlonahipa between contiguity, and 
action thuiking and the ability of perspective-differentiation. That 
such a relationship is aesumable can be deduced from the correlation 
betveen the developnent of recursive thinking and perspective-taking 
at the age of S years (see experiment 1). 
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8. AN EVALUATION 
In the previous six chapters attention was payed first, to a number of 
theoretical constructs with regard to the development of social cogni­
tion and perspective-taking. In particular, and second, to the relati­
on· between several (social) cognitive abilities and perspective-taking. 
On basis of the Introduction and the reported studies It became clear 
that two distinct questions can be raised with regard to the development 
of the processing of social perspectives. 
The first question can be formulated by the statement! "What Is a child 
able to do", and what kind of descriptive developaiental levels can be 
assigned to qualitative, and/or quantitative differences In his perfor­
mance. 
The second question, however, relates to the problem "why a child Is 
able to do Л and not B", or why a child functions on level η and not on 
level η + 1. The latter question can be further specified by asking 
what (social) cognitive abilities are prerequisite or necessary for a 
functioning on level η + 1, that are not yet present or developed when 
the child is functioning on level n. 
The studies reported in the present monograph centered on a limited 
number of (social) cognitive abilities hypothesized to affect the deve­
lopment of the processing abilities of social perspectives, with empha­
sis on the perspective-taking ability. 
Θ.1 The experiments 
In the first study reported in chapter 4, the ability of visual pers­
pective-taking and position-taking, in particular, was studied. Al­
though, visual perspective-taking Is most clearly linked to concrete, 
geographical (i.e. physical) rules and thus less characteristically a 
social cognitive ability, it functioned as the fundamental paradigm for 
most later social cognitive research, which focussed upon role-taking 
or perspective-taking. The ability to place oneself in the position of 
another person (and to determine what the other sees, i.e. what kind of 
visual experience the other individual will have) is best operationali-
zed by the visual perspective-taking task. 
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In addition, the visual perspective-taking ability is probably the 
most intensively studied type of perspective-taking. While part of 
the studies up till now have centered on rule learftiog (e.g. Flavell, 
1974, 1977; Lempers, Flavell, and Flavell, 1977) Nasangkay, McCluskey, 
Mclntyre, Sims-Knoght, Vaughn, and Flavell, 1974; Shantz and Watson, 
1970), another part of the studies has been investigating the perspec-
tive-taking ability and the inference processes, in particular (e.g. 
Brodzinsky, and Jackson, 1973; Coie, Costanzo, and F amili, 1973; 
Fishbein, Lewis, and Keiffer, 1972; Buttenlocher, and Pressen, 1973). 
However, in spite of the many often very ingeniously designed studies 
only little can be said about the actual inferential processes occur-
ing during the activity of perspective-taking. 
The issues studied in the visual perspective-, and position-inference 
study reported in chapter 4 were first whether both inferential pro-
cesses develop slnultaneously and in an identical way and second, 
whether the position-inference ability is related to the development 
of mental imagery. In accordance with Piaget and Inhelder's (1971) 
findings both inferential processes were found to be similar both in 
their patterns of correct scores as well as latencies. The initial 
hypothesis stating the position-inference ability to develop prior to 
the perspective-inference ability was not confirmed. In addition, the 
data corroborate the assumption that the position-inference process, 
like the perspective-inference process, makes use of systematic rever-
sals of left-right, and near-far relationships between the objects in 
the display (cf. Laurendeau and Pinard, 1970). 
The second question with regard to the relationship between position-
inference and the development of mental Imagery should have provided 
some information concerning its status (i.e. of mental imagery) as 
prerequisite ability to the position-inference ability. Previous 
studies (Huttenlocher and Pressen, 1973; Strauss and Cohen, Note 1) 
had Indicated that the ability of mental rotation underlies the abili-
ty of perspective-taking. In addition, according to Plaget and Inhel-
der (1971) the ability of mental rotation is dependent of the presence 
of antiäipatory imagery. On basis of the found similarity between 
perspective-, and position-inference the same link between mental ima-
gery, mental rotation and position-inference was postulated. The data 
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showed that there is no apparent relation between the developnent of 
mental imagery, that is product-imagery, and position-inference. Al-
though, this result does not warrant any conclusion with regard to the 
hypothesized relation between mental rotation and position-inference, 
the assumption that mental imagery will be prerequisite to mental ro-
tation, and consequently, prerequisite to position-Inference was not 
confirmed. 
The abilities of mental imagery, mental rotation, and systematic rever-
sals of interrelationships between objects then were regarded to be 
auxiliary, or supporting abilities for the visual position-, and per-
spective-taking abilities (i.e. the former abilities were hypothesized 
to affect the development of perspective-taking). 
For the more characteristically social cognitive types of perspective-
taking, that is emotional or affective, and conceptual perspective-
taking such an auxiliary ability may be the ability to conceptualize 
thoughts of other people; be it thoughts about people, objects, inter-
actions between them, or thoughts about the latter thoughts. Under the 
heading of recursive thinking these different types of thoughts are 
included. 
It is here necessary to note that the ability to conceptualize thoughts 
of other people is not yet identical to the process of conceptual per-
spective-taking. The inferential process which leads to the final 
conceptualization of the thinking of another individual will make use 
of certain types of information, observable in behavior or verbally 
obtained by interaction. The integration of this information will 
lead to the construction of the representation of the thoughts of an-
other individual. Which processes play a role in the extraction of 
the relevant information and which processes play a role in the inte-
gration and construction of the representation (i.e. the final concep-
tualization) lay as yet beyond the scope to the present discussion. 
The final process, that is the conceptualization (and verbalization) of 
the obtained representation of the thoughts of another individual is 
called the ability of recursive thinking. As such recursive thinking 
cannot be identical to conceptual perspective-taking, but only one 
of the variables, —or the last stage within this process, which affects 
its development. 
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The development of recursive thinking was studied in five successive 
experiments which are reported in chapter 5. Host salient in all the 
studies was the recurrent appearance of one sequence for the four dif-
ferent types of thinking included under the heading of recursive 
thinking. Thus the ability to conceptualize thinking about non-inter-
acting persons and objects (i.e. contiguity thinking) preceded the 
ability to conceptualize thinking about interacting people (i.e. action 
thinking), followed by one-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking, in 
this respective order. One-loop, and two-loop recursive thinking 
referred to the iterative nature of thoughts, that is, that 
thoughts can be abject of thoughts. 
Host interesting were the results of the last two experiments in this 
chapter. It appeared that there exists an additional sequence for the 
conceptualization of thinking about interactions. The sequence found 
indicates that thinking about Interacting people is easiest to concep-
tualize followed by the conceptualizations of thinking about people 
Interacting with objects, and objects (inter)acting with objects, in 
this respective order. The reasons for such a sequence are not yet 
clear, although, one explanation in terms of different and more complex 
combinations of causal rules inherent to each type of interaction, was 
offered. The major developmental achievonent with regard to the abili-
ty to conceptualize the thoughts of other people, within the age range 
under study (e.g. 4- to 9-year olds), seesis to be the transition from 
the conceptualization of interacting persons, by way of the conceptu-
alization of persons interacting with objects, to the conceptualization 
of (inter)acting objects. 
Prior to the investigation of the relationship between the development 
of recursive thinking and emotional, and conceptual perspective-taking 
(see chapter 7) a validation study for the emotional perspective-taking 
task was carried out. This study, -reported in chapter 6, highlights 
the complex nature of the perspective-taking tasks. As was noted in 
the introduction the subdivision of the social perspective Into content-
specific perspectives (i.e. visual, emotional, conceptual, and intenti-
onal perspectives) is an artificial and pragmatic one. Nevertheless, 
tasks were constructed which emphasize either one of the above perspec-
tives. The five tasks included in the emotional perspective-taking 
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instrument used by Urberg and Docherty (1976) were assumed to tap the 
emotional perspective-taking ability. In particular. The validation 
study showed that the third task did not fit this assumption. Hie 
shift of position of this task In relation to the other tasks as a func-
tion of age, and an additional analysis of the task requirements provi-
ded evidence for the conclusion that besides the perspective-differen-
tiation ability, other (social) cognitive abilities were required to 
reach a correct solution. A nonlinear analysis of the tasks further 
substantiated this assumption. As result this task was omitted from 
the emotional perspective-taking instrument. 
Chapter 7 reports on two studies In which the relationship between the 
development of recursive thinking and the development of emotional, and 
conceptual perspective-taking are explored. The results of this study 
really constitute the first confirmatory attempts of the theoretical 
models proposed in chapter"3. Besides an overall correlation between 
the developments of recursive thinking and emotiooal perspective-taking 
reported In the first experiment, the second experiment provided evi-
dence for a possible causal relationship between recursive thinking and 
both emotional, and conceptual perspective-taking. The evidence cen-
tered on the relationship between the ability to conceptualize the 
recursive nature of thought (i.e. one-loop recursive thinking, in par-
ticular) and emotional, and conceptual perspective-taking. Conform 
the hypothesis, it became apparent that at least for the third-graders 
the ability of one-loop recursive thinking affects the ability of mutu-
al perspective-taking. Fundamental to the latter ability is the com-
prehension that one's own perspective (e.g. thoughts, feelings, intents, 
and percepts) will influence the perspective of another individual and 
viae versa. Consequently, the comprehension that "he knows that (I 
know that . . . ) " (i.e. one-loop recursive thinking) becomes paramount in 
the ability of mutual perspective-taking. Training of this comprehen-
sion and the conceptualization of this type of thinking should then 
enhance the mutual perspective-taking ability. This was indeed found 
for the oldest age group (i.e. the third-graders). The proposed rela-
tionships between contiguity thinking and perspective-differentiation, 
on the one hand, and action thinking and non-mutual perspective-taking, 
on the other hand, could not be confirmed as result of ceiling-effects 
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for the perspective-differentiation and the non-mutual perspective-
taking taaks. 
Θ.2 Future experiments 
From the above it is clear that the presented studies only mark the 
initiation of an additional series of studies. Quite a number of 
proposals for further experloents can be derived from the unanswered 
questions. Thus the issue of the relation between the development of 
mental imagery, mental rotation, and visual perspective-taking can be 
further explored. Additional perspective-taking tasks for intentio­
nal perspective-taking can be developed to investigate the relation 
between recursive thinking and intentional perspective-taking. New 
perspective-differentiation, and non-mutual perspective-taking tasks 
should be constructed to study the relations between the latters and 
contiguity, and action thinking. 
Bowevar, it would lead too far to record all possible studies that 
could be designed to explore social cognitive development and the 
processing abilities of social perspectives, in particular. 
At present, three additional studies are on their way of execution. 
The first deals with the construction of an instrument which will 
provide some insight into the development of causal thinking and anti­
cipation in social interactions. The second study focusses upon the 
development of concepts about people. Also here new instruments are 
being developed which will function as assessment instruments for this 
developnent. Finally, the third study will explore the development of 
the temporal ordering of social events both into the future (i.e. 
anticipation! as well as back into the past. The three topics studied 
by the above experiments are also incorporated in the models presented 
in chapter 3. The final aim of each study is to relate the develop­
ments of causality, anticipation, temporal ordering, and concepts 
about people to the development of the processing abilities of social 
perspectives. 
In addition, during the work with the theoretical model presented In 
chapter 3, it became apparent that the cognitive model neglects too 
many additional, equally relevant variables given, for instance, in 
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the child's environment (e.g. context variables), and in the child's 
goals (e.g. Intentions, motivation, etc.). What is more, we even have 
not yet any clear idea how the child is perceiving and interpreting 
his social environment, nor do we have any notion about the transfor­
mation rules necessary to transit fron behavioral intent to behavior, 
and what kind of planning precedes the actual behavior. 
Obviously, the above questions are fundamental to the understanding 
of social cognitive development. In the next chapter an additional 
article is presented which represents the first steps towards the 
formulation of a more encompassing research paradigm. Three major 
issues, discussed in this paper: the development of plans-of-action, 
the development of Interpersonal conflict perception, and the develop­
ment of interpersonal conflict resolution are at present under study, 
and will be investigated in the near future. 
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9 . MORAL JUDGMENT: THE INVTîSTIGATION OF AN UNI-
DIMENSIONAL OR MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT? 1 ) 
Abstract 
With the assistance of action theoretical principles a com-
parison is made between processes of perspective-coodination, 
action-conflict resolution, and moral thinking. It appears 
that the three theoretically distinct constructs are very 
similar and that they consist of identical sub-processes and 
mechanisms. Alternative, and apparently more crucial problens 
for the study of moral judgment development within the con-
text of action-conflict resolution and perspective-coordina-
tion are proposed and discussed. 
An increasing number of studies have been concerned with the relation-
ships between social-cognitive development, e.g. perspective-taking, 
in particular, and the development of moral judgment (cf. Ambron and 
Irwin, 1975; Damon, 1975; Harsh and Serafica, 1977), on the one hand, 
and the relationships between moral judgment, and cognitive develop-
ment, e.g. formal, operational development, in particular (cf. Damon, 
1975; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan, 1977), on the other hand. 
Moral judgment is here defined as "that domain having to do with norms 
regarding interpersonal interactions" (Kuhn et al., 1977, p. 137). As 
result of inadequate theoretical points of departure, assumptions 
about logical and causal relationships between the various abilities 
(Reinshagen, 1977), and the poorly devised and often incomparable 
assessment instruments for these abilities (Damon, 1977; Kurdek, 197Θ), 
neither a clear picture of, nor unequivocal data with regard to the 
relationships between these variables are available. 
Nevertheless, the above studies have led to some important assumptions 
(e.g. conclusions) with regard to the constructs of perspective-taking 
and moral judgment and the relationships between them. Thus Kurdek 
(197Θ) considers both perspective-taking and moral judgment to be 
multidimensional constructs. A thought shared by Keller (1976), 
Oppenheimer (1977a, c), and ürberg and Docherty (1976) for perspecti-
1) In L.H. Eckensberger (Hg.), Enttitiaklung dea Moraliachen Urteilens: 
Theory, Methoden, Praxis. Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlan-
des, 197Θ. 
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ve-taking, and by Reinshagen (1977) for moral judgment. The aasumption 
of the multiplicity of both constructs led Kurdak (1978) to state that 
"ultimately, we would like to answer the intriguing question to what 
dlmenaionts) of moral judgment ... are dimensions of perspective-
taking related" (p. 2Э) (the brackets axe mine). While Kurdak argues 
for a relationship between the two constructs by "viewing the relation­
ship between (mature) moral judgment and perspective taking in terms 
of a cormcm flexible balancing and coordinating cognitive activities" 
(p. 12) (the brackets are mine), Reinshagen (1977) carries this assump­
tion one step farther by the hypothesis that perspective-taking may be 
part of moral judgment. An even more Integrating definition Is given 
by Köhlberg (1969) who considers moral judgment to be a process of 
perspective-taking. Notwithstanding the above postulates both Piaget 
(1965) and Kohlberg (1969) view cognitive perspective-taking, that is, 
the ability to Infer the thoughts of other persons, as a prerequisite 
cognitive ability for moral judgments based on Intentions. The empi-
rical evidence with regard to the latter relationship is equivocal 
(cf. Kurdek, 197Θ). However, by postulating that moral judgment will 
be a process of perspective—taking the claim that perspective-taking 
will be a "necessary but not sufficient condition" for moral judgment, 
inherent in the structural developmental theory (cf. Köhlberg, 19691 
Selman and Damon, 1975), will be considerably restricted. 
In short, research with regard to the relationship between perspective-
taking and moral judgment has reached a point at which new theoretical 
Ideas and subsequent assessment procedures and Instruments have become 
necessary. 
According to Eckensberger (197Θ) the action theory may be such a new 
theoretical point of departure for a fruitful investigation of moral 
judgment development. Reinshagen (1977) postulates a number of prin­
ciples of action theoretical nature by which she succeeds In construc­
ting a model in which several interrelationships between cognitive, 
social cognitive, and moral judgment variables become visible. 
In order to understand Reinshagen's model a short treatment of action 
theory and its basic principles as she herself interpretes them will 
be usefull. The principles are based on the assumption that events 
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occurring in the world can be divided into events constituted by 
"physical* objects without an own consciousness or energy and events 
constituted by (human) subjects with a goal-directed energy. Subse­
quently, social cognitions, in contrast to physical cognitions, will 
have to refer to subjects, as well as to relations and interactions 
between then. A second implication freu the above is that subjects or 
people are judged and evaluated as potential actors. And that acts 
are marked as final events, that is they are executed by as individual 
with the aim to attain a certain goal: 
All acts have in cannon the character of being intended or 
willed. But one act is distinguishable from another by the 
content of it, the expected result of it, which is here 
spoken of as its Intent (Lewis, 1946, p. 367). 
This line of thought is continued by elaborating on the concept of 
action (i.e. Konzept der Handlung). The most salient features of an 
action are: first, that only people can act; second, that at the ba­
sis of every action there will be a goal) third, that the actor will 
want to attain this goal; and finally, that the actor will consider 
only those means and ways of action of which first, he is convinced 
that they will lead to the attainment of the goal and second, which 
are in agreement with his value, or norm system. This, In turn, leads 
Reinshagen (1977) to conclude that " the constituting aspect of an 
action ... will be the conscious anticipation of the action is a phzn-
0 f-action, that is the final integration between a positively evaluated 
goal and possible means-of-action and their effects (p. С 135). 
In other words, people will encounter, and interact with each other on 
bases of plans-of-action. Consequently, a proper interaction involves 
the Inference of the underlying goal of the interaction-partner from 
the behavior and intentions he will show. In addition to role-, or 
perspective-taking, the ability to infer the goal of a plan-of-action, 
—goal-taking, is proposed. 
1 think it necessary to clarify and thereby redefine or restrict the 
scope of the tem goal-taking. Within the paradigm for perspective-
taking development the thought has been developing that there do not 
exist separate perspective-taking operations for the different contents 
(e.g. visual, conceptual. Intentional, and emotional). This latter 
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suggestion of more than one perspective-taking operation was derived 
from the empirical result that there was no parallelism or correlation 
between for instance visual, cognitive, and emotional perspective-ta-
king developments. Recent studies, however, have shown that each con-
tent requires different information processing mechanisms (e.g. modali-
ties, or strategies of storage, retrieval, and encoding) (cf. Kurdek 
and Rodgon, 1975; Piché, Michlln, Rubin, and Johnson, 1975), characte-
rizing the multidlmensionality of the perspectiva-takisg operation. 
Therefore, goal-taking as a specific kind of intentional perspective-
taking, that is, the inference of a goal, or underlying intention-of-
an-action, will be subject to the sane developmental processes as the 
other types of perspective-taking. 
To prevent misunderstanding let me note that it is not my aim to reduce 
goal-taking to a mere sub-skill of intentional perspective-taking. 
Strictly speaking goal-taking is identical to intentional perspective-
taking and as such can be operationalized within an existing frame of 
research and reference. However, theoretically, goal-taking has to be 
understood in a broader sense than intentional perspective-taking as it 
includes elements of a goal, the means to reach such a goal and the 
effects caused by the subsequent actions which are tangible dérivâtes 
of the means. 
Returning to the previous discussion of the action theory, it is clear 
that people act with certain aims or goal which underly each act. The 
plan-of-action or action-scheme has thus to be put into operation. 
During its execution the environment may prevent its completion by 
counteracting either by causally determined physical obstacles, or by 
social (human) obstacles. While the former can be coped with or accep-
ted, the latter social obstacles are more subtle and cause (interperso-
nal) conflicts which have to be solved (Relnshagen, 1977, pp. С 136-
137). 
An additional type of conflict, —the intrapersonal conflict, which 
will not further be discussed, is worth mentioning. Besides the envi­
ronment as a potential obstacle in the course of the execution of a 
plan-of-action also the internal value, or norm system may prevent the 
execution of such a plan-of-action (see Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, 
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1960). The resulting conflict is clearly an intrapersonal one, which 
will require its own mode of resolution. 
The above Implies that to carry out an actlon-schone successfully, the 
individual will have to anticipate and Incorporate in his plan-of-action 
all possible obstacles that say occur during its execution. In fact, 
these obstacles represent the concrete or potential actions of another 
individual which are and may be incompatible with the own course of 
action. 
While Reinahagen does not elaborate this issue it seena that goal-taking 
will enable the individual to infer the goals-of-action of other per-
sons (i.e. whether their goals and subsequent plans-of-action will devi-
ate from, or conflict with the own goal and plan-of-action) and to take 
the products of the process of goal-taking into account in the own 
schme-of-action. The latter process is very similar to that of pers-
pective-coordination (Oppenheimer, 1977a, c) in which the product of 
the perspective-taking process is incorporated into the own perspective) 
on basis of this coordinating activity the interaction is initiated. 
Furthermore, Oppenheimer (1977c) notes that the ability to anticipate, 
that is "to foresee what will be the (re)actions of another person as 
result of one's own actions when carried out" (p. 6) will enhance the 
product of perspective-taking and subsequently of perspective-coordina-
tion. In nearly identical terms Reinshagen considers the incalculation 
and anticipation of concrete and potential plans-of-action which may 
conflict with the own plan-of-action as very important. 
To sumnarize, goal-taking can be regarded as a type of intentional 
perspective-taking, in particular concerned with the inference of the 
underlying goals or intentions of actions performed by (human) subjects. 
In order to attain a goal, a plan-of-action Is worked out in which 
ways and means to achieve the proposed goal, as well as, anticipation 
of counteractions by the environment and alternative ways to solve or 
avoid then are present. 
The development of moral judgment is a continuous process in which the 
child integrates discrepancies and conflicts between his own actions 
and evaluations and those of other persons, which lead to progressive-
ly more comprehensive, differentiated and equilibrated justice struc-
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tures (cf. Kur dek, 197Θ). Again perspectlve-taJting plays an essential 
role in both the determination of the discrepancies and in the possible 
resolution of the conflicts: 
Principles of justice or moral principles are thaaselves 
essentially principles of role-taking, i.e. they essenti­
ally state "act so as to take account of everyone's pers­
pective on the moral conflict situation (Mead, 1934)" ... 
moral development is fundamentally a process of the re­
structuring of modes of role-talcing (Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 
39Θ-399). 
The development of moral judgment can thus be regarded as a function of 
the resolution of conflicts between the own, and the other person's 
actions. In action theoretical terminology the latter development of 
moral judgment can be regarded as the resolution of discrepancies and 
conflicts between one's own goals and plans-of-action and those of an­
other person. Conflicts between plans-of-action, either actual or 
anticipated, may, but not necessarily have to, represent moral aon-
flicte. Furthermore, those social cognitive processes which are con­
cerned with the recognition, and resolution of conflicts between plans-
of -action again may be, but not necessarily have to be, contents of 
moral thinking (see Reinshagen, 1977, p. с 137). 
It is important to stress the point that not all conflicting plans-of-
action will constitute moral conflicts and also that all processes of 
conflict resolution will not necessarily be contents of moral thinking. 
In a later section of this paper I will return to these problems. 
A careful analysis of the above definitions from the point of view of 
perspective-coordination, action, and moral judgment theories results 
m the realization that there is no clear distinction between the 
processes of "perspective-coordination", e.g. the process by which two, 
or more perspectives are integrated so that an efficient interaction 
can take place, "action-conflict resolution", and "moral thinking". 
Moral thinking can then be regarded as a specific kind of perspective-
coordination, that is concerned with moral conflicts. In line with 
this thought moral judgment can be viewed as a process of perspective-
taking in a moral context (cf. Kohlberg, 1969; Hoir, 1974). Conside­
ring the above arguments, the claim that perspective-taking would be 
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a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral reasoning is now 
reduced to an empty device, indeed. Nevertheless, perspective-taking, 
and coordination activities in a moral context do not solely constitute 
aoral judgment and moral reasoning. The more so, as conflicting plans-
of-action do not per definition constitute moral conflicts. It is even 
a question whether young children will perceive of contradicting plans-
of-action as conflicts, not to say moral conflicta. 
From the above discussion with regard to the development of moral judg-
ment in the context of the action theory a research paradigm can be 
constructed in which a number of problems can be hlerachically ordered: 
The developnent of confliot perception. Although Piaget (1974) notes 
that contradictions are neither in the things, nor in the thoughts, but 
primarily in the actions, and inferences about them, he does not des-
cribís how children perceive these contradictions. The only criteria 
for the occurence of a conflict-experience have been the behavioral 
features of surprise, shock, and bewildeznent. Directly related to 
this problem is the following question: What га a oonflict?, that is, 
what elements form or constitute a conflict. The answer to this pro-
blaa is a crucial one for all theories based on the assumption that 
development is a result of conflict resolution (cf. Kohlberg, 1969j 
Strauss, 1972). Research in respect to the nature of a conflict, as 
well as to the development of conflict perception can be carried out 
in either the physical, or social domain. 
The development of the aonetruation of plana-of-aation. if we accept 
the basic assumption that at the basis of every action there will be a 
goal and that the actor will plan his course of action such that he 
will attain his goal, than we mist study the development of plans-of-
action before we will be able to discuss conflicting plans-of-action. 
It can, for Instance, be argued that the plans-of-action of young chil­
dren will be based for a great extent on external actions and their 
effects. That is, a plan-of-action along the criteria in the foregoing 
sections (e.g. with the inclusion of possible conflicting plans-of-
action or goals, the countermeasures that can be taken to prevent the 
execution of a plan-of-action, and the sub-plans to encounter these 
obstacles) will not be present by young children. The hypothesis that 
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can be constructed would then run as follows: by an Lncraaslng age the 
child will progressively Internalize his plan-of-action. In addition, 
the plan-of-action will become логе detailed as result of the develop­
ment of related abilities, like the ability to anticipate events which 
may be the result of the planned actions. The latter anticipatory 
ability will again be related to the development of concepts of causa­
lity (i.e. the comprehension of the cause-consequence, and the conse­
quence-cause relationship) (Oppenheimer, 1977c). 
Furthermore, a plan-of-action has to be flexible in order to enable 
modification, change, or relinquishment. It would be interesting to 
Investigate whether the extent of flexibility of a plan-of-action will 
be a function of development. 
The development of goal-taking. In order to determine whether the 
goals of another person are incompatible with his own goals, the child 
will have to be able to Infer the goal (i.e. goal-taking) of another 
person. Developmentally, it can be maintained that the lower levels 
of goal-taking will refer to inferences of intents from the observable 
behavior of a person (e.g. either in action or verbal): "He wants 
(i.e. intends) something". This topic of behavioral perspective-taking 
Is known to be present with children at a very early age (cf. DeVries, 
1970; Oppenheimer, 1977b; Scaife and Bruner, 1975). From the inferen­
ce product, —the realization that the other person Intents something, 
the child will have to infer the aim or goal from the successive 
actions performed by the other person. The thus found (hypothetical?) 
goal is then related to the means and ways used to attain this goal; 
from the integration of these informations the plan-of-action of the 
other person will be derived. The latter process of deduction, —from 
observable actions to the plan-of-action of another person, should 
have to reflect the child's capability to construct his own plan-of-
action . 
Related to the latter is the distinction between the child himself as 
an actor and the child as an observer of an action in a situation 
designed to investigate the development of goal-taking. With regard 
to this distinction Oppenheimer (1977b) noted an interesting phenome­
non. As result of an analysis of eight emotional perspective-taking 
tasks it was found that the tasks clustered into two groups. The 
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distinguishing variable was the role of the child in each task. In one 
group of tasks the child was clearly personally involved in the pers-
pective-taking process, while in the other group of tasks he was a 
passive observer in this processi the first group of tasks reached a 
100% correct score at the age of approximately 7 years, while the lat-
ter group of tasks reached a 50% correct score at the age of about 11-
12 years. No other variable like for instance memory load, could ac-
count for this difference. The level of perspective-taking development 
required for each task was nearly identical (i.e. non-mutual perspecti-
ve-taking) . Such a finding points to the fact that when the child is 
personally involved in an interaction he may be able to infer the 
underlying intentions or goals of an action significantly earlier in 
his development than when he observes (inter)acting people. In the 
latter case he is then required, without consequences for himself, to 
infer the goals underlying these actions. Thus the role of the child 
in the tasks we present him may lead to a significant difference in 
his performance. As a consequence, goal-taking development can be 
best investigated in task-settings in which the child himself is Invol-
ved. However, in a second study, comparing the ability to think about 
the thoughts of other people and about their own thoughts by children 
at different age levels. Oppenheimer and Belsma (in preperation) sho-
wed that the latter ability (e.g. thinking about the own thoughts) 
lagged significantly behind the ability to think about the thoughts of 
other people. This result would suggest that experience, i.e. the 
amount of observation and exercize with regard to thinking about the 
thoughts of other persons, is necessary in order to reflect success-
fully about the own thoughts. Similarly, it could be argued that ex-
perience with the plans-of-aciton of other persons, i.e. interaction, 
will be required by the child to enable him to construct his own plans-
of-action.. 
Conflictirui pUms-of-aetion and conflict resolution. One person may 
have two plans-of-action which may be incompatible. Similarly, the 
1) An alternative interpretation of these empirical data is that whi-
le involvement accelerates performance, additional time is requi-
red to enable correct conceptualization (i.e. verbalization) 
(Robert Jan Simons, oersonal ccninunication). 
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plans-of-action of two persons nay be Incompatible. According to 
Miller et al. (1960): "the discovery that two Plans are incompatible 
may require great intelligence" (p. 97). The awareness that two plans-
of-action are conflicting may result in: 
a. either the abondonment of the goal and subsequent plan« or the con­
struction of a new plan-of-action based on changes in the internal 
representation of the external world, while the original goal is 
maintained. 
b. modifications of the plan so as to reduce the conflict to a minimum 
or to avoid it. 
с maintenance and execution of the plan in its original form even, if 
necessary, with force. 
An additional topic for investigation would then be the course of 
action taken to resolve such a conflict. Especially the latter alter­
native, that is, if no relinquishment or modification of a plan-of-
action is possible, could be an Interesting subject for study. As 
Miller et al. (1960) state: "The problem of conflicting Plans is most 
difficult when the two Plans are quite pervasive and the total aban­
donment of either one of than is impossible'' (p. 97). 
One type of studies investigating the resolution strategies for the 
above types of conflicting plans and goals can be found by Shure and 
Spivack (1972). The latter authors assessed means-end thinking in 
terms of the "ability to construct a story plot that reflects planning, 
awareness of potential obstacles, and recognition of time necessary to 
reach a stated goal" (p. 348). 
The development of moral conflict perception. That is, when does a 
child perceive a conflict between plans-of-action as a moral conflict, 
or when and how does a child judge an action, either his own or that 
of another person, in moral terms. An additional question that can be 
posed in relation to the above development is "how do concepts of moral 
norms or norms in general (i.e. institutional or societal) develop?" 
In recent studies children were always presented with a conflict about 
which questions were asked in moral terms.(cf. Selman and Damon, 1975, 
p. 63: the footnote). However, this type of research does not give 
us any insight into the types of situations which will be perceived аз 
moral conflict situations and judged as such, in particular in respect 
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to everyday situations. 
Th· aia of the present paper has been to reformulate problems within 
the field of moral judgment development. In the course of the enumera­
tion of research topics in the above order, the role of morality became 
a minor one. The latter minor role can be regarded as a result of the 
numerous more fundamental problems that have to be resolved before we 
will be able to investigate the development of moral judgment, without 
running the risk that we are investigating quite different phenomena. 
In addition, as principles brought forward by the action theory formed 
the basis for the above reformulation, I would like to regard this 
paper also as a specification of several of the ideas presented by 
Reinshagen (1977). 
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Summary 
The ability to place oneself in the position of another Individual and 
thereby to infer the subjective perspective of the other concerning a 
certain issue is referred to as the social cognitive ability of pers-
pective-taking. The process of perspective-taJcing then leads to a 
mental representation of the thoughts, visual experiences (i.e. per-
cepts) , emotions, or intentions of the other person. The majority of 
research concerning the perspective-taking ability has centered upon 
developmental differences in the type of representation obtained (e.g. 
egocentric vs non-egocentric, stereotypical vs non-stereotypical, 
etc.) as a function of age. This kind of investigation has led to the 
construction of numerous structural developmental sequences for the 
perspective-taking ability. Bowever, still little is known about the 
actual inferential processes occurring during perspective-taking, and 
about the cognitive variables which are affecting or necessary for 
the development of the perspective-taking ability. 
In the first two chapters of the present study (chapter 2 and 3), li-
terature reporting on studies with regard to the processing abilities 
of social perspectives, and perspective-taking, in particular, are 
reviewed and discussed. Subsequent analyses led to the postulation 
of a cognitive model for the development of the processing abilities 
of social perspectives, as well as for the process of perspective-
taking at any given moment during an interaction. With this model as 
point of departure a number of cognitive abilities are proposed which, 
on basis of the available literature, could be hypothesized to affect 
the development of the processing abilities. The proposed variables 
are (a) the ability of recursive thinking, that is the ability to con-
ceptualize thought structures of other people, (b) the ability of 
mental imagery, (c) the concept of psychological causality, that is 
the comprehension of the causal relations between individuals, (d) 
anticipatory abilities in social situations, and (e) concepts about 
people, that is how and why people act and react in certain ways in 
specific social situations (i.e. interactions). 
In chapter 4 the development of the ability to infer the position of 
a person in relation to a display, given his visual experience, was 
investigated and compared to the ability to infer the visual experien-
ce (i.e. the visual perspective) of another person, given his position 
in relation to a display. The results showed both inferential proces-
ses to be similar both in their patterns of correct scores and laten-
cies and to develop simultaneously. The data indicate that in both 
processes use is made of systonatic reversals of left-right and neai-
far relationships between the objects in the display. No apparent 
relation was found between the development of mental imagery (i.e. 
product imagery) and the ability of position-taking. 
The ability to conceptualize thought structures (i.e. recursive think-
ing) was intensively studied by five successive experiments reported 
in chapter 5. All studies point to the existence of one sequence for 
the conceptual operations running from the ability to conceptualize 
thoughts about contiguous people, then thoughts about interactions 
between people, followed by one-loop, and finally, two-loop recursive 
thinking, in the respective order. The reduction of the verbal pro-
duction requirements of the task led to the conclusion that the COQ-
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prehension of thought structures precedes the ability to verbalize the 
same structures by approximately two years. The development of the 
self-concept or self-consciousness seemed to influence the performance 
on the recursive thinking task negatively. The development of the 
self-concept apparently interfered with the child' ability to identify 
himself with the cartoon figure used in the pictures. As result of an 
elaboration of the action thinJcing component (i.e. thinking about in­
teracting people), by the addition of interactions between individuals 
and objects, and (inter)actions between objects besides the already 
present interactions between only individuals, an additional sequence 
of conceptualization of thought structures was found. It appeared that 
children are first able to conceptualize thoughts about interacting 
people« then thoughts about interactions between individuals and ob­
jects, and finally, thoughts about (inter)actions between objects. 
In chapter 6, a validation study of an instrument for the assessment 
of the development of anotional perspective-taking is reported. One 
of the tasks within the instrument was found not only to be situated 
along the hypothesized dimension of decentration. Additional non­
linear scalogram analyses confirmed this finding. As result, an in­
strument consisting of three tasks was formed. 
The relation between the development of recursive thinking and emotio­
nal, and conceptual perspective-taking was explored in first, a corre­
lational, and second, a training study for recursive thinking. Both 
studies are reported in chapter 7. The results indicate the existence 
of a possible causal relationship between at least one—loop recursive 
thinking and the development of perspective-taking. Conform the hy­
pothesis one-loop recursive thinking was found to be one of the essen­
tial abilities in order to expose the inner, psychological perspecti­
ves of another individual. 
In chapter β, an evaluation of the presented research and theory is 
offered with additional suggestions for future research and an over­
view of the research that is presently carried out. 
In chapter 9, the first initial steps to a further elaboration of the 
theoretical constructs and a specification of several fundamental 
research questions inherent in the new research paradigm are presen­
ted. 
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Samenvatting 
Da vaardigheid om zich in het standpunt van een ander te verplaatsen en 
daarmee het subjektieva perapektief van de ander t.o.v. een bepaald on-
derwerp af te leiden wordt de sociaal kognitieve vaardigheid van rol-
neaen of perspektief-nemen genoemd. Het perspektief-neem proces leidt 
dan tot een mentale representatie of weergave van de gedachten, visuele 
ervaringen (d.i. waarnemingen), gevoelens, of intenties van de ander. 
Bet grootste gedeelte van het onderzoek m.b.t. de perspektief-neem 
vaardigheid heeft zich toegespitst op ontwikkelingsmatige verschillen 
in de verkregen representatie als een funktie van leeftijd (bijv. ego-
centrische t.o.v. niet egocentrische weergaven of stereotype t.o.v. 
niet stereotype weergaven). Dit type onderzoek heeft geleid tot de 
formulering van een groot aantal strukturele ontwikkelingssekwenties 
voor de perspektief-neem vaardigheid. Desondanks is er nog maar weinig 
bekend over de feitelijke afleidingsprocessen die plaats vinden tijdens 
het perspektief-nemen en welke kognitieve variabelen deze processen be-
ïnvloeden of het mogelijk maken dat za zich ontwikkelen. 
In de eerste twee hoofdstukken (hoofdstukken 2 en 3) van de huidige 
studie wordt een overzicht gegeven van de literatuur m.b.t. onderzoek 
naar da verwerkingsvaardigheden van sociale perspaktieven. Tevens 
werd deze literatuur besproken. Daarop volgende analyses leidden tot 
het postuleren van een kognitief model voor de ontwikkeling van de ver-
werkingsvaardigheden van sociale perspektieven enerzijds, en het pro-
ces van perspektief-nemen op een bepaald moment tijdens een interaktie, 
anderzijds. Het dit model als uitgangspunt worden dan een aantal kog-
nitieve vaardigheden voorgesteld die, op grond van de aanwezige litera-
tuur, kunnen worden verondersteld de ontwikkeling van de verwerkings-
vaardigheden te beïnvloeden. De voorgestelde variabelen zijn (a) de 
vaardigheid van rekursief denken, d.w.z. de vaardigheid om denkstruktu-
ren van andere mensen te konceptualizeren,(b) de vaardigheid mentale 
voorstellingen te kunnen vormen, (c) het koncept van psychologische 
kausaliteit, d.w.z. begrip over de kausale relaties tussen mensen, (d) 
anticiperende vaardigheden in sociale situaties, en (e) koncepten over 
mensen, d.w.z. kennis m.b.t. het hoe en waarom mensen op bepaalde ma-
nieren handelen en reageren in specifieke situaties (d.i. interakties). 
In hoofdstuk 4 werd de ontwikkeling van de vaardigheid om de positie 
van een ander individu t.o.v. een groep Objekten af te leiden, gegeven 
zijn visuele ervaring, onderzocht en vergeleken met de vaardigheid om 
de visuele ervaring (d.i. het visuele perspektief) van een ander af te 
leiden, gegeven zijn positie t.o.v. dezelfde groep Objekten. De resul-
taten wezen uit dat beide inferentie processen identiek zijn. Zowel 
het verloop van de skores als die van de latentietijden waren gelijk. 
Beide processen blijken gebruik te maken van systematische omkeringen 
van de links-rechts en dichtbij-ver weg verhoudingen tussen de Objek-
ten. Er bleek geen relatie aanwezig te zijn tussen de ontwikkeling 
van mentale voorstellingen (d.i. produkt-voorstellingen) en de vaardig-
heid van positie-nonen. 
De vaardigheid om denkstrukturen te konceptualizeren (d.i. rekursief 
denken) werd uitgebreid onderzocht in vijf opeenvolgende studies die in 
hoofdstuk 5 werden gerapporteerd. Alle studies duiden op het bestaan 
van één vaste volgorde voor de konceptuele operaties. Zo verschijnt 
de vaardigheid om gedachten over individuele, niet interakterende men-
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san (d.i. kontlgu denken) te konceptualizeren als eerste, gevolgd door 
de vaardigheden om gedachten over interakterende nensen (aktle denken), 
gedachten over gedachten (een-loop lekursief denken), en gedachten over 
gedachten over gedachten (twee-loop rekursief denken) te konceptualize-
ren. Vermindering van de verbale produktle-elsen van de taak leidde 
tot de konkluaie dat het begrip van denkstrukturen zich ongeveer twee 
jaar eerder ontwikkelt dan de vaardigheid dezelfde strukturen te kunnen 
bevoordan. De ontwikkeling van het zelf-koncept of zelf-bewuetzijn 
scheen de prestatie of de taak voor rekursief denken negatief te beïn-
vloeden. Ogenschijnlijk stoort de ontwikkeling van het zelf-koncept de 
vaardigheid van het kind zich te identificeren met de strip-figuur op 
de plaatjes in deze taak. Als resultaat van een uitbreiding van de 
komponent voor aktle denken, door toevoeging van interakties tussen 
mensen en Objekten en (inter)akties tussen Objekten, naast de reeds 
aanwezige interakties tussen mensen, werd een aanvullende setcwentie 
voor de konceptualizering van denkstrukturen gevonden. Het bleek dat 
kinderen in eerste instantie in staat zijn de gedachten over interakte-
rende mensen te konceptualizeren, dan interakties tussen mensen en Ob-
jekten, en als laatste (inter)aktles tussen Objekten. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een validatie studie van een Instrument voor de 
vaststelling van ontwlkkelingsnivo's voor ootioneel perspektief-nemen 
beschreven. Een van de taken van dit instrument bleek niet allen af-
hankelijk te zijn van het nlvo van decentxatie zoals gehypothetiseerd. 
Een additionele nlet-llneaire scalogram analyse bevestigde dit resul-
taat. Op grond van des· bevindingen werd een instrument gevormd be-
staande uit drie taken. 
De relatie tussen de ontwikkeling van rekursief denken en emotioneel, 
en konceptueel perspektlef-noien werd nagegaan in zowel een korrelatio-
nele studie als ook in een trainingsstudie voor rekursief denken, wel-
ke in hoofdstuk 7 worden gerapporteerd. De resultaten duiden op het 
bestaan van een mogelijk kausale relatie tussen tenminste één-loop re-
kursief denken en de ontwikkeling van perspektief-nemen. In overeen-
stamning met de hypothese bleek één-loop rekursief denken een belang-
rijke vaardigheid te zijn om de afleiding van. de interne, psychologi-
sche perspektleven van een ander individu mogelijk te maken. 
In hoofdstuk β werd een evaluatie van het gepresenteerd onderzoek ge­
geven met additionele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek en een over­
zicht van het onderzoek dat momenteel in uitvoering is. 
In hoofdstuk 9 werd een eerste aanzet aangeboden voor verder uitwerking 
van de theoretisch konstzukten en de hieraan verbonden fundamentele on­
derzoeksvraagstallingen. 
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STELLINGEN
De stimulering van de bekwaamheid zich te kunnen verplaatsen in het 
standpunt van anderen leidt tot een afname van vooroordelen en een 
in sociaal opzicht betere maatschappij.
De eigenlijke betekenis van socialisme zou een uitdrukking moeten 
zijn van een optimale bekwaamheid tot perspektief-nemen van alle 
individuen in een bepaalde maatschappij.
Interpersoonlijke of relationele problemen zijn onder meer het 
resultaat van een gebrekkige ontwikkeling in de bekwaamheid zich 
te kunnen verplaatsen in het standjwnt van de ander en het niet 
kunnen verwoorden van het eigen perspektief.
De verhouding tussen de mate waarin volwassenen zich moeten 
verplaatsen in het standpunt van het kind en de mate waarin 
zij verwachten van kinderen dat dezen zich verplaatsen in de 
positie van de volwassenen valt niet uit ten gunste van het kind.
De maatschappelijke onderwaardering van de positie van de vrouw 
berust enerzijds op een taboe voor mannen zich te kunnen verplaatsen 
in de positie van de vrouw en anderzijds op het niet kunnen 
verdiskonteren van het verkregen perspektief.
Een noodzakelijke maar niet voldoende voorwaarde om de maatschap­
pelijke ongelijkheid tussen man en vrouw op te heffen is dat zij 
zich verplaatsen in eikaars standpunten.
7. Een belangrijk onderdeel van het gedrag van aajci*pciliticus vormt 
ten onrechte het kleineren, negeren en ridikuliseren van het 
perspektief van de ander.
8. Goed beleid is een weergave van een koordinatie van perspektieven 
van belanghebbenden.
9. De vraag wie van de twee, -Begin of Sadat-, zich het best kon en 
kan verplaatsen in de positie van de ander zal een intrigerende 
vraag voor politici en historici blijven.
10. Bovenstaande stellingen wijzen op het feit dat de ontwikkeling 
van sociale kognitie, en met name de bekwaamheid zich te kunnen 
verplaatsen in de positie of het standpunt van de ander, een 
belangrijke rol speelt in het mensenlijk doen en laten.
11. Bevallen is een heel gewone zaak en toch zo bijzonder.
(Nettie in: Hoe bevallen ziekenhuizen).
12. De toenemende realizering dat de mens een autonoom handelend en 
beslissend wezen is kost tot uiting in emancipatiebewegingen.
r " ’. t413. Glijdende poffertjes ritselen in de maag.
(Miohal).
Louis Oppenheimer Nijmegen, 1978.


